Submitted Oct. 31, 2013.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Keith W. Watters and Patricia D. Watters, Washington, DC, were on the brief for appellant.
Rotrica S. Neal was on the brief for appellee.
Before GLICKMAN and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and FARRELL, Senior Judge.
EASTERLY, Associate Judge:
In 2009, Appellant Anne Onyeneho was a passenger in a car driven by Bright Akwukwaegbu when Ms. Akwukwaegbu got into an accident in New Jersey. Ms. Onyeneho initially sued  Ms. Akwukwaegbu, a D.C. resident, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, for negligence. Ms. Onyeneho subsequently amended her complaint to add a claim against Ms. Akwukwaegbu's insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), for breach of contract for failure to pay Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits. Ms. Onyeneho settled her suit with Ms. Akwukwaegbu. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Allstate, finding tat Ms. Onyeneho's claim was time-barred. Ms. Onyeneho filed two motions for reconsideration. The trial court granted Ms. Onyeneho's first motion
for reconsideration and considered her newly raised claims on the merits, but ultimately entered summary judgment for a second time in favor of Allstate on statute of limitations grounds. The trial court denied the second motion for reconsideration.
Ms. Onyeneho appeals the court's entry of judgment in favor of Allstate and the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. We review de novo the order granting summary judgment, applying the same standard as the trial court and construing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Hunt v. District of Columbia, 66 A.3d 987, 990 (D.C.2013). We review the denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Dist. No. 1-Pac. Coast Dist. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 782 A.2d 269, 278 (D.C.2001) (" Motions under either rule [59(e) or 60(b) ] are committed to the broad discretion of the trial judge." ). We affirm.
Before turning to the specific legal issues presented, we quickly review the law that provides the foundation for Ms. Onyeneho's claim for PIP benefits: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:28-1.4 (West 2007). Known as the Deemer Statute, this provision " ‘ deems' New Jersey insurance coverage and tort limitations [regarding, inter alia, the provision of PIP benefits,] to apply to out-of-state policies."  Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 984 A.2d 872, 874 n. 2 (2009). Thus, although Ms. Akwukwaegbu had a District of Columbia insurance policy, because she was driving in New Jersey at the time of the accident and Allstate is an insurer under the Deemer Statute, New Jersey's mandatory PIP coverage is " deemed" to apply to Ms. Akwukwaegbu's policy.
As an occupant in Ms. Akwukwaegbu's automobile at the time of the accident, Ms. Onyeneho was entitled to seek PIP benefits via Ms. Akwukwaegbu's Allstate policy. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-4 (2012). PIP benefits, which encompass certain medical expenses, loss of income, essential services, death, and funeral expense benefits set out by statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-4, are " guaranteed ...