United States District Court, District of Columbia
Araya Henok, Washington, DC, pro se.
Jeffrey L. Tarkenton, Paul A. Kaplan, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, Washington, DC, Bizhan Beiramee, Beiramee Law Group, P.C., Matthew Daniel Cohen, BWW Law Group, LLC, Bethesda,
MD, Gregory Nelson Britto, Shapiro & Burson, LLP, Fairfax, VA, for Defendants.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RICHARD W. ROBERTS, District Judge.
Pro se plaintiff Araya Henok brings this action against Chase Home Finance, LLC (" Chase" ), Shapiro & Burson, LLP (" Shapiro" ), and Fannie Mae, challenging the legality of the foreclosure on a property he owned on C Street S.E. in Washington, D.C. (" the property" ). Henok moves for partial summary judgment against Chase arguing that Chase was not the note holder at the time of the foreclosure, and that Chase and Shapiro failed to send to Henok valid notice of default and notice of foreclosure. Henok also moves to strike Shapiro's opposition to his motion for partial summary judgment, and moves for sanctions against Chase and Shapiro and their counsel. Because Henok has failed to show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, his motions for partial summary judgment will be denied and judgment as to the notice of default will be entered for Chase since the undisputed material facts entitle it to such a judgment as a matter of law. Because Henok has also failed to show that Shapiro's motion should be stricken under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the motion to strike will be denied. Because Henok has not met the requirements of Rule 11 or shown that the defendants committed sanctionable conduct, Henok's motions for sanctions will be denied.
Henok purchased the property in 2007 with financing from JP Morgan Chase Bank (" JPMC" ). Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (" Pl.'s First Summ. J. Mot." ) ¶¶ 1-3, Ex. 1; Defs. Chase & FNMA's Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (" Chase's Opp'n to Pl.'s First Summ. J. Mot." ) at 2. In August of 2009, Chase returned his monthly payment and " stated that [his] property [was] going into foreclosure." Am. Compl. ¶ 8; Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Pl.'s Second Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (" Chase's Opp'n to Pl.'s Second Summ. J. Mot." ) ¶ 7. Fannie Mae bought the property in a foreclosure sale on November 18, 2009. Pl.'s First Summ. J. Mot. ¶ 6; Chase's Opp'n to Pl.'s First Summ. J. Mot. at 3.
Henok filed a complaint in D.C. Superior Court challenging the foreclosure in February 2012 and the defendants removed the case to federal court and answered the complaint. Henok v. Chase Home Finance, 915 F.Supp.2d 109, 112, Civil Action No. 12-292(RWR), 2013 WL 151173, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2013). Henok moved for partial summary judgment arguing that JPMC never transferred the note to Chase and that because Chase was not the noteholder at the time of the foreclosure sale, the foreclosure is void. Pl.'s First Summ. J. Mot. at 2, 4. After Chase and Shapiro opposed the first motion for partial summary judgment, Henok moved to strike Shapiro's opposition arguing that Shapiro was " responding to issues directly and exclusively dealing with [Chase]." Pl.'s Mot. to Strike Def. Shapiro's Opp'n to Partial Summ. J. at 1. Henok then moved again for partial summary judgment arguing that Chase and Shapiro breached the contract by failing to provide notice of default and failing to mail to the correct address the notice of foreclosure. Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (" Pl.'s Second Summ. J. Mot." ) at 6-9. Further, Henok moved for sanctions against Chase's attorneys, Shapiro's attorneys, Chase employee Kevin Johnson and Shapiro employee Brett Callahan arguing that Chase and Shapiro made intentionally false representations
with regard to their receipt of Henok's letters requesting cure amounts. Mot. for Sanctions Against Chase at 1-3; Mot. for Sanctions Against Shapiro at 1-3.
I. PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is warranted on an individual claim or part of a claim if " there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). " A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including ... documents, ... declarations, ... or other materials; or ... showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute[.]" Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). A party may not rely merely upon denials in pleadings to show a genuine dispute, but must come forward with specific evidence that reveals a genuine factual dispute. Rogers v. District of Columbia, 880 F.Supp.2d 163, 165-66 (D.D.C.2012); Ali v. District of Columbia Gov't, 810 F.Supp.2d 78, 82-83 (D.D.C.2011). At the summary judgment stage, " ‘ [t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’ " Feirson v. District of Columbia, 506 F.3d 1063, 1066 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Where there are no disputed ...