United States District Court, D. Columbia.
DICKINSON N. ADIONSER, Plaintiff, pro se,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al., Defendants
Dickinson Norman Adionser, Plaintiff, Pro se, Mcrae, GA, USA.
For United States Department of Justice, Plaintiff: John Gregory Lennon, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Washington, DC, USA; Timothy E. Broomhead, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Washington, DC, USA.
For Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Executive Office For United States Attorney, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Defendants: John Gregory Lennon, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Washington, DC, USA; Timothy E. Broomhead, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Washington, DC, USA.
RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge.
[Dkt. ##81, 91]
This is yet the latest chapter in the ongoing saga of plaintiff Dickinson Adionser's litigation under the Freedom of Information Act (" FOIA" ) against the Drug Enforcement Administration (" DEA" ). In September 2011, I granted summary judgment in favor of the DEA and other agency defendants, finding that various FOIA and Privacy Act exemptions allowed them to withhold certain documents from plaintiff. See Adionser v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 811 F.Supp.2d 284 (D.D.C. 2011) [Dkt. #47]. That decision was summarily affirmed on appeal, but the case was remanded so I could address new factual and legal circumstances. See Adionser v. U.S. Dep 't of Justice, No. 11-5093, 2012 WL 5897172, at *1-2 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 5, 2012) [Dkt. #65], cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 141, 187 L.Ed.2d 99 (2013). And so I will.
First, as part of its motion for summary affirmance on all other claims, the government notified our Court of Appeals that " the criminal appeal serving as the basis for invocation of [FOIA] Exemption 7(A) ha[d] concluded," thus necessitating a remand for me to consider whether other exemptions cover the documents previously withheld on Exemption 7(A) grounds. Appellees' Mot. for Partial Summ. Affirmance at 1-2 [D.C. Cir. Doc. #1376750]; see Adionser, 2012 WL 5897172, at *1. Second, the court on its own motion directed me to consider, " in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Milner [v. Department of the Navy], 562 U.S. 562, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 179 L.Ed.2d 268 [(2011)]," whether FOIA Exemption 7(E) applies to the DEA's Geographical Drug Enforcement Program (" G-DEP" ) codes previously withheld under Exemption 2. Adionser, 2012 WL 5897172, at *2. Adionser and the DEA have both moved for summary judgment on these two issues, and I will address them in turn. See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (" Def.'s Mot." ) [Dkt. #81]; Pl.'s Cross Mot. for Summ. J. (" Pl.'s Cross Mot." ) [Dkt. #90].
A. G-DEP Codes Withheld Under FOIA Exemption 7(E)
I begin with the second issue because it is discrete and simple. According to the DEA's Fourth Declaration of Katherine L. Myrick (" Fourth Myrick Decl." ) [Dkt. #81-3], and the attached Vaughn Index (Ex. B to Fourth Myrick Decl.)
[Dkt. #81-5]--which I find are sufficiently specific and detailed to warrant the same reliance that I and the Court of Appeals afforded the government's previous declarations and indices, see Adionser, 811 F.Supp.2d at 292-93; Adionser, 2012 WL 5897172, at *1--the G-DEP codes were the only things withheld under Exemption 7(E). See Fourth Myrick Decl. ¶ 28. But plaintiff now says " he is not interested in any G-DEP codes." Pl.'s ...