United States District Court, District of Columbia
William I. DUDLEY, Jr., Plaintiff,
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.
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Jerry Robert Goldstein, Bulman, Dunie, Burke & Feld, Chartered, Bethesda, MD, for Plaintiff.
Kathleen Ann Carey, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff William Dudley, Jr. has worked as a Sign and Shelter Mechanic for defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (" WMATA" ) for over two decades. Dudley brings this Title VII discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation suit, alleging that his supervisors routinely gave White employees special treatment and singled out Black employees for harsh criticism and unfair punishment. In particular, Dudley claims that while White employees frequently flouted WMATA's attendance policy without repercussion, supervisors strictly enforced the policy against African Americans. Dudley avers that, after complaining about racial discrimination, he became the target of disrespect, condescension, baseless write-ups and suspensions, and retaliatory work assignments.
Before the Court is defendant WMATA's Motion for Summary Judgment, July 31, 2012, ECF No. 14. Upon consideration of the defendant's motion, the plaintiff's Opposition, Sept. 10, 2012, ECF No. 19, the defendant's Reply thereto, Oct. 22, 2012, ECF No. 33, and the record herein, the Court will grant defendant's motion and dismiss the action with prejudice.
William Dudley, Jr. has worked for WMATA since November 1989, and has held the position of Sign and Shelter Mechanic AA since 1999. Affidavit of William I. Dudley, Jr. (" Dudley Aff." ) ¶ 1, Sept. 6, 2012, ECF No. 19-4; Def.'s Statement of Material Facts not in Dispute (" Def.'s SMF" ) ¶ 1, July 31, 2012, ECF No. 14; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts in Dispute (" Pl.'s SMF" ) 10, Sept. 10, 2012, ECF No. 19-1 (not disputing Def.'s SMF ¶ 1). Dudley is responsible for repairing and replacing bus stop signs and shelters. Dudley Aff. ¶ 1.
Dudley is African American. From 2005 to approximately February 2008, James Lacey, a Caucasian, held the title of Bus Maintenance Supervisor and supervised Dudley. Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 1-3; Pl.'s SMF 10 (not disputing Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 1-3). In February 2008, WMATA transferred responsibility for the Sign and Shelter Shop— where Dudley worked— from Bus Maintenance to Bus Planning. Since then, Scottie Borders, an African American Senior Program Manager for Bus Planning, has supervised Dudley. Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 3-4; Pl.'s SMF 10 (not disputing Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 3-4).
Dudley's Complaint alleges a series of instances of alleged discriminatory and retaliatory events that took place between June 2007 and May 2011. Compl. ¶¶ 6-18, Aug. 8, 2011, ECF No. 1. The Complaint asserts race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Compl. ¶¶ 21-26.
A. Mr. Dudley's June 2007 One Day Suspension for Violating WMATA's Attendance Policy
The WMATA Bus Services Employee's Handbook establishes a policy by which
WMATA may discipline employees for repeatedly reporting to work late. Ex. 5 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (excerpts of Bus Services Employee's Handbook). Employees who arrive late or out of uniform, or who fail to report at all, are assessed " points" in their record for each incident. Id. For late reports under twenty minutes, employees receive one point. Employees who fail to report receive four points. WMATA issues a one-day suspension for employees who accumulate eight points within one 365-day period. Id. Management does not assess any points for two late arrivals under twenty minutes; therefore, an employee who WMATA suspends under the policy has actually arrived late ten times in one year.
Between July 31, 2006, and June 16, 2007, Dudley arrived late to work ten times. Ex. 6 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (Record of Disciplinary Action for Unscheduled Absences). Lacey did not assess any points for two of Dudley's late reports; on June 16, 2007, Dudley accumulated eight points. Id. Pursuant to WMATA policy, Lacey suspended Dudley for one day, which Dudley served on June 18, 2007. Ex. 6 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J.
After meeting with the WMATA Office of Civil Rights, Ex. 9 to Pl.'s Opp'n, Dudley completed an EEOC Intake Questionnaire on November 6, 2007, Ex. 10 to Pl.'s Opp'n. In the Questionnaire, Dudley alleged that Lacey discriminatorily enforced the attendance policy and that his one-day suspension was the result of racial discrimination. Ex. 10 to Pl.'s Opp'n. Dudley also stated, " I also feel that the comments and actions by (Lacey) management has created an intimidating, offensive, stressfull [ sic ], and hostile working environment for me." Id.
On January 7, 2008, Dudley signed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination, stating that he was " unjustly issued a disciplinary write up for violating [WMATA]'s policies" on June 16, 2007, and later on August 31, 2007, " was suspended from employment for violating [WMATA]'s policies." Ex. 11 to Pl.'s Opp'n. Dudley stated, " I believe that I was discriminated against based upon my race, Black, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended." Id. The charge stated the earliest date of the discrimination was on " 06-16-2007," and the latest on " 08-31-2007." Id. Dudley did not check the form's " Continuing Action" box. Id. The EEOC sent Dudley a Right to Sue Notice on May 17, 2011. Dudley Aff. ¶ 22.
B. Claims of Harsh Treatment Following EEOC Charge
Dudley alleges that after he filed his EEOC Charge, Lacey and other management officials began to treat him more harshly. Dudley states that " Lacey regularly spoke to me in a derogatory and condescending manner at morning ‘ toolbox’ meetings where he gave out assignments to the employees, he gave me what I believed were retaliatory job assignments, singled me out for criticism, used intimidating language towards me, constantly harassed me, and wrote false statements about my work." Dudley Aff. ¶ 8.
In particular, Dudley alleges that in " July 2008 Lacey gave me a verbal warning for parking my personal vehicle in the Bus II parking lot behind the shop and transferring my tools between my personal vehicle and my work truck, even though all the Sign and Shelter Mechanics who are assigned a company vehicle do the same thing on a daily basis and Lacey did not reprimand other employees." Id. ¶ 9.
C. Co-Worker Peter White's July 2008 Incident
On July 19, 2008, Dudley claims that he was the victim of unwarranted and unprovoked
threats from Peter White, a Caribbean-Black co-worker. Dudley Aff. ¶ 10. When Lacey initially investigated the incident, he described it as " unprofessional behavior between co-workers," which Dudley took to suggest that he was " at fault as well as White." Id.; see also Ex. 13 to Pl.'s Opp'n. After supervisors completed the investigation, Lacey gave White a written reprimand and referred him to attend a Workplace Violence Awareness Class. Ex. 12 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Lacey did not discipline Dudley for his incident. Id. White later filed a grievance, and WMATA agreed to remove " all paper work and material related to th[e] grievance ... from all the employee personnel files." Ex. 13 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J.
D. Mr. Dudley's June 2009 Written Reprimand for Unprofessional Behavior
On June 24, 2009, Lacey completed an investigation of a verbal disagreement between Dudley and his co-worker, Kehinde Ogundiran. Dudley asserts that he made an innocuous comment about meeting Ogundiran's sister-in-law, to which Ogundiran responded angrily. Ex. 15 to Pl.'s Opp'n. Dudley characterizes Lacey's report as a write up " for unprofessional behavior among co-workers," see Pl.'s Opp'n 5, but WMATA insists that Lacey did not discipline either employee, see Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 8. Dudley filed a grievance requesting that WMATA remove the investigation report from his personnel file, worried about it being used for future discipline. Ex. 24 to Pl.'s Opp'n. Lacey denied this grievance, Ex. 16 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., and Dudley did not request further review.
E. Mr. Dudley's July 2009 Written Reprimand for Poor Work Performance/Insubordination
On July 24, 2009, Lacey assigned Dudley and a co-worker to work on a sign that was down, but Dudley claims that when the men arrived they could not do the work because they did not have the proper tools with them. Dudley Aff. ¶ 12. Dudley says that he secured the sign and moved on to higher priority assignments. Dudley alleges that on July 29, 2009, his co-worker was absent, and he went to Lacey's office to ask for help; after waiting three hours for Lacey to speak with him, he left to complete other jobs. The next day, Dudley again asked for help, and Lacey assigned Damien Wood to assist him. When the men arrived at the location of the down sign, Dudley claims that a maintenance man had disposed of the sign, and that he and Wood did not have that kind of sign with them in their truck. Id.
On July 31, 2009, Lacey asked Dudley to explain why, a week later, the down sign still had not been fixed. The parties disagree on how this conversation went. Dudley asserts:
Lacey began berating me for not completing the job the previous day and refused to listen to my explanation or talk to anyone else about why the work had not been completed. Lacey told me that I was to go out with William Arrington and get the job done that day. As I started to leave and Arrington came into the office, Lacey yelled at me in Arrington's presence to " stand right there and listen to me" as if I were a child. I was angry and embarrassed and walked to the restroom to avoid a verbal confrontation. Lacey, however, continued yelling at me to " come back here" and " we're going to the Superintendent's Office."
Dudley Aff. ¶ 12. WMATA's version of the events is different:
Mr. Dudley became verbally combative, walked away, and refused Mr. Lacey's
direction to report to Superintendent Joseph Royer and explain why he left the job undone. Based upon Plaintiff's behavior, Mr. Lacey ordered him to report for a drug and alcohol test. In preparing the report regarding the incident, Mr. Lacey originally referred to it as " poor work performance." However, after consulting with the Superintendent, the matter was documented as " insubordination." Mr. Dudley received a written reprimand, but was not suspended.
Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 8-9; see also Exs. 17-23 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (supporting evidence for this version of the events). Dudley claims, " Lacey changed the writeup of Dudley to ‘ insubordination’ because Lacey was told that it was improper to send an employee for drug and alcohol testing based upon an allegation of ‘ poor job performance.’ " Pl.'s Opp'n 6.
F. Mr. Lacey's July/September 2009 Order that Mr. Dudley Finish Installing a Bus Stop Previously Assigned to Another Employee
In June and September 2009, Lacey assigned Dudley to complete work left unfinished by another employee. Each time, Dudley complained that he should not have to do the job of other employees, and that the other employee should have been disciplined for not completing the job. Exs. 17, 21 to Pl.'s Opp'n. He filed grievances, stating that he thought these work assignments were retaliatory and evidence of discrimination. Id. WMATA denied these grievances, and Dudley did not pursue the matter any further.
G. Mr. Dudley's Attempt in September 2009 to Review his Personnel File
On September 3, 2009, Dudley sought to review his personnel file. Acting Superintendent Joseph Royer said he would allow Dudley to review the prior year of his personnel file, but Dudley refused this offer. See Exs. 42-43 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J.; Dudley Aff. ¶ 15. Dudley filed a grievance— which Royer denied— and Dudley did not pursue the matter any further. Exs. 42-43 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J.
H. The Fall 2009 Toolbox Meeting and the " Tap Dance" Comment
In Fall 2009, at a morning ‘ toolbox’ meeting, Lacey asked an African American employee if he wanted to " do a tap dance" for the group. Lacey claims he made the statement because the Black employee was fidgeting, and did not understand its racial implications. Ex. 24 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. After the meeting, several Black employees complained and informed Lacey that his comments were racially insensitive. That morning, Lacey reconvened a meeting and apologized for his comments. Dudley was not present at the meeting where Lacey made the original comment, but he was present at the meeting where Lacey apologized. Id.
I. Mr. Dudley's December 2009 " Constructive Demotion" and Referral to the Employee Assistance Program
In December 2009, WMATA instituted a bus route change in Silver Spring, Maryland. During the time WMATA undertook this project, Dudley missed five days of
work on sick leave. He was absent on December 14, and when he returned to work on the 15th, he was assigned to assist Dante Proctor and did not lead the work that day. Proctor does not typically work in the Sign and Shelter Shop, but he was present the day before. Dudley was again on sick leave from December 16 through December 21. See Exs. 25-30 to Def.'s Mot. Summ J. (evidentiary documents). When Dudley returned on the 22nd, he was again assigned to assist Proctor. WMATA asserts that it assigned Dudley to assist because " Proctor knew of the status of the service change." Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 10. Dudley argues that since " this was [his] regular job, [ ] he didn't need to be ‘ brought up to speed’ on assignments that are routinely assigned each day." Pl.'s Opp'n 7; see also Dudley Aff. ¶ 16.
Dudley " felt that [he] had been effectively demoted and humiliated in front of [his] coworkers and subsequently went to the WMATA Office of Civil Rights to file a retaliation claim about it and the other acts of harassment by Lacey, but ... Devin Walker refused to take these claims." Dudley Aff. ¶ 17.  Dudley admits he " was upset" when meeting with Walker, but says he " made no threatening statements." Id. ¶ 18. Walker submitted an affidavit stating that, based on Dudley's tone and some of his comments, he became " concerned for [Dudley's] safety and the safety of his coworkers." Affidavit of Devin L. Walker ¶ 3 (" Walker Aff." ), July 31, 2012, ECF No. 15-1. In particular, Walker claims Dudley stated that he would have to " drag [Lacey's] ass across the desk" in order for something to be done, and made a possibly threatening reference to an earlier incident where one WMATA employee stabbed another. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. Because of these concerns, Walker referred Dudley to the Employee Assistance Program (" EAP" ) where medical staff decided to hold Dudley off work until the matter was resolved. Id. ¶ 7; Ex. 41 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (under seal). Dudley was held off work until February 16, 2010, and this time was charged against his sick leave. Exs. 38, 39, 41 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Dudley filed a grievance regarding the use of his sick leave, Ex. 28 to Pl.'s Opp'n, but WMATA denied this grievance, Exs. 38, 39 to Def.'s Mot. Summ J.
J. Mr. Dudley's May 2010 Ten Day Suspension for Violating WMATA's Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy
On May 13, 2010, Dudley and William Adams— a Caucasian co-worker— were involved in a verbal altercation at work. According to Dudley, Adams " confronted [Dudley] in the bus yard cursing and threatening to ‘ permanently close your eyes and make you stop breathing.’ " Dudley Aff. ¶ 20. Dudley claims he was " clearly not the aggressor in this incident," id., but was nevertheless suspended for ten days for violating the WMATA zero-tolerance workplace violence policy, Ex. 33 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J.
At the time of this incident, Lacey was no longer Dudley's supervisor but did supervise Adams. After the incident, Lacey referred Adams to drug and alcohol testing, Ex. 32 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., and suspended Adams for twenty days, Ex. 33 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Scottie Borders, and African American, supervised Dudley at this time. Borders issued Dudley a ten day suspension, Ex. 35 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., but Dudley alleges that the
suspension was " based upon the decision of [Devin] Walker and other managers," and that " Borders told [him] that he did not share the view that [Dudley] should be suspended," Dudley Aff. ¶ 20.
Dudley filed a grievance challenging the suspension, Ex. 38 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., but Kevin Newman and the WMATA Office of Labor Relations denied the grievance on July 12, 2012, Ex. 39 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Dudley did not pursue this grievance any further.
K. Mr. Dudley's May 2011 Ten Day Suspension for Violating WMATA's Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy
On April 14, 2011, Dudley was involved in an altercation with Peter White, an African American co-worker. According to Dudley, " White came into a room" where Dudley was, " closed the door behind him, and said, ‘ if you keep fucking with me all of you motherfuckers are going down.’ " Dudley Aff. ¶ 21. On May 10, 2011, WMATA suspended both Dudley and White for ten days. Exs. 42-43 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. At this time, Borders supervised Dudley, and Borders issued the suspension. Id. However, Dudley alleges that " Borders did not believe that I had instigated the incident," but that the suspension came " upon the recommendation of [Devin] Walker and other managers." Dudley Aff. ¶ 21.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
" The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The mere existence of any factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment; " the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original). A fact is material if, under the applicable law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Id. A dispute is genuine if the " evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Because " [c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge," the " evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than " the existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The inferences drawn from the evidence " must be reasonably probable and based on more than mere speculation." Rogers Corp. v. E.P.A., 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citations omitted). In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999). The nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Id. If the evidence presented is " merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
B. Title VII Discrimination
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer to " fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). The plaintiff must plead " two elements for an employment discrimination case: (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Brady v. Office of Sergeant of Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2008). In Brady, the D.C. Circuit stated:
Lest there be any lingering uncertainty, we state the rule clearly: In a Title VII disparate-treatment suit where an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the district court need not— and should not — decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas [ v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ]. Rather, in considering an employer's motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in those circumstances, the district court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?
520 F.3d at 494.
C. Title VII Hostile Work Environment
To establish a claim of a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment occurred because of the plaintiff's protected status; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question but nonetheless failed to either take steps to prevent it or afford the plaintiff prompt remedial action. Baloch v. Norton, 355 F.Supp.2d 246, 259 (D.D.C.2005).
" To determine whether a hostile work environment exists, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee's work performance." Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C.Cir.2008). To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that her employer subjected her to " discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult" that is " sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). The conduct must be sufficiently extreme to constitute an alteration in the conditions of employment so that Title VII does not evolve into a " general civility code." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). " [S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment." Id.
D. Title VII Retaliation
Title VII also prohibits an employer from " discriminat[ing] against" an employee because he has " opposed" a practice proscribed by Title VII or because " he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). To make out a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show " (1) that he opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the employer took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) that the employer took the action ‘ because’ the employee opposed the practice." McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C.Cir.2012). Materially adverse actions are not limited " to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). However, a plaintiff must show that the employer's actions " would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee." Id. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Further, " an employer's actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Id. at 56, 126 S.Ct. 2405.
If the employer offers a " legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the materially adverse action, " the sole remaining question" becomes " retaliation vel non — whether, based on all the evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that [the] proffered reason ... was pretext for retaliation." Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 603-04 (D.C.Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1380 n. 3 (" [T]he only question is whether the employee's evidence creates a material dispute on the ultimate issue of retaliation." ). A plaintiff can show pretext " either directly by [showing] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 679 (D.C.Cir.2009) ( quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983)).
E. Title VII Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
" In actions brought under Title VII, a court has authority over only those claims that are (1) contained in the plaintiff's administrative complaint or claims ‘ like or reasonably related to’ those claims in the administrative complaint and (2) claims for which the plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies." Pierson v. WMATA, 821 F.Supp.2d 360, 364 (D.D.C.2011) ( citing Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1995); Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp., 966 F.Supp. 33, 49 (D.D.C.1997)). " It is the defendant's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies." Pierson, 821 F.Supp.2d at 364 ( citing Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C.Cir.1985) (stating that " because untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving it" )). " Dismissal results when a plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies." Pierson, 821 F.Supp.2d at 365 ( citing Rann v. Chao, 346 F.3d 192, 194-95 (D.C.Cir.2003) (affirming trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's ADEA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Gillet v. King, 931 F.Supp. 9, 12-13 (D.D.C.1996) (dismissing plaintiff's Title VII claim because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies)).
Title VII " requires that an employee exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the EEOC prior to filing suit in the district court." Headen v. WMATA, 741 F.Supp.2d 289, 294 (D.D.C.2010) ( citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006)); see also Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1995)
(" Title VII requires that a person complaining of a violation file an administrative charge with the EEOC and allow the agency time to act on the charge." ). Title VII provides detailed procedures for bringing administrative charges, and its " charge filing provision [ ] ‘ specifies with precision’ the prerequisites that a plaintiff must satisfy before filing suit." National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) ( quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974)). Title VII requires that " [a] charge ... shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred" or within three hundred days if the person " initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) ...