United States District Court, D. Columbia.
December 20, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
VINCENT JONES, Defendant
Decided December 19, 2013
For JUAN R. FLOYD, Defendant: A. Eduardo Balarezo, LEAD ATTORNEY, BALAREZO LAW, Washington, DC.
For JERI P. WRIGHT, also known as AUNTIE, Defendant: Christopher Michael Davis, LEAD ATTORNEY, DAVIS & DAVIS, Washington, DC.
For BRUCE SETTLES, also known as SPOON, Defendant: Pleasant S. Brodnax, III, LEAD ATTORNEY, Washington, DC.
For DONALD JOHNSON, also known as DON, Defendant: Edward Charles Sussman, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF EDWARD C. SUSSMAN, Washington, DC.
For MIKE JOHNSON, Defendant: John James Carney, LEAD ATTORNEY, CARNEY & CARNEY, Washington, DC.
For DEREK L. GADSDEN, also known as PEP, Defendant: Allen Howard Orenberg, LEAD ATTORNEY, THE ORENBERG LAW FIRM, PC, North Bethesda, MD.
For LAWRENCE E. PROCTOR, Defendant: Nathan I. Silver, II, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF NATHAN I. SILVER, Bethesda, MD.
For JUANITA N. CULBRETH, Defendant: Brian Keith McDaniel, LEAD ATTORNEY, MCDANIEL & ASSOCIATES, Washington, DC.
For JOHN FLOYD, also known as SNOW, Defendant: Atiq Rahman Ahmed, LEAD ATTORNEY, ATIQ R. AHMED, ESQUIRE, Washington, DC.
For VINCENT J. JONES, Defendant: Robert A. Spelke, LEAD ATTORNEY, THE LAW FIRM OF ROBERT A. SPELKE, PLLC, Washington, DC.
For RODNEY KIRK CARTER, Defendant (13): Thomas Abbenante, LEAD ATTORNEY, THOMAS ABBENANTE, ESQ., Washington, DC.
For ALBERT P. JONES, also known as KNUCKLES, Defendant: Elita C. Amato, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF ELITA C. AMATO, ESQ., Arlington, VA.
For MAURICE P. MERCER, also known as TOKE, Defendant: Harry Tun, LEAD ATTORNEY, Washington, DC.
For DARNELL S. ROGERS, also known as LOU, Defendant: William Jackson Garber, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM JACKSON GARBER, Washington, DC.
For GARY D. PRICE, also known as BIG FACE, also known as HARRY-O, Defendant: Ron Earnest, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF RON EARNEST, Riverdale, MD.
For DELSHAWN A. WRICE, Defendant: Dwight E. Crawley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Washington, DC.
For ROXANNE MATHEWS-BAKER, Defendant: Stephen F. Brennwald, LEAD ATTORNEY, BRENNWALD & ROBERTSON, LLP, Washington, DC.
For JEFFREY COACHMAN, also known as JEFF, Defendant: Robert Saul Becker, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT S. BECKER, Washington, DC.
For LISA ADONA, Defendant: James T. Maloney, LEAD ATTORNEY, MALONEY & MOHSEN, PLLC, Washington, DC.
For BRITTANY FLOYD, Defendant: James Lawrence Lyons, LEAD ATTORNEY, KELLOGG, WILLIAMS & LYONS, Washington, DC.
For MIA CULBRETH, Defendant: Joseph Roll Conte, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF J.R. CONTE, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC.
For USA, Plaintiff: Karla-Dee Clark, Thomas A. Gillice, LEAD ATTORNEYS U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Washington, DC; Zia Mustafa Faruqui, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Asset Forfeiture/Money Laundering Section, Washington, DC.
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, United States District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Vincent Jones, along with twenty-two others, has been charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, five hundred grams or more of cocaine, and twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, crimes punishable by a minimum of ten years imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. The government requested a detention hearing which was held by Magistrate Judge Kay on November 26, 2013. ( See Detention Memorandum (" Det. Mem." ) at 1, Dec. 3, 2013 [ECF No. 72].) At the conclusion of the hearing, Magistrate Judge Kay ruled that defendant Jones should be held pending trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. ( See id. at 6.) Jones thereafter filed a motion to appeal Magistrate Judge Kay's detention order under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), which the
government opposed. (Def.'s Mot. to Vacate Det. Order and Order for Pre-Trial Release, Dec. 11, 2013 [ECF No. 58]; Gov't's Omnibus Opp. to Defs.' Mot. for Review and Revocation of Det. Orders (" Opp." ), Dec. 13, 2013 [ECF No. 86].) This Court held a hearing on the motion on December 17, 2013. For the reasons stated in open court, as well as the reasons set forth herein, the Court will deny this motion.
Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., a judicial officer " shall order" a defendant's detention before trial if, after a hearing, " the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." Id. § 3142(e). The judicial officer considering the propriety of pretrial detention must consider four factors:
(1) [t]he nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense . . . involves . . . a controlled substance, [or] firearm;
(2) the weight of evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including . . . the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; . . . and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release.
Id. § 3142(g). The government is required to demonstrate the appropriateness of pretrial detention by clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 3142(f). However, when " there is probable cause to believe that the [defendant] committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.)," there is a rebuttable presumption that " no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of the community." Id. § 3142(e). Considering each factor below, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the government has met its burden and that defendant Jones has failed to rebut the presumption against pretrial detention.
First, the nature and circumstances of the offense favor Jones' continued detention. The indictment demonstrates probable cause that Jones participated in a large-scale narcotics conspiracy. Moreover, according to the government's proffer and the evidence presented at the hearing, Jones regularly purchased between ten and one hundred grams of heroin for redistribution from co-defendant Juan Floyd. Jones, a childhood friend of co-defendant Floyd, also alerted Floyd to the fact that he was being followed by law enforcement and participated in one hundred " pertinent phone calls" often conducted in coded language regarding narcotics transactions. On November 20, 2013, law enforcement searched Jones' residence in Washington, D.C. and found a fully-loaded, semi-automatic assault rifle along with ammunition of several different calibers, as well as four cellular phones.
Second, the weight of the evidence favors continued detention. At the hearing, the government proffered that Jones and Floyd completed thirty narcotics transactions during the course of the investigation.
Each transaction is believed to have been for between ten and one hundred grams of heroin. Among these suspected transactions, on one occasion, defendant Jones requested a " dollar bill" from co-defendant Juan Floyd. The government proffers, based on their experts and confidential sources that in the drug trade a " dollar bill" refers to one hundred grams of heroin. In addition, police recorded a call made by Jones to Floyd warning him that a law enforcement vehicle might be surveilling Floyd. (Det. Mem. at 3; Gov't's Second Mem. in Support of Pretrial Det., Nov. 26, 2013 [ECF No. 15], at 20-21.) Together these events constitute sufficient evidence that Jones was likely a narcotics redistributor for Floyd and that he has failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
Third, the history and characteristics of the defendant support his continued detention. As defense counsel explained, Jones' convictions are dated and he is gainfully employed by the D.C. Department of Public Works. However, the defendant's history and characteristics still support continued detention. Despite prior convictions of carrying a firearm and possession with intent to distribute, the evidence strongly suggests that Jones continued to re-distribute narcotics and kept illegal weapons and ammunition in his home where children live. (Det. Mem. at 3-4.)
Fourth, defendant's potential danger to the community favors his continued detention. As Magistrate Judge Kay explained, " the narcotics trade does serious and pervasive damage to this community [and] Mr. Jones was in frequent contact with the head of the criminal conspiracy charged here . . . ." (Det Mem. 6.) Moreover, defendant kept an illegal firearm and ammunition in his home. The Court is therefore not satisfied that Jones would not present a danger to the community if released pending further proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for reversal of the Magistrate Judge's order of detention is hereby DENIED, and in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i), the Court ORDERS that defendant remain in the custody of the Attorney General for confinement pending trial.