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Perry Capital LLC v. Lew

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 30, 2014

PERRY CAPITAL LLC, Plaintiff,
v.
JACOB J. LEW, et. al., Defendants. FAIRHOLME FUNDS, INC., et. al., Plaintiffs,
v.
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, et. al., Defendants. ARROWOOD INDEMNITY COMPANY, et. al., Plaintiffs,
v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, et. al., Defendants. IN RE FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT CLASS ACTION LITIGATIONS This Memorandum Opinion relates to: ALL CASES Civil Nos. 13-1025 (RCL), 13-1053 (RCL), 13-1439 (RCL)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH United States District Judge

Before the Court are motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, filed by the defendants United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) and Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), as well as a cross-motion for summary judgment on Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claims filed by the Perry, Fairholme, and Arrowood plaintiffs (collectively, “individual plaintiffs”). Upon consideration of the defendants’ respective motions to dismiss, the individual plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment, the various opposition and reply briefs thereto filed by the defendants, the individual plaintiffs, and the class action plaintiffs (“class plaintiffs”), the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court will GRANT the defendants’ motions to dismiss and DENY the individual plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter is brought before the Court by both a class action lawsuit and a set of three individual lawsuits. These four lawsuits contain numerous overlapping, though not identical, claims. The purported class plaintiffs consist of private individual and institutional investors who own either preferred or common stock in the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”). Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 30-44, In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action Litigs., No. 13-1288 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2013), ECF No. 4 (“In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Am. Compl.”); Derivative Compl. at ¶¶ 19-21, In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, No. 13-1288 (D.D.C. July 30, 2014), ECF No. 39 (“In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Derivative Compl.”). The individual plaintiffs comprise a collection of private investment funds and insurance companies. Compl. at ¶¶ 25-27, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 (D.D.C. July 7, 2013), ECF No. 1 (“Perry Compl.”); Compl. at ¶¶ 18-28, Fairholme Funds, Inc., v. FHFA, No. 13-1053 (D.D.C. July 10, 2013), ECF No. 1 (“Fairholme Compl.”); Compl. at ¶¶ 15-19, Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Fannie Mae, No. 13-1439 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2013), ECF No. 1 (“Arrowood Compl.”).

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”), [1] born from statutory charters issued by Congress. See Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459. Congress created the GSEs in order to, among other goals, “promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation . . . by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage financing.” 12 U.S.C. § 1716(3). In other words, the GSEs’ shared purpose was to make it easier (i.e., less risky) for local banks and other lenders to offer mortgages to prospective home buyers. The GSEs sought to accomplish this objective by purchasing mortgage loans from lenders, thus relieving lenders of default risk and “freeing up lenders’ capital to make additional loans.” See Treasury Defs.’s Mot. to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. at 6 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2014) (“Treasury Mot.”).[2] In order to finance this operation, the GSEs would, primarily, pool the many mortgage loans they purchased into various mortgage-backed securities and sell these securities to investors. See, e.g., Individual Pls.’s Opp’n and Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 4 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014) (“Individual Pls.’s Opp’n”).

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considered government-sponsored, rather than government-owned, because both congressionally chartered entities were eventually converted, by statute, into publicly traded corporations. Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 802, 82 Stat. 536-538 (1968); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 731, 103 Stat. 432-433 (1989). Yet despite this historically market-driven ownership structure, “the GSEs have benefitted from a public perception that the federal government had implicitly guaranteed the securities they issued; this perception allowed the GSEs to purchase more mortgages and [mortgage-backed securities], at cheaper rates, than would otherwise prevail in the private market.” Treasury Mot. at 6-7.

By 2008, the United States economy faced dire straits, in large part due to a massive decline within the national housing market. See Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 7. “As a result of the housing crisis, the value of the [GSEs’] assets . . . deteriorated and the [GSEs] suffered . . . credit losses in their portfolios.” FHFA Mot. to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. at 7 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2014) (“FHFA Mot.”).

Given the systemic danger that a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac collapse posed to the already fragile national economy, among other housing market-related perils, Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (“HERA”) on July 30, 2008. See Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 6; Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654. HERA established FHFA as an independent agency to supervise and regulate the GSEs. 12 U.S.C. § 4511. HERA further granted FHFA’s director the authority to appoint the agency as conservator or receiver for the GSEs. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a). Of most relevance to the present litigation, HERA empowered FHFA, as conservator or receiver, to “immediately succeed to—(i) all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the [GSE], and of any stockholder, officer, or director of such [GSE] with respect to the [GSE] and the assets of the [GSE].” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i). The statute also set forth a “[l]imitation on court action, ” noting that, “[e]xcept as provided in this section or at the request of the Director, no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of [FHFA] as a conservator or a receiver.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f). Moreover, apparently recognizing that Treasury (i.e., taxpayer) funds may soon be necessary to capitalize the struggling GSEs, [3]Congress, under HERA, amended the GSEs’ charters to temporarily authorize Treasury to “purchase any obligations and other securities issued by the [GSEs].” 12 U.S.C. § 1455(l)(1)(A) (Freddie Mac); 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(1)(A) (Fannie Mae).[4] This provision also provided that the “Secretary of the Treasury may, at any time, exercise any rights received in connection with such purchases.” 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(2)(A). Treasury’s authority to invest in the GSEs expired on December 31, 2009. 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(4).

Following the GSEs’ unsuccessful effort to “raise capital in the private markets, ” FHFA Mot. at 7-8, FHFA placed the GSEs into conservatorship on September 6, 2008. See, e.g., Class Pls.’s Opp’n at 7 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014) (“Class Pls.’s Opp’n”). One day later, Treasury, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g), entered into Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (“PSPAs”) with each of the GSEs. Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 8. Under the initial PSPAs, Treasury committed to provide up to $100 billion in funding to each GSE “to ensure that their assets were equal to their liabilities”—i.e., to “cure [the GSEs’] negative net worth”—at the end of any fiscal quarter. Id.; FHFA Mot. at 11. On May 6, 2009, Treasury and the GSEs, through FHFA, entered into the First Amendment to the PSPAs, whereby Treasury doubled its funding cap to $200 billion for each GSE. Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 11. On December 24, 2009, the parties executed the Second Amendment, which permitted the GSEs to continue to “draw unlimited sums from Treasury [as required to cure any quarterly negative net worth] until the end of 2012, ” and then, as of December 31, 2012, permanently fixed the funding cap for each GSE (at an amount that, in the end, totaled greater than $200 billion per GSE), in accordance with an agreed-upon formula. Id. at 11-12; FHFA Mot. at 12; see also Treasury AR at 190-91, 196-97.[5]

In exchange for its funding commitment, Treasury received senior preferred stock in each GSE, which entitled Treasury to four principal contractual rights under the PSPAs. See, e.g., Treasury AR at 14. First, Treasury received a senior liquidation preference[6] of $1 billion for each GSE plus a dollar-for-dollar increase each time the GSEs drew upon Treasury’s funding commitment. Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 8-9 (citing Treasury AR at 100, 133). Second, the PSPAs entitled Treasury to dividends equivalent to 10% of Treasury’s existing liquidation preference, paid quarterly.[7] Id. at 9 (citing AR at 32-33, 67-68); Treasury Mot. at 13. Third, Treasury received warrants to acquire up to 79.9% of the GSEs’ common stock at a nominal price. Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 9; e.g., Treasury AR at 15, 43. Fourth, beginning on March 31, 2010, Treasury would be entitled to a periodic commitment fee “to fully compensate [Treasury] for the support provided by the ongoing [funding] [c]ommitment.” Treasury AR at 22, 56. The amount of the periodic commitment fee was to be determined by mutual agreement, and Treasury reserved the right to waive the fee for one year at a time “based on adverse conditions in the United States mortgage market.” Id. Treasury waived the commitment fee in 2010 and 2011, and later, under the Third Amendment, the fee was suspended. Treasury Mot. at 14, 18.

As of August 8, 2012, Treasury had provided $187.5 billion in funding to the GSEs, [8] and, thus, held a total $189.5 billion senior liquidation preference between both GSEs, including the initial $1 billion liquidation preferences from each GSE. Therefore, “the GSEs’ dividend obligations to Treasury were nearly $19 billion per year.” Treasury Mot. at 16.

On August 17, 2012, Treasury and the GSEs, through FHFA, agreed to the Third Amendment to the PSPA, which is the focus of this litigation. The Third Amendment “replaced the previous dividend formula with a requirement that the GSEs pay, as a dividend, the amount by which their net worth for the quarter exceeds a capital buffer of $3 billion. The capital buffer gradually declines over time by $600 million per year, and is entirely eliminated in 2018.” Treasury Mot. at 18. In simpler terms, the amendment “requires Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to pay a quarterly dividend to Treasury equal to the entire net worth of each Enterprise, minus a small reserve that shrinks to zero over time.” Class Pls.’s Opp’n at 3. These dividend payments do not reduce Treasury’s outstanding liquidation preferences. See Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 16.

The plaintiffs cite multiple justifications offered publicly by the defendants for this “net worth sweep.” See Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 16-17. First, Treasury asserted that the amendment will end “the circular practice of the Treasury advancing funds to the [GSEs] simply to pay dividends back to Treasury.” Id. at 16 (citing Press Release, Treasury Dep’t Announces Further Steps to Expedite Wind Down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Aug. 17, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1684.aspx); see also Treasury Mot. at 2, 5, 50; FHFA Mot. at 3, 15-16. However, the plaintiffs counter that in 2012, the GSEs were once again profitable and, pertinently, able to pay the 10% dividend without drawing additional funds from Treasury. Id. at 14-15; but see Fairholme Compl. at ¶ 26 (stating that “approximately $26 billion” of Treasury’s current liquidation preference “were required simply to pay the 10% dividend payments owed to Treasury”). Second, quoting from the same Treasury press release, the plaintiffs note Treasury’s statement that the net worth sweep is consistent with the Obama Administration’s “commitment . . . that the GSEs will be wound down and will not be allowed to retain profits, rebuild capital, and return to the market in their prior form.” Id. at 16-17. Third, according to the press release, the net worth sweep would “make sure that every dollar of earnings that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac generate will be used to benefit taxpayers for their investment in those firms.” Id. at 17.

Under the Third Amendment net worth sweep, the GSEs paid Treasury nearly $130 billion in 2013.[9] Treasury AR at 4352. As mentioned above, under the former dividend arrangement requiring payment equivalent to 10% of Treasury’s existing liquidation preference, the GSEs would have owed nearly $19 billion. Through 2013, the cumulative draws of Treasury funding taken by the GSEs remained $187.5 billion, id. at 4351, and the cumulative dividends paid to Treasury by the GSEs totaled $185.2 billion, id. at 4352.

Notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ attempt to downplay the need for a GSE bailout in the first place, see, e.g., Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 6, 10-11, the plaintiffs do not contest the initial PSPA or subsequent two amendments to the PSPA, see, e.g., Class Pls.’s Opp’n at 11, but rather only challenge the Third Amendment to the PSPA. The class plaintiffs have brought claims of breach of contract, regarding allegedly promised dividends and liquidation preferences, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and an unconstitutional taking, as well as derivative claims of breach of fiduciary duty. The Perry plaintiff has brought claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Arrowood plaintiffs have also brought APA claims, as well as claims of breach of contract, regarding allegedly promised dividends and liquidation preferences, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Fairholme plaintiffs have brought the same claims as the Perry and Arrowood plaintiffs with an additional claim of breach of fiduciary duty against FHFA. The parties dispute whether the Fairholme plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim is direct or derivative. See infra n.24.

On January 17, 2014, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaints against the Third Amendment for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). In the alternative, the defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. In their opposition, filed March 21, 2014, the individual plaintiffs presented a cross-motion for summary judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The Court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff[s] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But “[b]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction focuses on the [C]ourt’s power to hear the claim . . ., the [C]ourt must give the plaintiff[s’] factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Youming Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 475 F.Supp.2d 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2007). Furthermore, when evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, “it has been long accepted that the [Court] may make appropriate inquiry beyond the pleadings to satisfy itself on authority to entertain the case.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A motion to dismiss is also appropriate when the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Court does not “require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Once again, “the complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiffs’ favor, and [the Court] grant[s] plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. However, the [C]ourt need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Nor must the [C]ourt accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . ., matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the [C]ourt, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12.

III. ANALYSIS

A. HERA Bars the Plaintiffs’ Prayers for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Equitable Relief against FHFA and Treasury

By this Court’s calculation, twenty-four of the thirty-one substantive prayers for relief[10] requested by the plaintiffs across their five complaints seek declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief against FHFA or Treasury. See also FHFA Mot. at 22 n.13. Such relief runs up against HERA’s anti-injunction provision, which declares that “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of [FHFA] as a conservator or a receiver.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f).

While case law adjudicating HERA-related disputes is generally sparse, “[c]ourts interpreting the scope of [§] 4617(f) have relied on decisions addressing the nearly identical jurisdictional bar applicable to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (‘FDIC’) conservatorships contained in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j).”[11] Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FHFA, 815 F.Supp.2d 630, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Town of Babylon v. FHFA, 699 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2012). Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, during the savings and loan crisis to enable the FDIC (and, formerly, the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”)) to serve as a conservator or receiver for troubled financial institutions. It was with this backdrop that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Freeman v. FDIC, explained that the language of § 1821(j) “does indeed effect a sweeping ouster of courts’ power to grant equitable remedies.” 56 F.3d 1394, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995).[12] The Circuit held that the FIRREA provision precludes courts from granting “non-monetary remedies, including injunctive relief [] [and] declaratory relief” that would “effectively ‘restrain’ the [agency] from” exercising its statutorily authorized responsibilities. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)). As the parties both agree, an equivalent bar on jurisdiction derives from HERA’s substantially identical anti-injunction provision. E.g., Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 31-32.

Like a number of its sister circuits, however, this Circuit has established that, if the agency “has acted or proposes to act beyond, or contrary to, its statutorily prescribed, constitutionally permitted, powers or functions, ” then 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) shall not apply. Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres. v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (referring to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)); see also Leon Cnty., Fla. v. FHFA, 700 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012) (“‘[I]f the FHFA were to act beyond statutory or constitutional bounds in a manner that adversely impacted the rights of others, § 4617(f) would not bar judicial oversight or review of its actions.’”) (quoting In re Freddie Mac Derivative Litig., 643 F.Supp.2d 790, 799 (E.D. Va. 2009)); Cnty. of Sonoma v. FHFA, 710 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he anti-judicial review provision is inapplicable when FHFA acts beyond the scope of its conservator power.”). Thus, the question for this Court is whether the plaintiffs sufficiently plead that FHFA acted beyond the scope of its statutory “powers or functions . . . as a conservator” when the agency executed the Third Amendment to the PSPAs with Treasury. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f). If not, the Court must dismiss all of the defendants’ claims for declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief.[13]

1. Section 4617(f) Bars Claims of Arbitrary and Capricious Conduct, under APA § 706(2)(A), Which Seek Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Equitable Relief

While there is a “strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action, ” Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986), that presumption is “defeated if the substantive statute precludes review.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 843 (1985) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)). The plaintiffs do not discuss the applicability of 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) of the APA to the present case in any of their oppositions, except to cite Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 63-64 (1993), in the individual plaintiffs’ opposition and reply briefs for the proposition that the Court can preclude APA review “only if presented with clear and convincing evidence” of congressional intent to preclude such review. E.g., Individual Pls.’s Reply to Defs.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 15-16 (D.D.C. June 2, 2014) (“Individual Pls.’s Reply”). The individual plaintiffs are correct in that the “presumption of judicial review [under the APA] is, after all, a presumption, and like all presumptions used in interpreting statutes, may be overcome by, inter alia, specific language . . . that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent . . . to preclude judicial review.” Bowen, 476 U.S. at 673 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). HERA’s express anti-injunction provision, which, as explained below, necessarily covers litigation arising out of contracts executed by FHFA in accordance with its duties as a conservator, qualifies as a reliable indicator of congressional intent to preclude review of non-monetary APA claims brought against both FHFA and Treasury. Importantly, when applying FIRREA’s anti-injunction provision, 12 U.S.C § 1821(j), this Circuit has only considered whether the FDIC acted beyond “its statutorily prescribed, constitutionally permitted, powers or functions” under FIRREA, specifically, and not whether it acted beyond any of its more general APA obligations under 5 U.S.C. § 702(2). See Nat’l Trust, 21 F.3d at 472 (Wald, J., concurring and further noting that, “given the breadth of the statutory language [of § 1821(j)], untempered by any persuasive legislative history pointing in a different direction, the statute would appear to bar a court from acting in virtually all circumstances”); Freeman, 56 F.3d at 1398-99; MBIA Ins. Corp. v. FDIC, 816 F.Supp.2d 81, 103 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 708 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Leon Cnty., 700 F.3d at 1278-79. In other words, this Circuit, like the APA itself, implicitly draws a distinction between acting beyond the scope of the constitution or a statute, see § 702(2)(B) and (C), and acting within the scope of a statute, but doing so arbitrarily and capriciously, see § 702(2)(A). This distinction arises directly from the text of § 4617(f), which prohibits the Court from restraining “the exercise of powers or functions of [FHFA]”—i.e., restraining how FHFA employs its powers or functions—but does not prohibit review based upon the statutory or constitutional origin of the powers or functions themselves. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (emphasis added). Consequently, it does appear that § 4617(f) bars all declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief stemming from claims of arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking, under APA § 706(2)(A). Thus, the two counts in each of the Perry, Fairholme, and Arrowood Complaints, and related prayers for relief, that claim APA violations for arbitrary and capricious conduct by both Treasury and FHFA are hereby dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).[14]

2. Section 4617(f) Applies to Treasury’s Authority under HERA

As a threshold matter, the plaintiffs contend that § 4617(f) does not bar claims against Treasury because the provision only governs claims against FHFA. However, the defendants’ argument that granting relief against the counterparty to a contract with FHFA would directly restrain FHFA’s ability as a conservator vis-à-vis that contract is based on sound reasoning. See, e.g., Treasury Reply at 12-13 (collecting cases outside of this Circuit). Conduct by a counterparty that is required under a contract with FHFA does not merely constitute “a peripheral connection to FHFA’s activities as the [GSEs’] conservator.” See Individual Pls.’s Opp’n at 29. To the contrary, such interdependent, contractual conduct is directly connected to FHFA’s activities as a conservator. A plaintiff is not entitled to use the technical wording of her complaint—i.e., bringing a claim against a counterparty when the contract in question is intertwined with FHFA’s responsibilities as a conservator—as an end-run around HERA. Therefore, § 4617(f) applies generally to litigation concerning a contract signed by FHFA pursuant to its powers as a conservator.

Additionally, when the counterparty to FHFA’s contract—Treasury—is also a government entity operating based on authority derived from HERA, e.g. 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g) (temporarily authorizing Treasury to purchase GSE securities), HERA’s anti-injunction provision may be logically extended to that government counterparty. Likewise, if FHFA, as a conservator or receiver, signs a contract with another government entity that is acting beyond the scope of its HERA powers, then FHFA is functionally complicit in its counterparty’s misconduct, and such unlawful actions may be imputed to FHFA. Here, as noted above, there can be little doubt that enjoining Treasury from partaking in the Third Amendment would restrain FHFA’s uncontested ...


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