United States District Court, District of Columbia
George V. Hill, Plaintiff,
Maria T. Cecala et al., Defendants. v.
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge.
proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia against two employees of
the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the
District of Columbia (“CSOSA”), which is a
federal agency. See D.C. Code § 24-133(a)
(establishing CSOSA “within the executive branch of the
Federal Government”). Plaintiff seeks $200, 000 in
money damages. See Compl. [Dkt. 1-1 at 2]. On March
25, 2016, the Civil Division Chief of the United States
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia
certified that the defendants were acting within scope of
their office or employment at the relevant time, and the case
was removed to this Court on April 7, 2016, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). See Not. of Removal [Dkt.
# 1]. Plaintiff has not contested the removal notice.
Consequently, the United States is substituted as the
defendant and the case is governed by the Federal Tort Claims
Act (“FTCA”). See id. §
before the Court is the United States’ Motion to
Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5), and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Dkt. # 5].
On May 17, 2016, the Court informed plaintiff about his
obligation to respond to the motion by June 30, 2016, and the
potential consequence of dismissal if he did not respond.
Plaintiff has not complied with the May 17, 2016 Order, and
he has not sought additional time to comply. Therefore, as
stated in the order, the United States’ motion is
treated as conceded.
United States argues, among other grounds for dismissal, that
plaintiff has failed to pursue, let alone exhaust, his
administrative remedies as to any claim brought under the
FTCA. See Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 7. By
not responding in any way to the motion, plaintiff has
conceded this argument. See May 17, 2016 Order at 1
(citing Hopkins v. Women’s Div., General Bd. of
Global Ministries, 284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003),
aff'd, 98 Fed.Appx. 8 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, “the United States
may not be sued without its consent and . . . the existence
of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
Such consent may not be implied, but must be
“unequivocally expressed.” United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The FTCA
waives the United States’ immunity under limited
circumstances. It states: “[a]n action shall not be
instituted [under the FTCA] unless the claimant shall have
first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency
and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in
writing and sent by certified or registered mail, ” or
unless the agency has failed to render a “final
disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed,
” which then is “deemed a final denial of the
claim[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). It is established
in this circuit that an unexhausted FTCA claim constitutes a
“jurisdictional” bar. Ali v. Rumsfeld,
649 F.3d 762, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see Simpkins v. District of
Columbia Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(“This court and the other courts of appeals have
treated the FTCA’s requirement of filing an
administrative complaint with the appropriate agency prior to
instituting an action as jurisdictional.”) (citation
omitted). Accordingly, the Court will grant the
United States’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1),
and it will dismiss the case without prejudice. A separate
Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
 In 2015, the Supreme Court held that
the FTCA’s statute of limitations set out at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401(b) is not jurisdictional in significant part
because “§ 2401(b)’s text speaks only to a
claim’s timeliness, not to a court’s
power.” United States v. Wong, 135 S.Ct. 1625,
1632 (2015). Unlike the plaintiff here, Wong had presented a
claim to the agency; thus, the presentment requirement under
§ 2675(a) was neither at issue nor discussed. The D.C.
Circuit has not revisited the precedent binding this Court on
the presentment requirement in light of Wong, and
the occasion is not presented here where the motion to
dismiss is uncontested. At least one district court, however,
has found Wong “entirely in apposite” to