United States District Court, D. Columbia
ILAW, Plaintiff, Pro se, San Jose, CA.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LUCY H. KOH, Defendants: Robin
Michelle Meriweather, LEAD ATTORNEY, U.S. ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE, Washington, DC.
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., Defendant: Joseph Peter Harkins,
Steven E. Kaplan, LEAD ATTORNEYS, LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.,
Washington, DC; Kenneth R. O'Brien, LITTLER MENDELSON,
P.C., Sacramento, CA.
KOLLAR-KOTELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
April 21, 2015, Plaintiff Miguel Ilaw, proceeding pro
se, filed suit against the United States Department of
Justice, United States District Court Judge Lucy H. Koh, and
Littler Mendelson, P.C., bringing several claims against
Defendants for their actions related to an employment
discrimination case brought by Plaintiff in a Ninth Circuit
district court. Plaintiff alleges violations of his
Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ § 1983 and 1985, as well as " Fraud upon the
Court" and the " Tort of Outrage."
10, 2015 the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against
Defendants Department of Justice and Judge Koh, in her
official capacity, pursuant to Plaintiff's
Application for Voluntary Dismissal of Action. See
Minute Order (dated July 10, 2015). Plaintiff brings his
remaining claims against Littler Mendelson and Judge Koh, in
her individual capacity.
before the Court are Judge Koh's  Motion to Dismiss
and Littler Mendelson's  Motion to Dismiss. Also
before the Court is Plaintiff's  Motion for Immunity
Analysis and Denial of Entitlement, in which Plaintiff seeks
an " immunity legal determination and denial of
entitlement against Defendants." Upon consideration of
the pleadings, the relevant legal authorities, and
the record as a whole, the Court (1) GRANTS Judge Koh's
 Motion to Dismiss; (2) GRANTS Littler Mendelson's
 Motion to Dismiss; (3) DENIES the relief requested by
Plaintiff in his  Motion for Immunity Analysis and Denial
of Entitlement; (4) DENIES as MOOT Plaintiff's 
Motion to Retain Venue; and (5) DENIES AS MOOT
Plaintiff's  Motion for Summary Judgment.
Court shall dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Judge Koh
because (1) judicial immunity bars Plaintiff's claims;
(2) res judicata precludes Plaintiff from
relitigating issues that arise from the same set of facts as
his earlier suit against Judge Koh; and (3) Plaintiff has
failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) against Judge Koh.
Court shall dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Littler
Mendelson because (1) res judicata precludes
Plaintiff from relitigating issues that arise from the same
set of facts as his earlier suit against Littler Mendelson
and (2) Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) against Littler Mendelson.
Court shall enter JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants.
Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED, with prejudice, in its
April 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant action pro
se. Plaintiff's 51-page Complaint is far from a
model of clarity, containing a plethora of lengthy quotes and
summaries of statutes, hearings, and other materials.
Nevertheless, the Court has been able to discern the
following factual allegations from the Complaint and will
accept these allegations as true for the purposes of the
pending Motions to Dismiss. See Atherton v. D.C.
Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681, 386 U.S.App.D.C. 144
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (" On review of a motion to dismiss, we
treat the complaint's factual allegations as true and
must grant [plaintiff] the benefit of all inferences that can
be derived from the facts alleged." (quotation marks and
Plaintiff's Employment Termination in 2010 and Subsequent
State Court Action
claims originate in the termination of his employment in
September 2010 by a hospital operated by the Daughters of
Charity Health Systems (" the Hospital" ).
See Compl. ¶ 4. According to the Complaint,
Plaintiff was terminated " after alleging Title VII
gender discrimination" in August 2010. Id.
¶ 4. In October 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (" EEOC" ) issued a Notice of Right to
Sue against the Hospital. Id.
November 2010, Plaintiff filed a discrimination action
against the Hospital in Superior Court in Santa Clara County.
Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff's counsel agreed with
the Hospital's counsel, Defendant Littler Mendelson, to
proceed with mediation through an alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) proceeding. See id. ¶ ¶
9-11. After the parties' counsel negotiated an agreement
resolving Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff terminated his
counsel " for betrayal and legal misrepresentation"
when " Plaintiff discovered (sic) local court rule
violation" in the agreement. Id. ¶ 11. The
court dismissed Plaintiff's action without prejudice,
after Plaintiff moved for voluntary dismissal of his claims.
See id. ¶ 13.
Plaintiff's Federal Court Action in 2011 ("
ILaw I" )
7, 2011, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Title
VII action against the Hospital in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, Ilaw v.
Daughters of Charity Health Sys. (" Ilaw I
" ), No. 11-cv-02752 (N.D. Cal.). Compl. ¶ ¶
Koh served as the presiding judge in that action.
Id. ¶ ¶ 25-26. Defendant Littler Mendelson
served as counsel to the Hospital. Id. ¶ ¶
21-22. Judge Koh dismissed Plaintiff's claims with
prejudice after previously dismissing his complaint with
leave to amend, reviewing the parties' two motions to
dismiss, and holding a motions hearing. See id.
¶ ¶ 28-90; see also Ilaw I, 2012
WL 381240, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb 6, 2012). Judge Koh concluded
that Plaintiff's claims were time-barred and that
Plaintiff had not established grounds for equitable-tolling.
See Compl. ¶ 83; see also Ilaw
I, 2012 WL 381240, at *7. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed Judge Koh's resolution of Ilaw I. See
Ilaw v. Daughters of Charity Health Sys., Inc., 585
Fed.Appx. 572, 572-73 (9th Cir. 2014). In its decision, the
Court of Appeals opined that " the district court
correctly concluded that Ilaw failed to exercise due
diligence to preserve his legal rights, and that equitable
tolling does not apply to extend the deadline."
Id. at 573. On February 23, 2015, the United States
Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition for a writ of
certiorari. Ilaw v. Daughters of Charity Health Sys.,
Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1412, 191 L.Ed.2d 379 (2015).
Plaintiff's Action in 2013 against Judge Koh and Littler
Mendelson (" ILaw II"
October 18, 2013, Plaintiff sued Judge Koh, Littler
Mendelson, and a number of other defendants in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Ilaw v. Littler Mendelson PC, et al. ("
Ilaw II" ), No. 13-cv-4851-JSW (N.D. Cal.).
Specifically, Plaintiff named fifteen defendants, including
Littler Mendelson, four of its attorneys, Judge Koh, the
Hospital, JAMS, one of its mediators, and numerous others.
See Second Amended Complaint, Ilaw II, No.
13-cv-4851-JSW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2013) (ECF No. 11).
Plaintiff's second amended complaint in Ilaw II
purported to seek relief for various alleged wrongs regarding
the adjudication of Plaintiff's claims in his state court
action and in Ilaw I, the federal court action
before Judge Koh. See id. ¶ ¶ 1-12.
Judge Koh, Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that (1)
Judge Koh dismissed the complaint in Ilaw I despite
her awareness that the defendants had violated his rights;
(2) Judge Koh reviewed Plaintiff's claims under a "
disguise of objectivity; " (3) Judge Koh was a
participant in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his right
to equal protection; and (4) Judge Koh was derelict in her
alleged duty to act to prevent wrongdoing by the retired
state judge who served as the mediator in Plaintiff's
state court action. See id. at 15, 39, 50,
56-58. Plaintiff's claims against Judge Koh included
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § § 1985,
1986 as well as the " Tort of Outrage."
See id. at 53, 56-59.
Littler Mendelson, Plaintiff alleged, inter alia,
that Littler Mendelson (1) " bought" the mediator
in Plaintiff's state court action, (2) " conspired
to conceal [Plaintiff]'s medical injury report," and
(3) participated in the aforementioned alleged conspiracy to
deprive Plaintiff of his right to equal protection.
Id. at 35, 56. Plaintiff's claims against
Littler Mendelson included (1) civil rights violations under
42 U.S.C. § § 1985, 1986, (2) attorney misconduct,
(3) violations of the California State Bar Act, and (4) the
" Tort of Outrage." Id. at 52-53.
also brought a number of claims against many of the
defendants under 42 U.S.C. § § 1983, but it is
unclear from Plaintiff's amended complaint whether
Plaintiff brought them against Judge Koh and Littler
Mendelson. See id. at 1.
January 14, 2014, Judge Jeffrey S. White dismissed
Plaintiff's case with prejudice. See Order,
Ilaw II, No. 13-cv-4851-JSW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14,
2014) (ECF No. 13). Specifically, Judge White dismissed all
of Plaintiff's claims against Judge Koh, finding that
judicial immunity barred Plaintiff's claims. Id.
at 3. Judge White also dismissed Plaintiff's claims under
42 U.S.C. § § 1983, 1985, and 1986 on the basis
that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under those statutes.
Id. at 3-4. After having granted Plaintiff leave to
file two amended complaints, Judge White concluded that any
further attempts to amend would be futile, and dismissed all
of Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. Id. at 5.
appeal, the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed the dismissal of
Plaintiff's claims. See Ilaw v. Littler
Mendelson, PC, et al., No. 14-15131, (9th Cir. Aug. 18,
2014) (ECF No. 14).
Plaintiff's Action in the Court of Federal Claims against
Judge Koh and Littler Mendelson (" ILAW
February 24, 2015, after filing more than a half-dozen other
unsuccessful actions in state and federal courts in
California--and after having been listed as a
" Vexatious Litigant" in Santa Clara County,
California Superior Court--Plaintiff sued Judge Koh and
Littler Mendelson in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for the
stated purpose of litigating in an " independent
jurisdiction away from 'home' circuit."
See Complaint, Ilaw v. United States ("
ILAW III" ), No. 15-cv-00173-MBH (Fed. Cl. Feb. 24,
2015) (ECF No. 1), at 3. Plaintiff again sought relief
against Judge Koh and Littler Mendelson for the alleged
wrongs concerning the adjudication of Plaintiff's claims
in Ilaw I, the federal court action before Judge
Koh. Id. Plaintiff also repeated his claims for
alleged violations of his Constitutional rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and violations of his civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § § 1983 and 1985, as well
as the " Tort of Outrage." See
id. at 22-27.
March 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for " voluntary
dismissal and removal to the district court," wherein
Plaintiff sought to have the case voluntarily dismissed, so
that he could file his complaint in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia. See Motion for
Voluntary Dismissal and Removal to District Court, Ilaw
III, No. 15-cv-00173-MBH (Fed. Cl. Mar. 16, 2015) (ECF
No. 8). Plaintiff stated that he sought dismissal because
jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims is conferred
exclusively on United States District Courts, and that the
Court of Federal Claims therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear
his claims. Id. at 1-2. On April 21, 2015, while his
motion was still pending in the Court of Federal Claims,
Plaintiff filed the instant action before this Court.
6, 2015, the judge presiding over Plaintiff's case in the
Court of Federal Claims issued an opinion dismissing
Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice after finding that
it lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims.
See Ilaw III, 121 Fed.Cl. 408, 428 (2015),
vacated and remanded, No. 2015-5096, 632 Fed.Appx.
614, 2015 WL 6842995 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2015). The court,
construing Plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal as
a transfer request, found that transfer to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia would not be in the "
interest of justice," given the " exhaustive
history of plaintiff's prior, unsuccessful litigation in
State and Federal Courts, and the prior findings by numerous
courts of the frivolous and vexatious nature of
plaintiff's allegations." Id. As the court
Plaintiff is a frequent litigator of cases brought in both
State and Federal courts, where his cases on matters related
to the ones now filed in this court have been dismissed
repeatedly. Moreover, not only has Mr. Ilaw previously filed
substantially similar complaints in a variety of
jurisdictions, on April 21, 2015, Mr. Ilaw filed a complaint
in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, shortly after he filed the above captioned case in
this court. As of the filing of this opinion, plaintiff's
case in the District Court for the District of Columbia is
still pending, and absolutely no purpose would be served to
transfer the above captioned case to the same court.
Id. Upon appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit vacated the district court's decision,
holding that Plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal
divested the district court of jurisdiction, and therefore
the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice, instead of without prejudice.
Ilaw v. United States, No. 2015-5096, 632 Fed.Appx.
614, 2015 WL 6842995, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2015). In
dicta, the appeals court noted that Plaintiff's "
almost certain litigation abuse thus far" may have