United States District Court, District of Columbia
AHMAD HALIM, Plaintiff, Pro se, Ellicott City, MD.
SHARIF ABDELHALIM, Plaintiff, Pro se, Durham, NC.
For SHAUN DONOVAN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Defendant: Theresa Ekeoma Dike, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Washington, DC.
For RAY GRIFFIN, City Manager, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF HENDERSON, MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL, Defendants: Cathryn M. Little, LEAD ATTORNEY, LITTLE & LITTLE, PLLC, Raleigh, NC.
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge.
Ahmad Halim (" Halim" ) and his son Sharif Abdelhalim (" Abdelhalim" ) (together " Plaintiffs" ), each proceeding pro se, commenced this action against Shaun Donovan, Secretary, United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (" HUD" ) and the city manager, mayor, and several members of the city council of the City of Henderson, North Carolina (the " City Defendants" ), alleging discrimination based on nationality and religion in relation to contracts for several properties owned or desired to be owned by Halim and/or Halim together with Abdelhalim. On February 15, 2013, the Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs' claims against the City Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Memorandum Opinion (Feb. 15, 2013), ECF No. ; Order (Feb. 15, 2013), ECF No. . As a result, all that remains in this action are Halim's claims against HUD.
Presently before the Court are two motions: HUD's  Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff Halim's  Motion to Transfer [ sic ] the Case Against Henderson Defendants to a Court in North Carolina that
Has Juirsdictions [ sic ] Over them. Also before the Court is Halim's self-styled  " Filinig [ sic ] of Legal Authorities to Supp. Juirsdictions [ sic ] of the Court over Henderson Defendents [ sic ] or Transfer [ sic ] the Case Against Henderson Defendants to a Court in North Carolina That Has Juirsdictions [ sic ] Over Them," wherein Halim requests that the Court reconsider its findings regarding personal jurisdiction and reiterates his request for a transfer in the alternative. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions,  the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall grant HUD's motion to dismiss and deny Halim's motion to reconsider or transfer. The Court shall address each motion in turn.
HALIM'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER OR TRANSFER
Subsequent to the issuance of this Court's February 15, 2013  Memorandum Opinion and  Order dismissing Plaintiffs' case against the City Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, Halim moved to transfer Plaintiffs' claims against the City Defendants to " a Court in North Carolina." See Pl.'s Mot. to Transfer. Halim has also filed a self-styled " Filinig [ sic ] of Legal Authorities," wherein he requests that the Court reconsider its findings regarding personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, transfer the case to North Carolina. See Pl.'s Filing of Legal Authorities. The Court shall construe the motions collectively as a motion to reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Roane v. Gonzales, 832 F.Supp.2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2011) (" A motion to reconsider a final order is generally treated as a Rule 59(e) motion if it is filed within [28 days after the entry of judgment] and as a Rule 60(b) motion if it is filed thereafter." ) (citing Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 355 F.Supp.2d 414, 420-21 (D.D.C. 2005)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to file " [a] motion to alter or amend a judgment" within " 28 days after the entry of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Motions under Rule 59(e) are " disfavored" and the moving party bears the burden of establishing " extraordinary circumstances" warranting relief from a final judgment. Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F.Supp.2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001). Rule 59(e) motions are " discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208, 316 U.S.App. D.C. 152 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 59(e) does not provide a vehicle " to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or ...