United States District Court, D. Columbia.
GREGORY WALSH, EX REL., Private Attorneys General, Realtor, Plaintiff, Pro se, Fairfax, VA.
For JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA, Defendant: Andrew Richard Louis, Jennifer Ann Slagle-Peck, LEAD ATTORNEYS, BUCKLEYSANDLER LLP, Washington, DC.
For BWW LAW GROUP, LLC, Defendant: Adam Marc Kaplan, LEAD ATTORNEY, BWW LAW GROUP, LLC, Rockville, MD.
For WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, Defendant: Virginia W. Barnhart, LEAD ATTORNEY, TREANOR, POPE & HUGHES, P.A., Towson, MD.
For GLENDELL HILL, in his Official and Private Capacity, PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, also known as PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT, Defendants: Alexander Francuzenko, LEAD ATTORNEY, COOK, CRAIG & FRANCUZENKO, PLLC, Fairfax, VA.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Gregory Walsh brings this pro se action against defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (" JPMorgan Chase" ), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (" Wells Fargo" ), and Bank of New York Mellon (" BNY Mellon" ) (the " bank defendants" ), Prince William County (Virginia) Sheriff Glendell Hill and the Prince William County (Virginia) Sheriff's Office (the " sheriff defendants" ), and BWW Law Group, LLC (" BWW" ). Compl. [Dkt. # 1]. In essence, plaintiff seeks to halt the planned foreclosures on two properties in Virginia. The six-count complaint advances numerous allegations of wrongdoing by defendants that plaintiff contends make the Virginia foreclosures invalid, including violations of the consent judgment entered in United States v. Bank of America Corporation, et al., No. 12-cv-0361-RMC [Dkt. # 10, 14] (D.D.C. April 4, 2012) (" consent judgment" ), the False Claims Act (" FCA" ), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § § 1983, 1985, and 1986, and various other constitutional, statutory, and common law rights. Compl. ¶ ¶ 66-109.
All defendants except for BNY Mellon have moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Sheriff Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 4] at 1 (" Sheriffs' Mot." ); Def. BWW's Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 7] at 1 (" BWW Mot." ); Mot. to Dismiss by Wells Fargo [Dkt. # 13] at 1 (" Wells Fargo Mot." ); Def. JPMorgan Chase's Mot. to Dismiss & Incorporated Mem. of Law [Dkt. # 15] at 1 (" JPMorgan Chase Mot." ). Defendant
BNY Mellon has not yet responded to the complaint. Because the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will dismiss the complaint as to all defendants.
I. Plaintiff's Allegations
According to the complaint, plaintiff is the owner of two properties located in Bristow, Virginia and Dumfries, Virginia. Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that " Defendants . . . have deliberately and with malice raced at break neck speed towards foreclosure and eviction of the Plaintiffs [sic] from their homes," id. ¶ 7, and that he will soon " suffer irreparable harm," id. ¶ 1. Plaintiff also contends that all of the defendants are working together to deprive him of his rights and his property under the direction of defendant Wells Fargo. Id. ¶ 3.
Plaintiff alleges repeatedly throughout the sixty-five page complaint that the three bank defendants have engaged in improper practices that make the planned foreclosures on the Virginia properties invalid. For instance, plaintiff claims that Wells Fargo and BNY Mellon have " created several documents . . . which are designed to deceive the Plaintiffs [sic] and the Courts and [to] give [Wells Fargo] a defective and fraudulent interest in" the two Virginia properties. Id. ¶ 3. He also claims that the banks have not " proven their ownership interest in the note and have not proven their possession of the original note," id. ¶ 7, that the banks never " provided the proper notification regarding any alleged assignment of the note," id. ¶ 9, and that JPMorgan Chase has failed to comply with plaintiff's " lawful demand for them to Exhibit the instrument." Id. ¶ 10; see also id. ¶ ¶ 11, 14-24, 26, 28-30, 32-34, 36-37, 39, 42, 44, 46, 48-51, 56-57 (outlining the same and similar allegations about the improper foreclosure practices of the bank defendants). Plaintiff further contends that the bank defendants' actions violate the consent judgment and the Uniform Commercial Code (" UCC" ). See, e.g., id. ¶ ¶ 1, 6-7, 9-11, 14-15, 17, 19-20, 23-25, 28, 36, 39-40, 42, 44, 47-50, 56, 63-64. And plaintiff claims that the bank defendants have conspired together to deprive him of his rights. See id. ¶ 36.
Plaintiff's allegations against the sheriff defendants stem from the claims he brings against the banks. The complaint explains that " [t]he Sheriff's [sic] Defendants are sued prospectively, in order to prevent irreparable harm from the planned foreclosures," id. ¶ 4, because the sheriff defendants " will be asked to assist the banks through their participation in an auction of the subject property and the issuance of a Sheriff's Deed, in violation of the consent [judgment]." Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff further alleges that Sheriff Hill " either knew or
should have known" that the bank defendants were violating the consent judgment and the UCC, and that he " has established [a] custom and policy for his department . . . to assist the five largest banks in their foreclosure sales, even though they do not have a documented enforceable interest in the note and mortgage as required under the consent [judgment]." Id. ¶ 36.
The complaint does not contain any express allegations against defendant BWW. See generally id. In his opposition to BWW's motion to dismiss, however, plaintiff identifies BWW as a legal representative for Wells Fargo and JPMorgan Chase, and contends that it has " assisted the other Defendants in filing an eviction case to obtain unlawful control and ownership" of plaintiff's properties. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Opp. to BWW Mot. [Dkt. # 19] ¶ ¶ 4-5 (" Pl.'s Opp. to BWW Mot." ). In the opposition, plaintiff also argues that " business partners, agents, assigns and proxies" of Wells Fargo, such as BWW, are bound by the consent judgment " [b]y implication." Id. ¶ 40.
The complaint contains six counts styled as " Causes of Action" (" COA" ). The first COA alleges that all defendants conspired together in violation of 42 U.S.C. § § 1983, 1985, and 1986, and that the " [n]on-state actors employed and used the state actors and government organs and instrumentalities to carry out their unlawful activities." Id. ¶ 66. It further asserts that all defendants " intentionally inflicted emotional distress" on plaintiff by improperly seeking to foreclose on his property. Id. And it again repeats plaintiff's claim that " the Defendants have not established, with admissible evidence, that any of them are the holder of the note or the holder of the Deed of Trust," that ...