United States District Court, D. Columbia.
For MOISES BATRES GUEVARA, JOSE GABINO BATRES GUEVARA, Plaintiffs: Gregg Cohen Greenberg, ZIPIN, AMSTER & GREENBERG, LLC, Silver Spring, MD.
For ISCHIA, INC., VITTORIO TESTA, Defendants: John Charles Cook, Lee B. Warren, LEAD ATTORNEYS, COOK, CRAIG & FRANCUZENKO, PLLC, Fairfax, VA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
JOHN D. BATES, United States District Judge.
Plaintiffs Moises Batres Guevara and Jose Gabino Batres Guevara (" the Guevaras" ) bring this action against defendants Ischia, Inc. and Vittorio Testa (doing business as Ristorante La Perla, or " La Perla" ), alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § § 201 et seq. (" FLSA" ) and the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act Revision Act of 1992, D.C. Code § § 32-1001 et seq. (" DCMWA" ). The Guevaras used to work for Testa--the primary owner, president, and executive chef at La Perla--and allege that they regularly worked uncompensated overtime hours at his restaurant. Before the Court is  the Guevaras' motion for partial summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the Guevaras' motion for summary judgment.
Moises Batres Guevara worked at La Perla from October 2010 to May 2011, Pls.' Stmt. of Material Facts Not in Dispute [ECF No. 19-1] (" Pls.' Stmt." ) ¶ 7, as a line cook, Dep. of Moises Guevara [ECF No. 19-5] (" M. Guevara Dep." ) at 12-15. Jose Gabino Batres Guevara worked at La Perla from 2007  to May 2013, Pls.' Stmt. ¶ 8, primarily as a dishwasher, Dep. of Jose Guevara [ECF No. 19-4] (" J. Guevara Dep." ) at 13. Through the duration of their employment, the Guevaras earned
a flat weekly salary. Pls.' Stmt. ¶ 9. Jose Guevara started off with a salary of $450 per week, and ultimately earned a raise to $575 per week. Compl. ¶ 21. Moises Guevara began at $300 per week, and by the time he left was earning $425 per week. Id. ¶ 20. Their pay was always calculated on a weekly basis; it did not fluctuate based on the amount of hours actually worked. Pls.' Stmt. ¶ 9. The Guevaras never received any separately designated overtime pay. Id. ¶ 13. In fact, the parties never discussed overtime. See id. ¶ 12.
The Guevaras claim to have regularly worked in excess of forty hours per week, but that they never received any additional overtime pay, in violation of the FLSA and the DCMWA. Jose Guevara also argues that his total compensation was frequently below the District of Columbia's $8.25 minimum wage. Defendants deny these allegations. The Guevaras now move for partial summary judgment on their overtime claims, asserting that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to liability, or as to their entitlement to liquidated damages under the FLSA and the DCMWA. In other words, the Guevaras seek a trial only on the amount of damages--with any amount found by the jury to be doubled under the FLSA and the DCMWA's liquidated damages provisions. Defendants want a trial on all disputed issues, including liability.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that " there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may successfully support its motion by identifying those portions of " the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1);
see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
In determining whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment, the Court must regard the non-movant's statements as true and accept all evidence and make all inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A non-moving party, however, must establish more than the " mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252. Moreover, " [i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted). Summary judgment, ...