United States District Court, D. Columbia.
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For PERRY CAPITAL LLC, for and on behalf of investment funds for which it acts as investment manager, Plaintiff (1:13-cv-01025): Theodore B. Olson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Douglas R. Cox, Matthew D McGill, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, L.L.P., Washington, DC.
For JACOB J. LEW, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Defendants (1:13-cv-01025): Joel L. McElvain, LEAD ATTORNEY, Thomas David Zimpleman, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Civil Division, Washington, DC.
For EDWARD DEMARCO, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, Defendants (1:13-cv-01025): Asim Varma, David Block Bergman, Howard Neil Cayne, LEAD ATTORNEYS, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Washington, DC.
For Fairholme Funds, Inc, on behalf of its series, The Fairholme Fund, Fairholme Fund a series of Fairholme Funds, Inc., Berkley Insurance Company, Acadia Insurance Company, Admiral Indemnity Company, Admiral Insurance Company, Berkley Regional Insurance Company, Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, Midwest Employers Casualty Insurance Company, Nautilus Insurance Company, Preferred Employers Insurance Company, Plaintiffs (1:13cv1053): Peter A. Patterson, LEAD ATTORNEY, David Henry Thompson, Howard C. Nielson, Jr., Vincent J. Colatriano, Charles J. Cooper, COOPER & KIRK, PLLC, Washington, DC USA.
For Federal Housing Finance Agency in its capacity as Conservator of the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Edward Demarco in his official capacity as Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Defendant (1:13cv1053): Asim Varma, David Block Bergman, Howard Neil Cayne, LEAD ATTORNEYS, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Washington, DC USA.
For Department of Treasury, Defendant (1:13cv1053): Joel L. McElvain, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Civil Division, Washington, DC USA; Thomas David Zimpleman, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC USA.
For Arrowood Indemnity Company, Arrowood Surplus Lines Insurance Company, Financial Structures Limited, Plaintiffs (1:13cv1439): Michael H. Barr, Richard M. Zuckerman, LEAD ATTORNEYS, PRO HAC VICE, DENTONS U.S. LLP, Ny, N.Y. USA; Sandra D Hauser, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, DENTONS U.S. LLP, New York, N.Y. USA; Drew William Marrocco, DENTONS U.S. LLP, Washington, DC USA.
For Federal National Mortgage Association, Defendant (1:13cv1439): Paul Clement, LEAD ATTORNEY, BANCROFT PLLC, Washington, DC USA. Stephen V Potenza, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, BANCROFT PLLC, New York, N.Y. USA.
For Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Defendant (1:13cv1439): Graciela Maria Rodriguez, LEAD ATTORNEY, KING & SPALDING, LLP, Washington, DC USA; Michael Joseph Ciatti, LEAD ATTORNEY, KING & SPALDING, Washington, DC USA.
For Federal Housing Finance Agency, Defendant (1:13cv1439): Asim Varma, LEAD ATTORNEY, David Block Bergman, Howard Neil Cayne, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Washington, DC USA.
For Department of Treasury, Defendant (1:13cv1439): Joel L. McElvain, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Civil Division, Washington, DC USA; Thomas David Zimpleman, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC USA.
For Edward Demarco, Defendant (1:13cv1439): Asim Varma, LEAD ATTORNEY, David Block Bergman, Howard Neil Cayne, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Washington, DC USA.
For Jacob J. Lew, Defendant (1:13cv1439): Joel L. McElvain, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Civil Division, Washington, DC USA; Thomas David Zimpleman, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC USA.
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, United States District Judge.
Before the Court are motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment,
filed by the defendants United States Department of the Treasury (" Treasury" ) and Federal Housing Finance Agency (" FHFA" ), as well as a cross-motion for summary judgment on Administrative Procedure Act (" APA" ) claims filed by the Perry, Fairholme, and Arrowood plaintiffs (collectively, " individual plaintiffs" ). Upon consideration of the defendants' respective motions to dismiss, the individual plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment, the various opposition and reply briefs thereto filed by the defendants, the individual plaintiffs, and the class action plaintiffs (" class plaintiffs" ), the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court will GRANT the defendants' motions to dismiss and DENY the individual plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment.
This matter is brought before the Court by both a class action lawsuit and a set of three individual lawsuits. These four lawsuits contain numerous overlapping, though not identical, claims. The purported class plaintiffs consist of private individual and institutional investors who own either preferred or common stock in the Federal National Mortgage Association (" Fannie Mae" ) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (" Freddie Mac" ). Am. Compl. at ¶ ¶ 30-44, In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action Litigs., No. 13-1288 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2013), ECF No. 4 (" In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Am. Compl." ); Derivative Compl. at ¶ ¶ 19-21, In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, No. 13-1288 (D.D.C. July 30, 2014), ECF No. 39 (" In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Derivative Compl." ). The individual plaintiffs comprise a collection of private investment funds and insurance companies. Compl. at ¶ ¶ 25-27, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 (D.D.C. July 7, 2013), ECF No. 1 (" Perry Compl." ); Compl. at ¶ ¶ 18-28, Fairholme Funds, Inc., v. FHFA, No. 13-1053 (D.D.C. July 10, 2013), ECF No. 1 (" Fairholme Compl." ); Compl. at ¶ ¶ 15-19, Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Fannie Mae, No. 13-1439 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2013), ECF No. 1 (" Arrowood Compl." ).
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (" GSEs" ), born from statutory charters issued by Congress. See Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, 12 U.S.C. § § 1716-1723; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § § 1451-1459. Congress created the GSEs in order to, among other goals, " promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation . . . by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage financing." 12 U.S.C. § 1716(3). In other words, the GSEs' shared purpose was to make it easier ( i.e., less risky) for local banks and other lenders to offer mortgages to prospective home buyers. The GSEs sought to accomplish this objective by purchasing mortgage loans from lenders, thus relieving lenders of default risk and " freeing up lenders' capital to make additional loans." See Treasury Defs.'s Mot. to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. at 6 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2014) (" Treasury Mot." ). In order
to finance this operation, the GSEs would, primarily, pool the many mortgage loans they purchased into various mortgage-backed securities and sell these securities to investors. See, e.g., Individual Pls.'s Opp'n and Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 4 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014) (" Individual Pls.'s Opp'n" ).
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considered government- sponsored, rather than government- owned, because both congressionally chartered entities were eventually converted, by statute, into publicly traded corporations. Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 802, 82 Stat. 536-538 (1968); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 731, 103 Stat. 432-433 (1989). Yet despite this historically market-driven ownership structure, " the GSEs have benefitted from a public perception that the federal government had implicitly guaranteed the securities they issued; this perception allowed the GSEs to purchase more mortgages and [mortgage-backed securities], at cheaper rates, than would otherwise prevail in the private market." Treasury Mot. at 6-7.
By 2008, the United States economy faced dire straits, in large part due to a massive decline within the national housing market. See Individual Pls.'s Opp'n at 7. " As a result of the housing crisis, the value of the [GSEs'] assets . . . deteriorated and the [GSEs] suffered . . . credit losses in their portfolios." FHFA Mot. to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. at 7 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2014) (" FHFA Mot." ).
Given the systemic danger that a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac collapse posed to the already fragile national economy, among other housing market-related perils, Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (" HERA" ) on July 30, 2008. See Individual Pls.'s Opp'n at 6; Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654. HERA established FHFA as an independent agency to supervise and regulate the GSEs. 12 U.S.C. § 4511. HERA further granted FHFA's director the authority to appoint the agency as conservator or receiver for the GSEs. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a). Of most relevance to the present litigation, HERA empowered FHFA, as conservator or receiver, to " immediately succeed to--(i) all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the [GSE], and of any stockholder, officer, or director of such [GSE] with respect to the [GSE] and the assets of the [GSE]." 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i). The statute also set forth a " [l]imitation on court action," noting that, " [e]xcept as provided in this section or at the request of the Director, no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of [FHFA] as a conservator or a receiver." 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f). Moreover, apparently recognizing that Treasury ( i.e., taxpayer) funds may soon be necessary to capitalize the struggling GSEs, Congress, under HERA, amended the GSEs' charters to temporarily authorize Treasury to " purchase any obligations and other securities issued by the [GSEs]." 12 U.S.C. § 1455(l)(1)(A) (Freddie Mac); 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(1)(A)
(Fannie Mae). This provision also provided that the " Secretary of the Treasury may, at any time, exercise any rights received in connection with such purchases." 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(2)(A). Treasury's authority to invest in the GSEs expired on December 31, 2009. 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(4).
Following the GSEs' unsuccessful effort to " raise capital in the private markets," FHFA Mot. at 7-8, FHFA placed the GSEs into conservatorship on September 6, 2008. See, e.g., Class Pls.'s Opp'n at 7 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014) (" Class Pls.'s Opp'n" ). One day later, Treasury, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g), entered into Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (" PSPAs" ) with each of the GSEs. Individual Pls.'s Opp'n at 8. Under the initial PSPAs, Treasury committed to provide up to $100 billion in funding to each GSE " to ensure that their assets were equal to their liabilities" -- i.e., to " cure [the GSEs'] negative net worth" --at the end of any fiscal quarter. Id.; FHFA Mot. at 11. On May 6, 2009, Treasury and the GSEs, through FHFA, entered into the First Amendment to the PSPAs, whereby Treasury doubled its funding cap to $200 billion for each GSE. Individual Pls.'s Opp'n at 11. On December 24, 2009, the parties executed the Second Amendment, which permitted the GSEs to continue to " draw unlimited sums from Treasury [as required to cure any quarterly negative net worth] until the end of 2012," and then, as of December 31, 2012, permanently fixed the funding cap for each GSE (at an amount that, in the end, totaled greater than $200 billion per GSE), in accordance with an agreed-upon formula. Id. at 11-12; FHFA Mot. at 12; see also Treasury AR at 190-91, 196-97.
In exchange for its funding commitment, Treasury received senior preferred stock in each GSE, which entitled Treasury to four principal contractual rights under the PSPAs. See, e.g., Treasury AR at 14. First, Treasury received a senior liquidation preference of $1 billion for each GSE plus a dollar-for-dollar increase each time the GSEs drew upon Treasury's funding commitment. Individual Pls.'s Opp'n at 8-9 (citing Treasury AR at 100, 133). Second, the PSPAs entitled Treasury to dividends equivalent to 10% of Treasury's existing liquidation preference, paid quarterly. Id. at 9 (citing AR at 32-33, 67-68); Treasury Mot. at 13. Third, Treasury
received warrants to acquire up to 79.9% of the GSEs' common stock at a nominal price. Individual Pls.'s Opp'n at 9; e.g., Treasury AR at 15, 43. Fourth, beginning on March 31, 2010, Treasury would be entitled to a periodic commitment fee " to fully compensate [Treasury] for the support provided by the ongoing [funding] [c]ommitment." Treasury AR at 22, 56. The amount of the periodic commitment fee was to be determined by mutual agreement, and Treasury reserved the right to waive the fee for one year at a time " based on adverse conditions in the United States mortgage market." Id. Treasury waived the commitment fee in 2010 and 2011, and later, under the Third Amendment, the fee was suspended. Treasury Mot. at 14, 18.
As of August 8, 2012, Treasury had provided $187.5 billion in funding to the GSEs, and, thus, held a total $189.5 billion senior liquidation preference between both GSEs, including the initial $1 billion liquidation preferences from each GSE. Therefore, " the GSEs' dividend obligations to Treasury were nearly $19 billion per year." Treasury Mot. at 16.
On August 17, 2012, Treasury and the GSEs, through FHFA, agreed to the Third Amendment to the PSPA, which is the focus of this litigation. The Third Amendment " replaced the previous dividend formula with a requirement that the GSEs pay, as a dividend, the amount by which their net worth for the quarter exceeds a capital buffer of $3 billion. The capital buffer gradually declines over time by $600 million per year, and is entirely eliminated in 2018." Treasury Mot. at 18. In simpler terms, the amendment " requires
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to pay a quarterly dividend to Treasury equal to the entire net worth of each Enterprise, minus a small reserve that shrinks to zero over time." Class Pls.'s Opp'n at 3. These dividend payments do not reduce Treasury's outstanding liquidation preferences. See Individual Pls.'s Opp'n at 16.
The plaintiffs cite multiple justifications offered publicly by the defendants for this " net worth sweep." See Individual Pls.'s Opp'n at 16-17. First, Treasury asserted that the amendment will end " the circular practice of the Treasury advancing funds to the [GSEs] simply to pay dividends back to Treasury." Id. at 16 (citing Press Release, Treasury Dep't Announces Further Steps to Expedite Wind Down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Aug. 17, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1684.aspx); see also Treasury Mot. at 2, 5, 50; FHFA Mot. at 3, 15-16. However, the plaintiffs counter that in 2012, the GSEs were once again profitable and, pertinently, able to pay the 10% dividend without drawing additional funds from Treasury. Id. at 14-15; but see Fairholme Compl. at ¶ 26 (stating that " approximately $26 billion" of Treasury's current liquidation preference " were required simply to pay the 10% dividend payments owed to Treasury" ). Second, quoting from the same Treasury press release, the plaintiffs note Treasury's statement that the net worth sweep is consistent with the Obama Administration's " commitment . . . that the GSEs will be wound down and will not be allowed to retain profits, rebuild capital, and return to the market in their prior form." Id. at 16-17. Third, according to the press release, the net worth sweep would " make sure that every dollar of earnings that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac generate will be used to benefit taxpayers for their investment in those firms." Id. at 17.
Under the Third Amendment net worth sweep, the GSEs paid Treasury nearly $130 billion in 2013. Treasury AR at 4352. As mentioned above, under the former dividend arrangement requiring payment equivalent to 10% of Treasury's existing liquidation preference, the GSEs would have owed nearly $19 billion. Through 2013, the cumulative draws of Treasury funding taken by the GSEs remained $187.5 billion, id. at 4351, and the cumulative dividends paid to Treasury by the GSEs totaled $185.2 billion, id. at 4352.
Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' attempt to downplay the need for a GSE bailout in the first place, see, e.g., Individual Pls.'s Opp'n at 6, 10-11, the plaintiffs do not contest the initial PSPA or subsequent two amendments to the PSPA, see, e.g., Class Pls.'s Opp'n at 11, but rather only challenge the Third Amendment to the PSPA. The class plaintiffs have brought claims of breach of contract, regarding allegedly promised dividends and liquidation preferences, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and an unconstitutional taking, as well as derivative claims of breach of fiduciary duty. The Perry plaintiff has brought claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (" APA" ). The Arrowood plaintiffs have also brought APA claims, as well as claims of breach of contract, regarding allegedly promised dividends and liquidation preferences, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Fairholme plaintiffs have brought the same claims as the Perry and Arrowood plaintiffs with an additional claim of breach of fiduciary duty against FHFA. The parties
dispute whether the Fairholme plaintiffs' fiduciary duty claim is direct or ...