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Aygen v. District of Columbia

United States District Court, D. Columbia

October 7, 2015

NURSAT I. AYGEN, Plaintiff,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant

          NURSAT I. AYGEN, Plaintiff, Pro se, Arlington, VA.

         For DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant: Alex Karpinski, LEAD ATTORNEY, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL/DC, Washington, DC.

Page 2

         MEMORANDUM OPINION

         ROYCE C LAMBERTH, United States District Judge.

         Before the Court are plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and plaintiff's motion for sanctions. For the following reasons and after consideration of the parties' briefing and relevant legal standards, plaintiff's motions for reconsideration and sanctions will be DENIED.

         I. BACKGROUND

         In 2010, the plaintiff, Ms. Nursat Aygen, brought an action pro se against District of Columbia Public Schools (" District" ) for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (" FMLA" ), 29 U.S.C. § 2601.[1] This Court granted the District's motion for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(d) and 41(b) in March 2015 due to Ms. Aygen's continued failure to appear for her own deposition. ECF No. 74.

         In its Memorandum and Order, the Court noted that Ms. Aygen had offered no viable defense for her failure to appear for at least four depositions. Id. at 4. Rather, her response to the defendant's motion to dismiss focused entirely on the scheduling of the deposition of a witness, Ms. Talley-Melvin. Id. The Court explicitly stated that the scheduling of Ms. Talley-Melvin's deposition " is entirely irrelevant to Ms. Aygen's failure to appear for her own deposition." Id. The Court also directly rejected the plaintiff's opinion that her deposition could not occur until after Ms. Talley-Melvin's deposition was completed. Id. at 5.

         Ultimately, the Court determined that Ms. Aygen's " continued requests for extensions of time and continued refusal to attend her own depositions ha[d] hampered the District's ability to move forward with the case" and dismissed her case with prejudice. Id.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         Courts have discretion to grant relief from final judgments for five specific reasons under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)-(5):(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; and (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; the judgment is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated, or applying the judgment prospectively is no longer equitable. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1)-(5).

         In order to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(3), the moving party must show that (1) the other party engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct; and (2) this misconduct prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting her case.

Page 3

Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188, 1193, 362 U.S.App.D.C. 363 (D.C. ...


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