United States District Court, District of Columbia
PAUL B. JONES, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent.
B. JONES, Petitioner, Pro Se.
STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent, represented by Jeffrey
Napoleon Poulin, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR DISTRICT OF
A. HOWELL, District Chief Judge.
petitioner, Paul B. Jones, seeks a "Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Â§ 2255, " ECF No. 1,
contending that he was denied a timely probable cause hearing
following his arrest on a parole violator warrant issued by
the United States Parole Commission. Claiming a due process
violation, the petitioner seeks $500, 000 for each day spent
in custody,  a probable cause hearing, "and/or
immediate reinstatement to his pre-arrest parole release
conditions[.]" Pet. at 3. The Commission responds with
documentation showing that (1) the petitioner received his
probable cause hearing before this case commenced on January
11, 2016, and (2) the petitioner is no longer in custody on
the underlying warrant. Resp't's Opp'n to the
Pet. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 7. Consequently,
this case will be dismissed for the reasons explained below.
August 1981, the petitioner was convicted in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia of multiple felony offenses
and sentenced to an aggregate prison sentence of 41 years.
Resp't's Ex. A, ECF No. 7-1; United States v.
Jones, 1978 FEL 004073 (D.C. Super. Aug. 11, 1981). On
June 26, 2015, the petitioner was released to parole
supervision, where he was to remain until February 4, 2023.
Resp't's Ex. B. On October 8, 2015, the Commission
issued a warrant, charging the petitioner with violating the
terms of his parole by (1) using cocaine on multiple dates,
(2) failing to submit to drug testing on multiple dates, and
(3) violating a special condition involving drug aftercare.
Id. (Warrant Application). The warrant was executed
by the petitioner's arrest on October 29, 2015. In the
instant petition, dated December 18, 2015, the petitioner
contends that his probable cause hearing was held "on or
about December 11, 2015, ... 42 days late and out of
accordance with the (5) days a probable cause hearing was
suppose[d] to have been held after Petitioner's October
29, 2015 arrest." Pet. at 2.
the probable cause hearing on December 11, 2015, the
petitioner's attorney in fact argued for his release
because of the delay and the petitioner's need for drug
treatment. See Resp't's Ex. C (Probable
Cause Hearing Digest at 13-14). Although the Commission found
probable cause to hold the petitioner for a revocation
hearing, id., it reinstated the petitioner to parole
supervision and released him to a Reentry and Sanction Center
on January 5, 2016. Resp't's Opp'n at 2. The next
day, the petitioner "walked away" from the Center.
Id. He has since been arrested on a new parole
violator warrant, which is not the subject of this action.
claims arising from the execution of a sentence, such as
here, are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. Â§ 2241.
See Herndon v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 961
F.Supp.2d 138, 141 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Perkins v.
Henderson, 881 F.Supp. 55, 60 (D.D.C. 1995)). District
of Columbia prisoners are entitled to habeas relief upon a
showing that their "custody is in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
Id. Â§ 2241(c)(3).
petitioner invokes the due process clause, but in the absence
of "a delay [in holding a probable cause hearing] that
is both unreasonable and prejudicial, " the due process
clause is not violated. Vactor v. U.S. Parole
Comm'n, 815 F.Supp.2d 81, 83 (D.D.C. 2011)
(citations omitted); see Stoddard v. Wynn,
68 F.Supp. 3d 104, 113 (D.D.C. 2014) ("A delay in
holding a probable cause and/or revocation hearing is
actionable where a plaintiff can show the delay was both
unreasonable and prejudicial.") (citing Sutherland
v. McCall, 709 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The
petitioner has not asserted any prejudice resulting from the
42-day delay between his arrest and probable cause hearing,
and at least one judge of this Court has found a longer
delay, 63 days, "not per se unreasonable."
Vactor, 815 F.Supp.2d at 83.
event, the appropriate remedy for a constitutionally
defective parole proceeding "is a writ of mandamus to
compel the Commission's compliance with the statute not a
writ of habeas corpus to compel release on parole or to
extinguish the remainder of the sentence."
Sutherland, 709 F.2d at 732; see accord
Proctor v. Wainwright, 828 F.Supp.2d 215, 217
(D.D.C. 2011) (A delay in conducting a revocation hearing
"is not itself a valid ground for immediate release,
" and instead a releasee's "remedy... is an
action to compel a hearing."). Yet, any claim for
mandamus relief in this case is moot in light of the probable
cause hearing the petitioner received on December 11, 2015.
Accordingly, this case will be dismissed. A separate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
 The petitioner cannot recover money
damages by way of a writ of habeas corpus. SeePreiser v. Rodriguez,411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973)
(noting "[i]n the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus
is not an appropriate or ...