United States District Court, D. Columbia.
December 19, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MAURICE MERCER, also known as " TOKE," Defendant
Decided December 18, 2013.
For JUAN R. FLOYD, Defendant: A. Eduardo Balarezo, LEAD ATTORNEY, BALAREZO LAW, Washington, DC.
For JERI P. WRIGHT, also known as AUNTIE, Defendant: Christopher Michael Davis, LEAD ATTORNEY, DAVIS & DAVIS, Washington, DC.
For BRUCE SETTLES, also known as SPOON, Defendant: Pleasant S. Brodnax, III, LEAD ATTORNEY, Washington, DC.
For DONALD JOHNSON, also known as DON, Defendant: Edward Charles Sussman, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF EDWARD C. SUSSMAN, Washington, DC.
For MIKE JOHNSON, Defendant: John James Carney, LEAD ATTORNEY, CARNEY & CARNEY, Washington, DC.
For DEREK L. GADSDEN, also known as PEP, Defendant: Allen Howard Orenberg, LEAD ATTORNEY, THE ORENBERG LAW FIRM, PC, North Bethesda, MD.
For LAWRENCE E. PROCTOR, Defendant: Nathan I. Silver, II, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF NATHAN I. SILVER, Bethesda, MD.
For JUANITA N. CULBRETH, Defendant: Brian Keith McDaniel, LEAD ATTORNEY, MCDANIEL & ASSOCIATES, Washington, DC.
For JOHN FLOYD, also known as SNOW, Defendant: Atiq Rahman Ahmed, LEAD ATTORNEY, ATIQ R. AHMED, ESQUIRE, Washington, DC.
For VINCENT J. JONES, Defendant: Robert A. Spelke, LEAD ATTORNEY, THE LAW FIRM OF ROBERT A. SPELKE, PLLC, Washington, DC.
For RODNEY KIRK CARTER, Defendant: Thomas Abbenante, LEAD ATTORNEY, THOMAS ABBENANTE, ESQ., Washington, DC.
For ALBERT P. JONES, also known as KNUCKLES, Defendant: Elita C. Amato, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF ELITA C. AMATO, ESQ., Arlington, VA.
For MAURICE P. MERCER, also known as TOKE, Defendant: Harry Tun, LEAD ATTORNEY, Washington, DC.
For DARNELL S. ROGERS, also known as LOU, Defendant: William Jackson Garber, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM JACKSON GARBER, Washington, DC.
For GARY D. PRICE, also known as BIG FACE, also known as HARRY-O, Defendant: Ron Earnest, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF RON EARNEST, Riverdale, MD.
For DELSHAWN A. WRICE, Defendant: Dwight E. Crawley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Washington, DC.
For ROXANNE MATHEWS-BAKER, Defendant: Stephen F. Brennwald, LEAD ATTORNEY, BRENNWALD & ROBERTSON, LLP, Washington, DC.
For JEFFREY COACHMAN, also known as JEFF, Defendant: Robert Saul Becker, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT S. BECKER, Washington, DC.
For LISA ADONA, Defendant: James T. Maloney, LEAD ATTORNEY, MALONEY & MOHSEN, PLLC, Washington, DC.
For BRITTANY FLOYD, Defendant: James Lawrence Lyons, LEAD ATTORNEY, KELLOGG, WILLIAMS & LYONS, Washington, DC.
For MIA CULBRETH, Defendant: Joseph Roll Conte, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF J.R. CONTE, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC.
For USA, Plaintiff: Karla-Dee Clark, Thomas A. Gillice, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Zia Mustafa Faruqui, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Washington, DC.
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, United States District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Maurice Mercer, along with twenty-two others, has been charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, five hundred grams or more of cocaine, and twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, crimes punishable by a minimum of ten years imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. The government requested
a detention hearing which was held by Magistrate Judge Kay on November 26, 2013. ( See Detention Memorandum (" Det. Mem." ) at 1, Dec. 3, 2013 [ECF No. 75].) At the conclusion of the hearing, Magistrate Judge Kay ruled that defendant Mercer should be held pending trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. ( See id. at 6.) Mercer thereafter filed a motion to appeal Magistrate Judge Kay's detention order under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), which the government opposed. (Def.'s Mot. for Modification of Pretrial Det. Order and Mem. of Points and Authorities, Dec. 16, 2013 [ECF No. 88]; Gov't's Opp. to the Defs.' Mot. for Modification of Pretrial Det. Order (" Opp." ), Dec. 16, 2013 [ECF No. 91].) This Court held a hearing on the motion on December 17, 2013. For the reasons stated in open court, as well as the reasons set forth herein, the Court will deny this motion.
Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., a judicial officer " shall order" a defendant's detention before trial if, after a hearing, " the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." Id. § 3142(e). The judicial officer considering the propriety of pretrial detention must consider four factors:
(1) [t]he nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense . . . involves . . . a controlled substance, [or] firearm;
(2) the weight of evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including . . . the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; . . . and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release.
Id. § 3142(g). The government is required to demonstrate the appropriateness of pretrial detention by clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 3142(f). However, when " there is probable cause to believe that the [defendant] committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.)," there is a rebuttable presumption that " no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of the community." Id. § 3142(e). Considering each factor below, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the government has met its burden and that defendant Mercer has failed to rebut the presumption against pretrial detention.
First, the nature and circumstances of the offense favor Mercer's continued detention. The evidence heard by Magistrate Judge Kay and this Court overwhelmingly demonstrates that Mercer sold heroin and other narcotics in large quantities in the D.C. area. In February 2013, Mercer sold fifty grams of heroin for several thousand dollars to a confidential informant during a " controlled purchase" coordinated by the FBI. (Det. Mem. at 5.) A wiretap also recorded a conversation between Mercer and co-defendant Juan Floyd in which Mercer asked to purchase one hundred grams of heroin. ( Id. ) In addition, when law enforcement searched Mercer's home on November 20, they found six ounces of phencyclidine (PCP)
(valued at $300-$500 per ounce), marijuana in multiple ziplock bags, a white power substance suspected to be cocaine, and other drug paraphernalia including a digital scale and plastic bags. ( Id. ; Opp. at 6.)
Second, the weight of the evidence strongly favors continued detention. Regarding the controlled purchase, defendant attempts to call the government's evidence into question by arguing that law enforcement lost sight of the confidential source for a brief period during the sale. While that is true, there is also evidence that law enforcement found no drugs on the confidential source during a search conducted prior to meeting Mercer and then, after the meeting with Mercer, the informant turned over fifty grams of heroin to the FBI. (Det. Mem. at 5; Opp. at 5.) Mercer's role in this transaction is corroborated by an audio recording of the sale. (Det. Mem. at 5.) There is also evidence that Mercer called the leader of the alleged narcotics conspiracy, co-defendant Juan Floyd, in order to purchase heroin  and there is the evidence that drugs and drug paraphernalia were found by law enforcement in Mercer's home. ( See id. )
Third, the history and characteristics of the defendant support his continued detention. Though somewhat dated, Mr. Mercer has a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine in 1996. (Det. Mem. at 5) Moreover, while the Court recognizes that Mr. Mercer is employed, recently married, and has five children including a new born, he showed a serious disregard for the safety of his family by keeping large quantities of drugs in his home, as well as drug paraphernalia.
Fourth, defendant's potential danger to the community favors his continued detention. As Magistrate Judge Kay explained, Mercer " conducted sales of significant quantities of highly dangerous narcotics, and he was in possession of more narcotics as well as the materials to package and sell more. These drugs do tremendous damage to this community and the likelihood of further distribution . . . pose[s] a significant danger to the community." ( Id. at 6.) The Court agrees with this conclusion and finds that Mercer represents a danger to the community.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for reversal of the Magistrate Judge's order of detention is hereby DENIED, and in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i), the Court ORDERS that defendant remain in the custody of the Attorney General for confinement pending trial.