United States District Court, D. Columbia
L. STEWART, JR, Defendant, Pro se, Winton, NC.
USA, Plaintiff: Sherri Lee Berthrong, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Washington, DC.
W. ROBERTS, Chief United States District Judge.
defendant Willie Stewart contends that a warrant issued by
the United States Parole Commission (" Commission"
) on September 11, 2012, for an alleged violation of his
special parole conditions is invalid because he claims the
warrant was issued after he had completed his underlying
sentence. He seeks a writ of mandamus directing the
Commission to provide him with a prompt hearing on the
alleged violation and a writ of habeas corpus freeing him
from any confinement ordered after such a hearing since the
confinement would stem from what he contends was an illegally
issued warrant. Because the special parole violation warrant
was lawfully issued before Stewart's sentence expired in
his underlying criminal case, and because Stewart did not
have a due process right to a revocation hearing before the
special parole warrant was executed, Stewart's petition
will be denied.
22, 1984, Judge Joyce Hens Green sentenced Stewart to one
year of imprisonment for carrying a pistol without a license,
in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3204, two to six years of
imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute heroin,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and a special parole
term of three years to follow his imprisonment, with those
sentences to run concurrently to each other and consecutively
to any other sentence. See Govt.'s Oppn. to Def.'s
Pet. for a Writ of Mandamus (" Govt.'s Oppn."
), ECF No. 5, Ex. A, J. & Commitment Order at 1.
time, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) required that the
sentencing judge impose a mandatory term of three years of
special parole. See United States v. Brundage, 903
F.2d 837, 839, 284 U.S.App.D.C. 219 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(discussing the history of sentencing provisions under 21
U.S.C. § 841). " Special parole was 'a period
of supervision served upon completion of a prison term'
and administered by the United States Parole
Commission." Gozlon-Peretz v. United
States, 498 U.S. 395, 399, 111 S.Ct. 840, 112
L.Ed.2d 919 (1991) (quoting Bifulco v. United
States, 447 U.S. 381, 388, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d
205 (1980)). The special parole term was " designed to
take effect upon the expiration of the period of parole
supervision following mandatory release, or at the full term
date following parole, or upon release from confinement
following sentence expiration." United States v.
Watson, 548 F.2d 1058, 1060 n.3, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 103
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Roberts v. United States,
491 F.2d 1236, 1238 (3d Cir. 1974)).
was paroled in this case on June 18, 1990, and his parole was
scheduled to last until June 16, 1994. See Govt.'s Oppn.,
Ex. B, Certificate of Parole at 1. During this period of
parole, Stewart was convicted in Virginia of robbery,
possession of a firearm by an individual convicted of a
felony, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.
See id., Ex. C, Order for the Circuit Ct. for Fauquier
County, Commonwealth of Va. at 1-2. For these offenses,
Stewart was sentenced on August 3, 1993 to an aggregate
maximum term of 27 years of imprisonment, followed by a
five-year term of supervision. See id. at 3. After Stewart
completed the sentence for his Virginia offenses, the
Commission revoked Stewart's parole in this case on March
13, 2007. See id., Ex. D, 3/13/07 Notice of Action at 1-2.
14, 2009, Stewart was released from prison and began serving
a mandatory release supervision period in this case. See id.,
Ex. E, Bureau of Prison Sentence Monitoring Computation Data
at 13. Stewart's mandatory release supervision period
ended on March 21, 2010, id. at 17, and his three-year term
of special parole imposed in this case began without any
credit for time previously spent on parole. See id. That term
of special parole was scheduled to expire on March 22, 2013.
See id., Ex. G, Warrant and Warrant Application at 4.
September 2012, Stewart was convicted in D.C. Superior Court
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See id., Ex.
G-1, J. in Crim. Case; Ex. G at 1, 4; Ex. E at 3. He was
sentenced on September 10, 2012 to a term of 28 months of
imprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release of
five years. See id., Ex. E at 3-4; Ex. G-1. Following
Stewart's sentencing in D.C. Superior Court on September
10, 2012, the Commission issued a special parole violation
warrant on September 11, 2012 to be lodged as a detainer
against Stewart and to be executed upon the completion of his
D.C. Superior Court sentence. See id., Ex. G at 1, 5. Stewart
filed the instant petition on July 29, 2014, just before the
Commission executed the special parole violation warrant on
September 19, 2014, when Stewart completed his D.C. Superior
Court prison term. See id., Ex. G at 2, Ex. E at 5. The
Commission then notified Stewart that it had found probable
cause to believe that he had violated the conditions of his
special parole in this case due to his D.C. Superior Court
conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
See id., Ex. I, Letter from Bureau of Prisons, dated October
7, 2014, at 1. The Commission held a hearing on November 5,
2014, revoked his special parole in this case, and sentenced
him to 32 months in prison. See 11/5/14 Notice of Action at
1. Stewart served time in prison from November 5, 2014 until
May 8, 2015. On May 9, 2015, he began serving the
term of supervised release that was imposed by the Superior
Court in 2012. That term is scheduled to end May 7,
asserts that the Parole Commission issued a parole violation
warrant after he had completed his parole term when the
Commission had no further authority over him. He complains
that the warrant, lodged as a detainer in North Carolina
where he was incarcerated on other charges at the time he
filed his motion, is therefore an illegal detainer. He frames
his request for relief as both a request for a writ of habeas
corpus to free him from the restraints of the illegal
detainer, and a request for a writ of mandamus directing the
Commission to grant him the parole hearing he has been
seeking in which he can challenge the parole violation
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
has an independent obligation to satisfy itself of its
subject matter jurisdiction in any litigation. A habeas
petition is certainly the kind of matter that a district
court has the power to entertain. See 28 U.S.C. §
2241(a). But the two bases upon which Stewart asserts that
subject matter jurisdiction lies in this Court over his
habeas claim sound more in issues of venue and personal
jurisdiction: 1) any future detention resulting from a parole