United States District Court, District of Columbia
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, District Judge.
Ricky Lynn Cole is currently serving a 365-month sentence for interstate transportation and distribution of child pornography. In 2011, Cole filed a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request for the employment and disciplinary records of a Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agent, whom Cole has accused of misconduct in connection with his prosecution. The FBI responded by neither confirming nor denying the existence of any such records. The FBI based its response on FOIA Exemptions (6) and (7)(C), stating that disclosure of any personnel records would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the agent's personal privacy. After unsuccessfully appealing the FBI's response within the Agency, Cole filed suit in this Court, asserting that the public interest in uncovering the improper conduct that he claims would be revealed in the requested record outweighs the agent's privacy interests. The FBI moved for summary judgment. Because the Court finds that Cole has failed to support his allegations of misconduct with sufficient evidence to warrant balancing the public interest in disclosure against the privacy interests at stake, the Court will grant the FBI's motion for summary judgment.
In October 2005, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas convicted Cole of "107 counts of interstate transportation of child pornography, distribution of child obscenity, transportation of obscene matter, and aiding and abetting." United States v. Cole, 535 F.Appx. 445, 446 (5th Cir. 2013). Cole was sentenced in January 2006 to a prison term of 365 months. Id . He then filed a habeas petition with the district court seeking to vacate his conviction and sentence on the grounds that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to alleged government interference with a defense witness, Tina Cox-Cole ("Cox"). Cole v. United States, No. 5:05-CR-027-01-C, 2014 WL 1724768, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2014). After a hearing, the court found the evidence insufficient to support Cole's allegations and concluded that his motions were frivolous, without merit, and filed to delay a final resolution. Id. at *1.
In September 2011, Cole submitted a FOIA request for any records regarding complaints of misconduct, disciplinary action, and the employment status of FBI Special Agent Derek Stone, who had investigated his crimes. Cole alleges that Agent Stone "intimidated a key defense witness to scare her from testifying" at his trial, Decl. of Ricky Lynn Cole, ¶ 2 (Dec. 12, 2014), and he consequently needs the documents to "support his claim of substantial government misconduct" during his prosecution. Def.'s Stmt of Material Facts ¶ 2 (ECF No. 21-2). Pursuant to the FBI's policy on FOIA requests seeking third-party records, the FBI issued a "Glomar response, " neither confirming nor denying the existence of such records absent a privacy waiver, proof of the subject's death, "or a clear demonstration that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the personal privacy interest and that significant public benefit would result from the disclosure of the requested records." Decl. of David M. Hardy ¶¶ 2-3, 6 (ECF No. 22-1) ("Hardy Decl."). The FBI based its response on FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), which protect from disclosure personnel and medical records, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), and records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, production of which would constitute an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy". Id . § (7)(C).
Cole appealed the FBI's decision to the Office of Information Policy ("OIP"), asserting that the requested information was needed to support his claims of "innocence" and "prosecutorial misconduct, specifically substantial interference of critical defense witnesses by Special Agent Stone." See Hardy Decl. Ex. C. OIP affirmed the FBI's decision. Id . Ex. E. Cole then filed this suit.
II. Legal Standard
Congress created FOIA "to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny." Am. Civil Liberties Union v. DOJ, 655 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)). Despite this broad mandate, FOIA contains a set of exemptions to the general obligation to provide government records to the public. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b). These exemptions are in place "to balance the public's interest in governmental transparency against the "legitimate governmental and private interests [that] could be harmed by release of certain types of information.'" United Techs. Corp. v. Dep't of Defense, 601 F.3d 557, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Critical Mass. Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc)). Because FOIA "mandates a strong presumption in favor of disclosure, " its "statutory exemptions, which are exclusive, are to be narrowly construed." Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted).
"FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment." Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F.Supp.2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court assumes the truth of the non-movant's evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The government bears the burden to establish that the claimed exemptions apply to each document for which they are invoked. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The government may satisfy this burden through declarations that describe the justifications for its withholdings in "specific detail, demonstrat[ing] that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption.'" Id . The agency's affidavits will not be sufficient to warrant summary judgment if the plaintiff puts forth contrary evidence or demonstrates the agency's bad faith. Id.
Cole does not dispute that the requested information falls within FOIA's Exemptions 6 and 7(C). He asserts instead that Special Agent Stone engaged in "substantial misconduct" and the public interest in exposing this "government corruption" outweighs the agent's privacy interests. See Pl.'s Opp'g Mem. of P. & A. at 2-4. The Court finds that the information Cole requested is protected under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) because Cole has not demonstrated that Agent Stone's privacy interest in the requested information is outweighed by a public interest in disclosure.
A. Glomar Response
An agency may issue a Glomar response, refusing to confirm or deny the existence of requested information under a FOIA exemption when doing so "would itself cause harm cognizable.'" Am. Civil Liberties Union v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Roth v. DOJ, 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011)) (citation omitted); accord Smith v. FBI, 663 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding a Glomar response proper when confirmation of records concerning any adverse action or disciplinary reports on an FBI agent would necessarily reveal the information Exemption 6 shields). Here, the FBI based its Glomar response on two grounds. First, under FOIA Exemption 6, an agency is not required to disclose "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Second, Exemption 7(C) protects "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information... could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id . § 552(b)(7)(C).
Although both exemptions seek to prevent unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, the scope of their protection differs. The privacy interests to be weighed under Exemption 7(C) are somewhat broader than those considered under Exemption 6 because the latter is limited to "clearly" unwarranted invasions. Beck, 997 F.2d at 1491 (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756). For both exemptions, the Court must balance the privacy interests against "the public interest in release of the requested information." Beck, 997 F.2d at 1491 (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773). The Court concludes, however, that it ...