United States District Court, District of Columbia
BERMAN JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
action for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner Raymond Brown
III challenges the United States Parole Commission’s
authority to revoke his parole and to rescind credit for the
eight years he spent on parole ("street-time
credit"). Petitioner contends that the Commission has
violated the separation of powers doctrine and the
Constitution’s ex post facto clause and double
jeopardy clause. The Commission counters that
petitioner’s grounds for relief lack merit.
See Gov’t’s Opp’n to
Pet’r’s Pet. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. #
6]. Since the Commission’s authority over D.C. Code
offenders is settled, and the challenged decision complied
with D.C. law, the Court agrees that petitioner has stated no
grounds for relief. Accordingly, the petition will be denied
for the reasons explained below.
December 1992, petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia of assault with a dangerous
weapon, kidnapping while armed, and possession with intent to
distribute heroin. He was sentenced to an aggregate prison
term of three to fifteen years. Gov’t Ex.
Petitioner’s custody beyond fifteen years stems from
his failed parole supervision terms.
April 18, 1996, the then-D.C. Board of Parole released
petitioner to parole supervision, where he was to remain
until the expiration of his sentence on December 7, 2007. Ex.
3. Petitioner agreed to "narcotics surveillance"
and an "outpatient drug program" as special
conditions of his parole. Id. Four months after his
release to parole, petitioner was arrested in the District
for possession with intent to distribute heroin. Ex. 8. He
was released on a personal recognizance bond. Id. A
jury convicted petitioner of the new charge on April 21,
1998, and he was sentenced on June 10, 1998, to a prison term
of two to six years, running consecutively to any other
sentence. Exs. 5, 8; see United States v. Brown,
1996 FEL 007523 (Sup. Ct.).
April 22, 1998, the Parole Board issued "a detainer
warrant based on [the foregoing] allegations of criminal
violation(s) of parole." Ex. 4. The warrant was executed
the following day, on April 23, 1998, by petitioner’s
arrest. Ex. 8. The Parole Board conducted a parole revocation
hearing on July 7, 1998, revoked petitioner’s parole on
July 30, 1998, and deferred consideration of reparole until
petitioner became eligible on the aggregated
sentences. Ex. 7.
November 1999, the Commission, having assumed parole
responsibility over D.C. Code offenders, held an initial
hearing for petitioner and scheduled a parole rehearing in
June 2000.Ex. 9. On December 20, 2000, petitioner was
released to parole supervision, where he was to remain until
the expiration of his sentence, recalculated to be November
30, 2015. Exs. 10-11. Approximately eight years later, on
April 8, 2008, the Commission issued a parole violator
warrant based on the following four charges: use of dangerous
and habit-forming drugs; failure to submit to drug testing;
failure to report to supervision officer on several listed
dates; and violation of the special condition of drug
aftercare. Ex. 12.
warrant was executed on April 30, 2008, by petitioner’s
arrest, and petitioner denied the charges at a probable cause
hearing held on May 16, 2008. Ex. 14 at 1. However, on June
30, 2008, petitioner accepted the Commission’s proposed
expedited decision to revoke his parole, rescind his
street-time credit, and set a reparole date of August 27,
2008, after petitioner’s service of six months’
incarceration. Petitioner accepted responsibility for the
charged behavior, and he waived his right to a revocation
hearing and to appeal the Commission’s decision. In
addition, petitioner agreed to special parole conditions
consisting of drug, alcohol, and mental health aftercare
programs. Exs. 15-16. On August 27, 2008, petitioner was
released to parole supervision, where he is to remain until
expiration of his sentence, recalculated to be December 28,
2022. Id., Ex. 17.
is on parole under the supervision of the D.C. Court Services
and Offender Supervision Agency. Gov’t’s
Opp’n at 4 n.3. He filed this action on October 23,
2014, claiming that the Commission’s recalculation of
his sentence expiration date constitutes an unlawful
extension of the Superior Court’s sentence.
See Pet. at 3-4. Petitioner insists that his
"parole sentence . . .has already expired."
Pet’r’s Mot. to Strike the Gov’t’s
Opp’n Mot. and to Vacate the Pet’r’s Parole
Sentence Today at 16 ("Pet’r’s Reply")
[Dkt. # 8].
extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus is available to
District of Columbia prisoners if the prisoner shows that he
is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). Petitioner’s invocation of the separation
of powers doctrine and the double jeopardy clause ...