United States District Court, District of Columbia
PAUL B. JONES, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent.
A. HOWELL CHIEF JUDGE
petitioner, Paul B. Jones, seeks a “Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ” ECF No. 1,
contending that he was denied a timely probable cause hearing
following his arrest on a parole violator warrant issued by
the United States Parole Commission. Claiming a due process
violation, the petitioner seeks $500, 000 for each day spent
in custody,  a probable cause hearing, “and/or
immediate reinstatement to his pre-arrest parole release
conditions[.]” Pet. at 3. The Commission responds with
documentation showing that (1) the petitioner received his
probable cause hearing before this case commenced on January
11, 2016, and (2) the petitioner is no longer in custody on
the underlying warrant. Resp’t’s Opp’n to
the Pet. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 7.
Consequently, this case will be dismissed for the reasons
August 1981, the petitioner was convicted in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia of multiple felony offenses
and sentenced to an aggregate prison sentence of 41 years.
Resp’t’s Ex. A, ECF No. 7-1; United States v.
Jones, 1978 FEL 004073 (D.C. Super. Aug. 11, 1981). On
June 26, 2015, the petitioner was released to parole
supervision, where he was to remain until February 4, 2023.
Resp’t’s Ex. B. On October 8, 2015, the
Commission issued a warrant, charging the petitioner with
violating the terms of his parole by (1) using cocaine on
multiple dates, (2) failing to submit to drug testing on
multiple dates, and (3) violating a special condition
involving drug aftercare. Id. (Warrant Application).
The warrant was executed by the petitioner’s arrest on
October 29, 2015. In the instant petition, dated December 18,
2015, the petitioner contends that his probable cause hearing
was held “on or about December 11, 2015, . . . 42 days
late and out of accordance with the (5) days a probable cause
hearing was suppose[d] to have been held after
Petitioner’s October 29, 2015 arrest.” Pet. at 2.
the probable cause hearing on December 11, 2015, the
petitioner’s attorney in fact argued for his release
because of the delay and the petitioner’s need for drug
treatment. See Resp’t’s Ex. C (Probable
Cause Hearing Digest at 13-14). Although the Commission found
probable cause to hold the petitioner for a revocation
hearing, id., it reinstated the petitioner to parole
supervision and released him to a Reentry and Sanction Center
on January 5, 2016. Resp’t’s Opp’n at 2.
The next day, the petitioner “walked away” from
the Center. Id. He has since been arrested on a new
parole violator warrant, which is not the subject of this
claims arising from the execution of a sentence, such as
here, are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
See Herndon v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 961 F.Supp.2d
138, 141 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Perkins v.
Henderson, 881 F.Supp. 55, 60 (D.D.C. 1995)). District
of Columbia prisoners are entitled to habeas relief upon a
showing that their “custody is in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
Id. § 2241(c)(3).
petitioner invokes the due process clause, but in the absence
of “a delay [in holding a probable cause hearing] that
is both unreasonable and prejudicial, ” the due process
clause is not violated. Vactor v. U.S. Parole
Comm'n, 815 F.Supp.2d 81, 83 (D.D.C. 2011)
(citations omitted); see Stoddard v. Wynn, 68
F.Supp.3d 104, 113 (D.D.C. 2014) (“A delay in holding a
probable cause and/or revocation hearing is actionable where
a plaintiff can show the delay was both unreasonable and
prejudicial.”) (citing Sutherland v. McCall,
709 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The petitioner has not
asserted any prejudice resulting from the 42-day delay
between his arrest and probable cause hearing, and at least
one judge of this Court has found a longer delay, 63 days,
“not per se unreasonable.” Vactor, 815
F.Supp.2d at 83.
event, the appropriate remedy for a constitutionally
defective parole proceeding “is a writ of mandamus to
compel the Commission’s compliance with the statute not
a writ of habeas corpus to compel release on parole or to
extinguish the remainder of the sentence.”
Sutherland, 709 F.2d at 732; see accord Proctor
v. Wainwright, 828 F.Supp.2d 215, 217 (D.D.C. 2011) (A
delay in conducting a revocation hearing “is not itself
a valid ground for immediate release, ” and instead a
releasee's “remedy . . . is an action to compel a
hearing.”). Yet, any claim for mandamus relief in this
case is moot in light of the probable cause hearing the
petitioner received on December 11, 2015. Accordingly, this
case will be dismissed. A separate Order accompanies this
 The petitioner cannot recover money
damages by way of a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973) (noting “[i]n
the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an