United States District Court, D. Columbia.
Julie Elice Fontaine, Ex Rel., Realtor, Private Attorney General, Plaintiff, Pro se, Mammoth Lakes, CA.
For Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Federal National Mortgage Association, a/k/a Fannie Mae, also known as FANNIE MAE, Defendants: Mark Anthony Smith, LEAD ATTORNEY, SMITH COWETT, LLP, Washington, DC.
For Phh Mortgage Corporation, formerly known as CENDANT MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant: David M. Souders, LEAD ATTORNEY, Tessa Katherine Somers, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, WEINER BRODSKY KIDER, PC, Washington, DC.
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Julie Elice Fontaine (" Plaintiff" or " Fontaine" ), proceeding pro se, has filed a complaint challenging the potential future foreclosure of property that she owns in Jacksonville, Florida. ( See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Fontaine seeks an injunction to prevent two institutional defendants--JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (" Chase" ) and Federal National Mortgage Association (" Fannie Mae" )--and ten John Does (collectively, " Defendants" ) from foreclosing on 4544 Deer Valley Drive (" the Property" ) at some point in the future, and she also claims that Defendants' past actions
with respect to assigning the mortgage and securitizing the mortgage Note have both violated her right to due process and caused her to suffer emotional distress. ( See Compl. ¶ ¶ 34-60.) Significantly for present purposes, the instant complaint appears to constitute a preemptive strike against the mere possibility of future default because Fontaine specifically alleges that she is not delinquent in her mortgage payments to date and that the Property is not currently subject to foreclosure. ( See id. ¶ ¶ 15, 57.)
As explained further below, this Court concludes that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Fontaine's challenge to a hypothetical potential future foreclosure proceeding--which is the only foreclosure-related injury that the instant complaint alleges. Moreover, given existing precedent in this jurisdiction and elsewhere, Fontaine's claims and allegations regarding Defendants' wrongful treatment of the mortgage Note plainly fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Consequently, despite the fact that Defendants have elected to file an answer containing myriad affirmative defenses rather than moving to dismiss the complaint ( see Chase Answer, ECF No. 10, at 8-9; Fannie Mae Answer, ECF No. 11, at 8-9), Fontaine's complaint must be DISMISSED in its entirety sua sponte. A separate order consistent with this opinion will follow.
Fontaine's 44-page complaint, which was filed on November 27, 2013, is exceedingly difficult to decipher. Relevant to the Property at issue here, the complaint alleges that Fontaine initially entered into a mortgage agreement with PHH Mortgage Corporation (" PHH" ) and that PHH later assigned the mortgage to Chase ( id. ¶ ¶ 3, 6; Assignment of Mortg., Ex. 3 to Compl., ECF No. 1-3 at 2), but it purportedly did not pass the physical Note to Chase at that time of the assignment. ( See Compl. ¶ ¶ 8, 16.) That assignment was recorded in the Clerk's Office for Duval County, Florida ( see Ex. 3 to Compl.), and at some point thereafter, one of the defendants securitized the Note and passed ownership of it to a different party. ( See Compl. ¶ ¶ 17, 21, 25, 44.)
These basic allegations of fact are the basis for the complaint's contention that the assignment and securitization of Fontaine's mortgage Note--in particular, the fact that the assignment allegedly was not accompanied by a physical transfer of the Note and securitization further separated the mortgage from the Note--was wrongful. ( See id. ¶ 48). Fontaine contends that, because the original Note was not physically transferred, the assignment of the Note was invalid and fraudulent such that Defendants would not have standing to foreclose on the Property if they do attempt to do so in the future. ( See, e.g., id. ¶ ¶ 45-49.) Fontaine also alleges that Defendants' handling of the Note, and any possible future foreclosure action, violated her due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution ( id. ¶ 83), as well as the Consent Orders issued in United States v. Bank of America, No. 12-361 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012) (Compl. ¶ ¶ 3, 34, 37), and additionally constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress ( id. ¶ 51). Based on these claims, Fontaine requests compensatory and punitive damages; a cease and desist order admonishing Defendants not to engage in any future foreclosure proceedings related
to the Property; a declaration that Fontaine holds superior title to the property and that Defendants have no lawful claim thereto; and an injunction preventing Defendants from foreclosing on the Property (or any other property owned by any other ...