United States District Court, District of Columbia
AMERICAN FOREST RESOURCE COUNCIL, CARPENTERS INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL, and DOUGLAS COUNTY, OREGON, Plaintiffs,
DANIEL M. ASHE, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the Interior, Defendants, and AUDUBON SOCIETY OF PORTLAND, SEATTLE AUDUBON SOCIETY, CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, OREGON WILD, CONSERVATION NORTHWEST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INFORMATION CENTER, and SIERRA CLUB, Defendant-Intervenors.
JOHN D. BATES, District Judge.
Plaintiffs American Forest Resource Council, Carpenters Industrial Council, and Douglas County, Oregon (collectively, "AFRC") brought this action against defendants Daniel M. Ashe, Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Sally Jewell, Secretary of the Interior (collectively, "FWS"). Before the Court is AFRC's unopposed motion for an order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) entering final judgment on three of AFRC's claims. Pls.' Mot. for Entry of Final Judgment ("Pls.' Mot.") [ECF No. 74]. For the reasons stated below, the Court "expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay, " Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), and will grant AFRC's motion.
The case concerns the marbled murrelet, a small seabird native to the Pacific Northwest. The marbled murrelet has the unfortunate luck of making its home in old-growth forests that are highly desirable to the logging and timber industries, so it is a frequent subject of agency rulemaking (and thus, environmental litigation). The complex factual and procedural background of this case is fully set forth in the Court's March 30, 2013 and September 5, 2013 memorandum opinions. See Am. Forest Res. Council v. Ashe, No. 12-111 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013) ("Sept. 2013 Mem. Op.") [ECF No. 68]; Am. Forest Res. Council v. Ashe , 946 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) ("Mar. 2013 Mem. Op.") [ECF No. 50]. In those two decisions, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of FWS and intervenors on all three of AFRC's claims regarding FWS's decision not to "delist" the Washington, Oregon, and California ("tri-state") population of the marbled murrelet (the "delisting claims"). See Sept. 2013 Mem. Op. at 14-15 (granting FWS's cross-motion for summary judgment on AFRC's third delisting claim); Mar. 2013 Mem. Op. at 18, 29 (granting FWS's cross-motion for summary judgment on AFRC's first and second delisting claims). The Court also granted FWS's motion for voluntary remand without vacatur of FWS's 1996 rulemaking with respect to its critical habitat designation for the marbled murrelet. See Sept. 2013 Mem. Op. at 27. That rulemaking, as FWS ultimately conceded, suffered from several legal defects. See generally Defs.' Mot. for Voluntary Remand Without Vacatur ("Defs.' Mot. for Remand") [ECF No. 54]. AFRC had challenged those defects in its four remaining claims (the "habitat claims"). FWS's current deadline to submit a new final critical habitat designation for the marbled murrelet to the Federal Register is September 30, 2016, just over three years from the date of the Court's most recent opinion. See Sept. 5, 2013 Order [ECF No. 69].
After the September 2013 opinion-which disposed of all of AFRC's remaining claims-AFRC filed a notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit, challenging the Court's grant of summary judgment to FWS on AFRC's delisting claims. Pls.' Notice of Appeal [ECF No. 71]. Shortly thereafter, the D.C. Circuit ordered AFRC to "show cause, within 30 days..., why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final order." Am. Forest Res. Council v. Ashe, No. 13-5302 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2014). The next day, AFRC filed this motion, noting (correctly) that
[t]he premise of the Order To Show Cause appears to be that because this Court remanded AFRC's Fourth through Seventh Claims (challenging marbled murrelet critical habitat) to FWS, at its request, and because a district court order remanding an agency decision back to the agency for further action is generally not a final appealable order, the Court's orders disposing of AFRC's delisting claims are not final appealable orders in the absence of an order from this Court directing entry of judgment on the First, Second, and Third Claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
Pls.' Mot. at 2. Hence, AFRC now moves for an order entering final judgment on its delisting claims under Rule 54(b). Neither FWS nor intervenors oppose AFRC's motion.
Rule 54(b) provides that when more than one claim is presented in an action, a district court "may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims... if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay." Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 446 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey , 351 U.S. 427, 435-36 (1956). "Rule 54(b) mediates between the sometimes antagonistic goals of avoiding piecemeal appeals and giving parties timely justice." Taylor v. FDIC , 132 F.3d 753, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The role "of the district court under the Rule is to act as a dispatcher, '" exercising "sound judicial discretion" in order "to determine the appropriate time' when each final decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal." Curtiss-Wright , 446 U.S. at 8 (quoting Sears , 351 U.S. at 435).
The Supreme Court has "outlined the steps to be followed in making determinations under Rule 54(b)." Id. at 7. "A district court must first determine that it is dealing with a final judgment, '" id., that is, "an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action, " Sears , 351 U.S. at 436. Next, the district court asks "whether there is any just reason for delay." Curtiss-Wright , 446 U.S. at 8. The Supreme Court has cautioned that "[n]ot all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims." Id . In exercising this discretion, "a district court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved." Id .; see also Sears , 351 U.S. at 438 (noting "the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals"). One important factor is whether granting the motion makes it likely that an "appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once." Curtiss-Wright , 446 U.S. at 8.
The D.C. Circuit has been clear that the courts in this district should "supply a statement of reasons" in ruling on a motion under Rule 54(b). Taylor , 132 F.3d at 761; Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Superior Cal. v. Babbitt , 161 F.3d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("As we cannot on the record before us determine that the district court [properly exercised its discretion], we conclude that the Rule 54(b) certification before us is not proper."); see also Baystate Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 587 F.Supp.2d 44, 46 (D.D.C. 2008) ("A district court must supply a meaningful explanation for not allowing the normal delay inherent in litigation of multiple claims.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
AFRC seeks an entry of final judgment on all three of its delisting claims, as to which the Court has granted summary judgment in favor of FWS. The unifying premise of the delisting claims is that FWS's denial of AFRC's petition to delist the tri-state population of the marbled murrelet was arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, AFRC challenges FWS's decision finding delisting "not warranted" on three grounds: (1) FWS failed to make the requisite determination under the Endangered Species Act that marbled murrelets "interbreed when mature, " (2) FWS's determination that the tri-state population of marbled murrelets is "discrete" was arbitrary and capricious, and (3) FWS's determination that the tri-state population of marbled murrelets is "significant" was arbitrary and capricious. Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 34, 39, 46.
AFRC's four remaining claims, the habitat claims, have all been remanded to the agency for further consideration. See Sept. 5, 2013 Order. This remand was at FWS's request, which admitted that its 1996 critical habitat designation rested on shaky legal grounds. See Def.'s Mot. for Remand. AFRC brought four habitat claims: (1) FWS improperly designated as critical habitat three million acres that were "not occupied" by the marbled murrelet; (2) FWS failed to use the best scientific and commercial information available in designating the critical habitat; (3) FWS unlawfully designated a critical habitat by including areas that do not "contain physical or biological features essential to the conservation" of the marbled murrelet; and (4) FWS failed to provide an ...