United States District Court, District of Columbia
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17, 2016, the Court granted both Defendants' motions to
dismiss, because Plaintiff Pamela Duarte had failed to plead
sufficient facts to enable the Court to exercise general or
specific personal jurisdiction over either Defendant.
Defendant Michael Edward Nolan, a citizen of California,
allegedly struck Duarte's car while working on a project
for his employer, Defendant Helix Electric, Inc.
("Helix"), in Richmond, Virginia. Helix was alleged
to be a national corporation with its principal place of
business in San Diego, California and an office in Northern
Virginia. As relevant to the issue of personal jurisdiction,
Duarte claimed that Helix maintained a "Contact Us"
page with its Chantilly, Virginia office address listed under
the descriptor "Washington, D.C."; that its website
listed four job openings in "Washington, D.C."; and
that Helix had both sued and been sued in D.C. Superior Court
in the last year.
Court declined to exercise general personal jurisdiction over
Helix, finding the above allegations far too meager to
demonstrate that Helix's affiliations with the District
were "so constant and pervasive as to render [it]
essentially at home here." Duarte v. Nolan, No.
15-cv-01396 (CRC), 2016 WL 2885872, at *4 (D.D.C. May 17,
2016) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman. 134 S.Ct. 746,
751 (2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
also denied as futile Duarte's motion to conduct
jurisdictional discovery, since determining whether Helix
"conducts business in Washington, D.C., "
"employs personnel in the District of Columbia, "
or "maintains an office in Washington, DC" would
hardly have established whether it was "essentially at
home" in the District. Id. at *5. As the Court
emphasized, "this standard requires a plaintiff to show
more than that a defendant 'engages in a substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business' in a
particular state, as many large corporations do throughout
the entire nation." Id. at *4 (quoting
Daimler AG, 134 S.Ct. at 761); see also Daimler
AG, 134 S.Ct. at 761 (rejecting this formula as
"unacceptably grasping"); Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington. 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (stating that
"continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not
enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable
to suits unrelated to that activity"). All-purpose
jurisdiction, then, does not exist in every state in which a
defendant's business activities are "sizable."
Daimler AG, 134 S.Ct. at 761.
has now moved to alter or amend the Court's order of
dismissal, invoking Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. She asserts that "this Court can exercise
general jurisdiction over Defendant Helix based upon . . .
newly discovered evidence." Mem. Supp. PL's Mot.
Alter Amend J. ("PL's Mot. Alter Amend") 7, ECF
No. 20. All of this evidence-for example, that Helix
maintains an "Active" status with D.C.'s
Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, biennially
submits required reports on its organizational structure, and
has performed electrical work in the District-would of course
tend to show that Helix conducts some "business activity
... in the District of Columbia." Id. at 9. But
the Court plainly held that merely "conducting] business
in Washington, D.C." would not satisfy the Supreme
Court's more-demanding "at home" standard for
exercising general personal jurisdiction. Duarte,
2016 WL 2885872, at *5. Duarte has made no effort to satisfy
the standard that the Court must actually apply, despite
quoting it at length. As a result, her "newly discovered
evidence"-even considered cumulatively, and charitably
assuming its timeliness-could not change the Court's
calculus on this point.
alternatively reargues that D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4)
authorizes the Court to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over Helix. That provision permits personal
jurisdiction "as to a claim for relief arising
from" a defendant's "causing tortious
injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission
outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or
solicits business [or] engages in any other persistent course
of conduct... in the District of Columbia" (emphasis
added). This argument is baseless, given that-by Duarte's
own admission-"Helix's contacts did not give rise to
the claim in the case at hand." PL's Mot. Alter
Amend 9. And as the Court also made clear in its previous
opinion, Defendants were "alleged to have caused
tortious injury outside the District, "
Duarte. 2016 WL 2885872, at *4, not "in the
District of Columbia, " D.C. Code §
foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that  Plaintiffs
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment be DENIED. The Court will
accept no further filings in this case.
 Because the Court has at all times
considered Duarte's most recently proffered allegations
in the light most favorable to her, it will not entertain her
alternative argument that she was prejudiced by Helix's
purported "scheme to defraud the court" through