United States District Court, District of Columbia
STEVEN D. ROACH, Plaintiff,
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, et al., Defendants
STEVEN D. ROACH, Plaintiff, Pro se, Fredricksburg, VA.
For VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., LOWELL MCADAM, Defendants: Natalie Olivia Ludaway, LEAD ATTORNEY, LEFTWICH & LUDAWAY, Washington, DC.
For GROUPE CGI INC./CGI GROUP INC., MICHAEL E. ROACH, GEORGE SCHINDLER, CGI FEDERAL INC., DONNA RYAN, Defendants: Richard W. Smith, LEAD ATTORNEY, WILEY REIN LLP, Washington, DC.
For UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Interested Party: Alan R. Burch, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Civil Division, Washington, DC.
Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge.
Before the Court are defendants' Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 6 and 11)--one filed by CGI Federal Inc., CGI Group Inc., Michael Roach, George Schindler, and Donna Ryan (collectively, " CGI defendants"), and the other filed by Verizon Communications Inc. and Lowell McAdam (collectively, " Verizon defendants")--and the Statement of Interest of the United States requesting dismissal of the claims of plaintiff Steven D. Roach against all government defendants sua sponte (ECF No. 4). Upon consideration of defendants' motions and taking up plaintiff's claims against the government defendants sua sponte, this Court GRANTS defendants' Motions to Dismiss and DISMISSES plaintiff's complaint against all defendants for the reasons stated below.
Plaintiff's complaint contains detailed allegations of the historical background of President Barrack Obama and his citizenship. Compl. 5-14. Although the complaint is difficult to navigate, plaintiff's ultimate assertion is that President Barrack Obama is not a citizen of the United States of America and is therefore ineligible to hold the office of President. Plaintiff claims that " defendant President's laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and appointments are subject to a sustained objection and a demand for an exemption or other relief, as requested." Id. at 19. Plaintiff also asserts that " [i]nstead of investigating and curing the defect after notice of the allegation defendant President was ineligible, defendants engaged in a scheme to use government resources for surveillance and to track, watch, harass, interfere, intimidate, pen register and discourage Plaintiff from pursuing the allegations and further exposing corruption and subversion of the U.S. Const." Id. at 22. The complaint does not specify the actions in which each of the individual defendants engaged, but only that the defendants as a unit are responsible for covering up the President's ineligibility and attempted to quiet plaintiff from making this information public.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Because this Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), an argument raised by all defendants, this opinion will address only the Rule 12(b)(6) argument for dismissal.
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal
For plaintiff's complaint to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), it must " contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible on its face when " the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.; see also Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) . Although a court must accept factual allegations as true, it is " not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations must " raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported only by conclusory statements are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 556; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.
This Court has difficulty comprehending exactly what are plaintiff's claims. It appears that plaintiff is seeking redress for tortious actions carried out by the defendants because plaintiff states in his complaint that he is seeking monetary relief pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (" FTCA"). Compl. 31. It seems plaintiff believes the tortious actions were the defendants' alleged activities undertaken to cover up the President's ineligibility for office. Id. Plaintiff also uses language such as " conspire, " " conspiracy, " " defraud, " and " fraudulent" throughout his complaint. This Court notes that plaintiff may be claiming conspiracy and fraud on the part of the defendants. Whatever the claims plaintiff may be asserting, all claims are dismissed because plaintiff does not state a single claim for relief in his complaint to satisfy the ...