United States District Court, District of Columbia
Shewaferaw S. Shibeshi, Mifflin, PA, pro se.
Jeffrey Earl Warner, U.S. Attorney's Office, Patricia Ann Oxendine, Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, Marilyn Richter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants.
JAMES E. BOASBERG, District Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff Shewaferaw Shibeshi, a frequent litigant in assorted federal and state courts, has filed this opaque suit against 21 Defendants, including a dozen federal judges who have ruled against him in previous cases. Having already granted four separate motions to dismiss brought by seven other Defendants, see ECF Nos. 35, 46, 52, 54, the Court now grants the federal judges' and the United States of America's combined Motion to Dismiss.
A centerpiece of the many grievances embodied in Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint is his unhappiness with the numerous federal judges who have ruled against him in previous frivolous lawsuits. Plaintiff claims, for example, that assorted courts have " entered in their orders multitude of misrepresentations and omissions in factual findings and applications of laws." Fourth Am. Compl., ¶ 5. Indeed, one federal court " declared that the litigation of Plaintiff is malicious and frivolous." Id., ¶ 9. In his so-called " Addendum A," he goes into great detail about the errors each court made in his cases. See Fourth Am. Compl., Addendum A.
His allegations against the United States are as vague as his catalog of errors by federal judges is detailed. He alleges only that the Department of Homeland Security " required Plaintiff to meet certain economic standards (property ownership and money) in order to enter or stay in the United States to pursue his legal cause of actions. [DHS] ignored that Plaintiff's situation creates fundamental rights protection duty upon the United States [ sic ]." Fourth Am. Compl., ¶ 10. In addition, he claims that " [l]etters sent to [DHS] on August 16 and September 30, 2011 to get visa to enter or extend stay in the United States to initiate lawsuits, conduct discovery and attend trial proceedings without requirement of economic standards were ignored. Consequently, Plaintiff unwillingly remained in legally and economically inferior status in the United States to avoid imminent obstacle for reentry." Id., ¶ 11. Such governmental actions allegedly violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Id., ¶¶ 25-30.
II. Legal Standard
In evaluating Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court must " treat the complaint's factual allegations as true ... and must grant plaintiff ‘ the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’ " Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C.Cir.2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979)) (internal citation omitted); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C.Cir.2005). This standard governs the Court's considerations of a defendant's motions under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (" in passing on a motion to dismiss,
whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader" ); Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 925-26 (D.C.Cir.1984) (same). The Court need not accept as true, however, " a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As Plaintiff's claims against the twelve federal judges all stem from acts committed entirely within the course of their judicial duties, the judges are, as a matter of law, afforded the protection of judicial immunity. " Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). One purpose of the doctrine is to " protect [ ] judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants," Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (citation omitted)— precisely the case here. As a result, " judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (citation omitted). Such immunity ...