Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Alford v. Defense Intelligence Agency

United States District Court, District of Columbia

December 12, 2012

Leroy ALFORD, Plaintiff,
v.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Defendant.

Page 165

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Page 166

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Page 167

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Page 168

Leroy Alford, Temple Hills, MD, pro se.

Benton Gregory Peterson, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES E. BOASBERG, District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Leroy Alford worked as a management analyst for Defendant Defense Intelligence Agency. After being terminated from his position and subsequently reinstated, he alleges that the Agency repeatedly retaliated against him. He then filed this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), and other federal statutes. DIA now moves for summary judgment on the six remaining counts of Plaintiff's Complaint, asserting that his claimed instances of retaliation were not materially adverse employment actions and that, even if they were, Alford has not shown that the Agency's asserted reasons were in fact pretexts for unlawful retaliation. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the remaining counts, it will grant Defendant's motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff began his employment with DIA on June 26, 2006, as Deputy Chief of the Force Structure Management and Compensation Office (FE-3). See Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (SUMF), ¶¶ 13-14. He was terminated on September 29, 2007, for unsatisfactory performance. Id., ¶¶ 22, 26. Because Plaintiff had been employed for less than the Agency's two-year probationary period, he was not given procedural due process. Id., ¶¶ 23-24. Plaintiff then contacted an EEO Counselor and also appealed his termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board. Id., ¶¶ 27-28. He was subsequently reinstated by the Agency on April 9, 2008. Id., ¶ 32. Plaintiff alleges that he was then subjected to numerous forms of retaliation for having filed his EEO and MSPB complaints. See Compl. at 9-11. In April 2010, Alford filed this lawsuit.

DIA moved to dismiss the case or, in the alternative, for summary judgment in September 2010. Plaintiff then responded by moving for a continuance to conduct discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). After the case was transferred to this judge, the Court granted Defendant's motion in part and denied it in part. See Memorandum Opinion and Order of October 24, 2011 (ECF No. 22). The Court dismissed Plaintiff's non-Title VII claims as well as his discrimination-based Title VII claims, but granted Plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion as to his Title VII retaliation claims. Id.

Page 169

After discovery, DIA brought this Motion for Summary Judgment as to each of Plaintiff's remaining causes of action, which the Court now considers.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment may be granted if " the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006). A fact is " material" if it is capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895; Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute is " genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007); Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. " A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A).

The party seeking summary judgment " bears the heavy burden of establishing that the merits of his case are so clear that expedited action is justified." Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C.Cir.1987). When a motion for summary judgment is under consideration, " the evidence of the non-movant[s] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [his] favor." Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Mastro v. PEPCO, 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C.Cir.2006); Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1998) ( en banc ). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must " eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C.Cir.2007).

The nonmoving party's opposition, however, must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmovant is required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1987). If the nonmovant's evidence ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.