United States District Court, D. Columbia
XIA, W. LIU, H. CHEN, J. CHEN, H. LUN, H. LI, Plaintiffs:
Ning Ye, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICE OF NING YE, Flushing, NY;
Xiaosheng Huang, HUANG, TANG & MARVIN, LLP, New York, NY.
JOHN F. KERRY, Secretary of the United States Department of
State, In Official Capacity, JEH JOHNSON, Secretary of the
United States Department of Homeland Security, In Official
Capacity, Defendants: Elianis N. Perez, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Trial Attorney, District Court
Section, Washington, DC; Wynne Patrick Kelly, LEAD ATTORNEY,
U.S. Attorney's Office, Civil Division, Washington, DC.
C. LAMBERTH, United States District Judge.
matter comes before the Court on the plaintiffs' Motion
for Leave to File Amended Complaint . Upon consideration
of the record and applicable legal standards, the
plaintiffs' motion will be DENIED.
brought suit against John F. Kerry, Secretary of State, and
Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (" Defendants" ), in January
2014. Compl. 1. The plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
the Civil Rights Act
(" CRA" ), 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 1983; the
Immigration and Nationality Act (" INA" ), 8 U.S.C.
§ § 1421, 1451(a) ; and the Administrative
Procedure Act (" APA" ), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et
seq. Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 62-71.
Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims sua sponte in
November 2014 for failure to state a claim, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 19. Namely,
the Court found that three of the four plaintiffs' Fifth
Amendment, INA, and APA claims failed because only Xia had
administratively exhausted her claim. ECF No. 18 at 14-15.
The Court also found that the complaint failed to state a
claim under the Fifth Amendment because it did not describe
" what additional procedures plaintiffs believe[d] they
were guaranteed pursuant to the Due Process Clause."
Id. at 11.
the Court determined that the plaintiffs did not adequately
state a cause of action under the CRA, 42 U.S.C. §
§ 1981, 1983, because they failed to allege that the
defendants acted " under color of state law."
See id. at 12-13 (noting that these
sections of the CRA are inapplicable to actions against
" federal defendants acting under color of federal
law" ). The complaint also failed to state a claim under
the INA § § 1421 and 1451(a) because, in sum, these
statutes did not apply to the provided facts. Id. at
the plaintiffs did not adequately plead specific violations
of the APA. They made broad claims that their passports were
arbitrarily revoked and did not explain how this revocation
was arbitrary or what process they were denied when their
naturalization certificates were cancelled. Id. at
15. Furthermore, the Court determined that " [e]ven if
plaintiffs had adequately pleaded specific violations of the
APA, plaintiff Xia likely would be precluded from such a
claim because she ha[d] an alternate judicial remedy
available to her." Id. at 14.
" alternate judicial remedy" available to Xia is
§ 1503 of the INA. See id. at 16
(" [O]nly plaintiff Xia has administratively exhausted
her claims, and therefore is entitled to bring a claim under
Section 1503." ). As asserted by the Court, " At
the heart of Xia's claim is her desire to be recognized
as a United States citizen: to be afforded due process and
obtain a lawful passport and Naturalization Certificate. This
seems to be exactly the opportunity Section 1503 offers
her." Id. (internal citations omitted). "
Section 1503 permits citizens to have an Article III court
adjudge their citizenship de novo if it is
questioned. A successful adjudication would permit Xia to
obtain the relevant paperwork." Id. at 16-17.
Court also noted that courts must generally give plaintiffs
an opportunity to amend their complaint following a sua
sponte dismissal of their claims. Id. at 8. Thus,
though the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, it
identified an opportunity for plaintiff Xia to move to file
an amended complaint, presumably based on § 1503.
plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration  of the
dismissal, which the Court denied because the dismissal was
not a " final judgment." ECF No. 23 at 1. In this
memorandum, the Court once again reminded the plaintiffs that
they could request leave to file an amended complaint.
See id. at 2 (" [P]laintiffs
are permitted to seek to file an amended complaint
in an attempt to satisfy the requirements of Twombly
and Iqbal. Of course, this motion must be
accompanied by a proposed amended complaint that
plaintiff's [sic] will seek to file, giving defendants an
opportunity to oppose." ).
April 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file
an amended complaint. ECF No. 24. The proposed amended
complaint once again ...