RICHARD W. ROBERTS Chief Judge
A magistrate judge ordered that defendant William Hubbard be detained pending trial. Hubbard moved for review of the magistrate judge’s detention order. After a hearing, Hubbard’s motion was denied. This Memorandum Opinion sets forth in further detail the basis for that ruling.
A grand jury charged that in November 2010, Hubbard used a firearm to rob a Garda Cash Logistics armored truck in Washington, D.C. A grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Hubbard, which charges Hubbard with one count of interference with interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and one count of using, carrying, and possessing a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
In February 2013, Magistrate Judge Alan Kay arraigned Hubbard. At the arraignment, the government orally moved that Hubbard be temporarily detained pursuant to: 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), as he [has] been charged with a crime of violence; 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(D), as he has two prior convictions for crimes of violence; and 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(1)(A), as he is on supervised release in case 2008-CF1-198 (Attempted Second Degree Child Sex Abuse), and parole in case 1997-FEL-5744 (Armed Robbery, Possession of a Firearm During a Violent Offense, and Unlawful Use of an Automobile).
Govt.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Modify Release Conditions & Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. Thereof (“Govt.’s Opp’n”) at 1. Magistrate Judge Kay granted the government’s motion and set a detention hearing. Magistrate Judge John Facciola presided over the detention hearing and granted the government’s oral motion to detain Hubbard pending trial and denied Hubbard’s oral motion to be released pending trial. On March 12, 2013, Magistrate Judge Facciola issued a detention memorandum explaining that he detained Hubbard pending trial because he found that “there is clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s release on any condition or combination of conditions will not reasonably assure the safety of the community and his detention is, therefore, appropriate.” Detention Mem. entered Mar. 12, 2013 (“Detention Mem.”) at 2.
Hubbard moved for a district court judge to review Magistrate Judge Facciola’s detention memorandum and “permit his release on high intensity supervision, [to a] halfway house, or [on his own] personal recognizance.” Mot. to Modify Release Conditions (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 1. The government opposed. On July 17, 2013, a hearing was held to consider Hubbard’s motion. At the hearing, the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the magistrate judge’s order were adopted and Hubbard’s motion was denied because it was found that there is no condition or combination of conditions that could reasonably assure the safety of the community or Hubbard’s presence at trial.
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). “The Bail Reform Act of 1984 sets forth the limited circumstances in which a defendant may be detained before trial despite the presumption in favor of liberty.” United States v. Hanson, 613 F.Supp.2d 85, 87-88 (D.D.C. 2009). Under the Act, a judicial officer “‘shall order’” the detention of a defendant before trial if, after a hearing, the judicial officer “finds by clear and convincing evidence that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community.’” Hanson, 613 F.Supp.2d at 88 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)); see also United States v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A judicial officer must also order pretrial detention if he finds by a “preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant in court as required.” Hanson, 613 F.Supp.2d at 88; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1); Simpkins, 826 F.2d at 96.
In making these determinations, a judicial officer must consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence,  a violation of section 1591, a Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including--
(A) the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal ...