United States District Court, District of Columbia
E. BOASBERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
buyer of a new car knows, driving off the lot typically
triggers a feeling of buyer's remorse. In other words,
once we know there is an opportunity lost by a decision we
make, we often feel post-decision regret. Plaintiffs, eight
former employees of Giant Food, LLC, who have brought a
"hybrid" claim under the Labor Management Relations
Act alleging wrongdoing by both Giant and their Unions,
appear to suffer from a serious case of buyer's remorse
with regard to the severance package they accepted when the
grocery-store company laid them off. They insist that had
they known that their decision to opt for severance pay meant
they forfeited the right to be placed on a recall list, which
might have afforded them an opportunity to be rehired within
six months of their termination, they would not have accepted
such payments. Giant maintains that the choice posed by the
severance package was clear, and that Plaintiffs are
precluded from suing the company by the releases they signed.
bringing this suit, Plaintiffs contend that they are not
bound by such releases because Giant only induced them to
sign through material misrepresentations. As causes of
action, they allege that the two Unions of which they were
members, Local 730 and Local 922, failed to adequately
discharge their duty of fair representation in negotiating
the terms of the severance and release, and that Giant's
termination of them and subsequent recall of other employees
violated its collective-bargaining agreements with the
Unions. In an earlier Opinion, the Court ruled that these two
claims are interrelated, constituting one "hybrid"
claim against both Giant and the Unions, all three of whom
are Defendants in this suit.
reject Plaintiffs' narrative and, asserting that the
material facts at issue are undisputed, have separately moved
for summary judgment. Concluding that Giant made no material
misrepresentations related to Plaintiffs' release
agreements and that their waiver of claims is therefore
valid, the Court will grant the company's Motion. In
addition, as Plaintiffs' hybrid claim is deficient, the
Court will also grant the Unions' Motion, putting an end
to this long-running conflict arising from Plaintiffs'
the Court well knows that facts on summary judgment should be
considered in the light most favorable to the non-movant, it
also notes that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c), parties "asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing
to particular parts of materials in the record, " and
the Court "need consider only the cited materials,
[though] it may consider others in the record."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), (c)(3). In this case, Defendants
have submitted a 54-page Joint Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs
have responded with a 137-page Response, and both sides have
each submitted more than 60 exhibits. See Def. JSOF (ECF No.
130-7); PL Resp. to JSOF (ECF No. 141-1). Plaintiffs'
filings, in addition to being voluminous, are riddled with
typographical errors and incomplete sentences, frequently
confuse argument with fact, and often fail to identify
precise record citations to support their claims. It is not
the Court's duty to mine the record for every relevant
evidentiary item. See Pottery. District of Columbia,
558 F.3d 542, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Williams, J.,
concurring). Where "a party fails to properly support an
assertion of fact or fails to properly address another
party's assertion of fact. . ., the court may . . .
consider the fact undisputed." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(1);
see also LCvR 7(h)(1) (explaining that Court may
assume that nonmoving party "admitted" facts it
failed to "controvert" in its response or
opposition). In other words, the Court will decline the
invitation to fill in the literal blanks left by
Plaintiffs' briefing. See, e.g., PI. Resp. to
JSOF, ¶ 104 ("Plaintiffs further incorporate by
reference then-responses in response to Defendants
allegations in paragraphs, as if fully pled herein."),
¶ 130 ("See Ex____"). With these principles in
mind, the Court recites the facts relevant to its disposition
of Defendants'Motions for Summary Judgment.
Parties and Setting
in this case are eight former employees of Giant, which
operates a chain of grocery stores located in Maryland,
Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia.
See PI. Resp. to JSOF, ¶ 1. While employed by
Giant, Plaintiffs were members of one of two unions, Local
922 or Local 730 ("the Unions"). Id., ¶ 2.
Until 2011, Giant's retail stores were supported by two
distribution centers located in Jessup, Maryland: one for
"fresh" groceries and the other for "dry"
groceries. Id., ¶ 6. The fresh-foods center, including a
recycling facility, was operated entirely by Giant, but the
dry-goods compound was only partially operated by Giant; the
dry-goods recycling facility was run by the company, but the
dry-goods warehouse was run by a subsidiary of C&S
Wholesale Company. Id., ¶¶7-8, 15. All of the
Plaintiffs worked at one of the two recycling facilities.
Id., ¶ 9.
previous years, Giant had operated a variety of facilities in
support of its stores -including its own dairy, bakery, and
the like - but at the time of the events at issue, the
company was focused more on the operation of its retail
grocery stores and, in streamlining its operations,
reallocated or laid off workers. Id., ¶ 16. In
addition, in June 2012, C&S closed the dry-goods
warehouse it operated in Jessup, Maryland, and relocated
those operations to Pennsylvania, leading to a number of
layoffs, including some members of Local 730. Id.
¶ 19. The parties agree that Giant learned of that
planned closure in April 2012 and made some efforts to
prepare for those layoffs, though they dispute precisely what
actions were taken and when, id, ¶¶ 20-24; those
disputes, however, are irrelevant to Defendants' Motions.
memorandum dated April 26, 2012, and addressed to the entire
Giant Distribution Team, Giant's Vice President of
Distribution Operations, Mike Scott, informed the Team of the
dry-goods-warehouse closure and indicated that "Giant
was still assessing the impact of C&S's
decision." Id. ¶26. This memorandum was
posted in some employee break rooms. Id. Giant
ultimately concluded that, after the C&S closure,
"it would be more efficient to operate only one
recycling facility instead of two." Id. ¶
29 (citing Def. Exh. 12 (ECF No. 132-2) (Deposition of Billye
Pounds, Giant Senior Manager of Human Resources) at 46:3-16).
Because "multiple people" had been doing the
"same work" at the two separate facilities, Giant
expected that after their consolidation, it would not require
as many employees. See Id. ¶ 32;
Pounds Dep. at 55:10-56:10. The parties disagree about how
Giant arrived at that expectation, whether its belief in the
reduced need for employees was reasonable, and other such
details, but Plaintiffs point to no testimony indicating that
Giant did not "believe that the consolidation
of the two warehouses would . .. mean that there was going to
be less work for employees to do." Pounds Dep. at
Negotiation and Termination
May and early June of 2012, Giant met with the leaders of
Local 730 and Local 922 to discuss the effects of the
facilities' consolidation -what the parties refer to as
"effects bargaining." See PI. Resp. to
JSOF, ¶¶ 34-46. Ritchie Brooks, President of Local
730, and Ferline Buie, President of Local 922, agreed that
the two Unions would jointly negotiate with Giant during the
effects bargaining. Id. ¶¶ 39, 46. At
least one meeting between Buie and Giant was attended by five
of the Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 43.
Unions sought to convince Giant that the layoffs were not
necessary, the number of laid-off employees should be fewer
than the company's predictions, and Giant should engage
in a $50, 000 voluntary buyout. Id. ¶¶
49-51. The Unions succeeded in bargaining down the number of
laid-off employees but not on their other demands.
Id. ¶ 50. The Unions then requested severance
pay for the affected employees or, in the alternative,
"recall rights, " meaning the right to be placed on
a list for potential rehire, based on seniority, following
termination of employment. Id. ¶ 51. As to
severance, the Unions asked Giant to provide two weeks of
severance pay for each year of employment with the company,
but Giant agreed to only one week per year of service.
Id. ¶52. As to recall, the Unions asked that
those employees who decided not to accept the severance
package would have recall rights for one year. Id.
¶ 53. Giant and the Unions disputed whether each
Union's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company
already gave Union members recall rights, and Plaintiffs and
Defendants continue to dispute what the CBAs required.
Id. ¶¶ 54-57.
the Unions and Giant agreed to a severance package under
which affected employees would have the option either to
receive up to eight weeks of severance pay, depending on
their years of service but with a minimum of two
weeks'pay, or instead to be placed on the recall list for
six months. Id. ¶ 58. If they chose the latter
option, they would still lose then-jobs, but would be
eligible for rehire if Giant recalled any employees. The
company agreed to reduce its number of layoffs to eight
employees from Local 730 and twelve employees from Local 922.
Id. ¶ 81. This agreement was later memorialized
in two Memoranda of Understanding. See Def. Exh. 33 (ECF No.
133-13) (Local 922 MOU), 34 (ECF No. 133-14) (Local 730 MOU).
the effects bargaining, leadership of Local 730 and Local 922
had requested that the Unions, rather than Giant, be
permitted to inform their members about the layoff, and Giant
acquiesced. Id. ¶62; see also Def.
Exh. 1 (ECF No. 131-1) (Deposition of Michael Scott, Giant
Director of Warehousing) at 112:6-9. The Unions held these
meetings from the beginning to the middle of June 2012.
Id. ¶¶ 63-64. What was and was not said at
those meetings is the source of some dispute, but the parties
agree that representatives from Giant's Human Resources
department and Distribution Services division attended,
Id. ¶ 64, and that Union members were informed
about the impending layoffs and severance package that had
been negotiated on then-behalf with Giant. Id.
¶¶ 65, 74. The parties do not agree whether the
Union leaders told Union members that, should they choose to
decline the severance package, they would be placed on a
recall list for up to six months. Id. In addition,
information was provided to the employees who would be laid
off to help them find new employment. Id. ¶ 67.
request of Union leaders, Kelli Hall, Giant's Human
Resources Manager, or her associate met individually with
each of the twenty affected employees for approximately ten
minutes each and provided them with copies of the Separation
and Release Agreement they would need to sign if they chose
to receive severance pay. Id. ¶¶ 87-90.
Although Plaintiffs maintain that they did not understand the
terms of the Agreement, Hall maintains that she read the
separate Acknowledgement of Receipt of Separation and Release
Agreement out loud to each of them and gave them copies of
both documents, informed them that they had forty-five days
in which to determine whether or not to sign it, encouraged
them to consult with an attorney before signing it, and
explained that, as required by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990, employees had seven days after
signing the Agreement in which to revoke it. Id.,
¶ 92. She states that she explained that they would
receive the severance pay within two weeks if they decided to
sign the Agreement. Li After meeting with Hall, all
Plaintiffs then signed the Acknowledgement, which set forth
in writing this information. See Declaration of
Kelli Hall, Exh. l(ECFNo. 130-4) (Plaintiffs' Signed
Acknowledgements). The Acknowledgement also explained that
the terminations had been determined pursuant to the
seniority process in the Collective Bargaining Agreements and
that employees should not sign and return the Agreement any
earlier than three days before their last day of work.
Id. The Agreement itself contained two provisions of
special relevance to this litigation. The first is a
paragraph entitled "Rehire" telling employees that
by signing the Agreement, they "hereby agree not to
knowingly seek or accept employment, whether directly or
indirectly, with the Company ... or any of its operating
companies or affiliates. You further agree that your
execution of this Agreement is good and sufficient cause for
the Company and/or its affiliates to reject any application
you may make for employment or re-employment." Def. Exh.
2 (ECF No. 130-5) (Plaintiffs' Signed Agreements), ¶
10. The second is a "Complete Release of Claims"
paragraph explaining that employees
fully release, waive and forever discharge the Company . . .
from any and all administrative claims, actions, suits, ...
or liabilities of any nature . . ., whether known or unknown,
arising prior to the Effective Date of this Agreement,
including, but not limited to . . . all claims arising in law
or equity or any claims arising under [a variety of federal
and state statutory and common-law causes of action] .... You
expressly agree and understand that this General Release
means that you are releasing the Released Parties from all
claims, whether known or unknown, . . . and whether or not
the claims arise out of your employment with or termination
of employment from the Company ....
Id., ¶ 3; see also Id. ¶
4 ("Pursuit of Released Claims").
the Plaintiffs signed the Agreements. Id. They agree
that they had the opportunity to review the Agreement prior
to signing it, though they maintain that they did not
understand all of it. See PI. Resp. to JSOF, ¶
110. Only one of the twenty laid-off employees opted not to
sign the Agreement. Id. ¶ 108; see
also Hall Decl., ¶ 17 (explaining that Frank
Manieri told her he wanted to be placed on the recall list,
and she told him that he should not sign the Agreement if he
wanted to preserve the option of being recalled). The parties
do not agree about what, if any, advice the Unions gave the
employees about whether to sign the Agreements. See,
e.g., PI. Resp. to JSOF, ¶¶ 111-12. No
Plaintiff revoked or attempted to revoke her Agreement within
seven days of signing it, and all Plaintiffs received their
severance payments in accordance with the terms of their
Agreements. Id. ¶¶ 114-15.
29, 2012, a massive storm known as a "derecho" hit
the Washington metropolitan area, resulting in the loss of
power to more than seventy of Giant's stores in the
region. Id. ¶ 119. While the parties disagree
about the impact of the storm on the Jessup facility's
operations, Id. ¶¶ 120-21, it is
undisputed that Giant chose to recall - first on a temporary
basis and then permanently - three employees on July 4 and
then hired twelve additional temporary employees in the days
afterward. Id. ¶¶ 123-25. Plaintiffs
maintain that Giant knew or should have known that the July
4th period would be a busy time, requiring additional
workers, but Giant insists that it had no plans to recall or
hire new workers prior to the derecho. Id.
¶¶ 123-26. Neither the eight Plaintiffs nor any of
the other employees who signed the Agreements were among the
recalled employees. Id. ¶ 127.
Grievances, NLRB Charge, and Litigation
early July, Plaintiffs learned of some recalls. Id.
¶ 128. On August 16, 2012, members of Local 730,
including Plaintiffs Tiffany Cherry, Christopher Mundell, and
Sharron Foster, filed a "group grievance" with
their Union complaining that their layoffs violated the Local
730 CBA. Id. ¶ 137. On the same day, members of
Local 922, including Plaintiffs Donna Ward, Donchez Coates,
Linda Mathis, William Christopher, and Ralph Jackson, also
filed a "group grievance" with their Union raising
the same complaint with regard to their CBA. Id.
¶ 138. A joint letter from both Unions was also sent on
Plaintiffs' behalf to Giant's Human Resources
department, accusing the company of improperly laying off
Plaintiffs and requesting that the Company meet with them to
resolve the grievance. Id. ¶ 139. The parties
"vigorously" dispute whether the grievances filed
against the Unions were timely and whether they were handled
properly by the Unions, see, e.g., Id.
¶ 144, but neither Union processed the grievance to
arbitration. Id. ¶¶ 146, 149. After
receiving the grievances from the Unions, Giant denied the
grievance of the Local 730 Plaintiffs by letter dated August
26, 2012, and the Local 922 Plaintiffs' grievance by
letter dated August 29, 2012. Id. ¶¶
November 17, 2012, those Plaintiffs, through counsel,
together filed three unfair-labor-practice charges with the
National Labor Relations Board: one each against the Unions
and one against Giant. Id. ¶ 152; see
also Def. Exh. 45-46 (ECF No. 134-5, -6) (NLRB Charges).
In their charges against the Unions, Plaintiffs claimed that
Local 730 and Local 922 breached then-duty of fair
representation vis-a-vis their termination and
severance package; in their charge against Giant, Plaintiffs
claimed the company "unlawfully" terminated their
employment by inducing them through threats and coercion to
sign the Separation and Release Agreements. See PI.
Resp. to JSOF, ¶¶ 153-154. The NLRB Regional Office
then conducted an investigation into the charges,
Id. ¶ 156, which included interviewing six of
the eight Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 157.
letters dated January 31, 2013, the NLRB Regional Director,
Wayne Gold, dismissed the charges against the Unions.
See Def. Exh. 56-57 (ECF No. 134-16, -17) (Letters
Dismissing Local 730 & Local 922 Charges) ("The
investigation failed to reveal any evidence that employees
were coerced into signing severance agreements. Rather, the
evidence established that the Union simply informed employees
of their options regarding severance."). Gold similarly
dismissed the charge against Giant on the same day.
See Def. Exh. 55 (ECF No. 134-15) (Letter Dismissing
Giant Charge) ("The evidence obtained during the
investigation established the Employer notified the
employees' collective-bargaining representative of its
decision to conduct the layoff. The Employer then bargained
over the effects of the layoff with [that] representative.
The employees were selected for layoff by order of seniority;
and, they were provided with two options, (1) sign a
severance agreement and waive .. . recall rights or (2)
accept six months of recall rights. . .. Your allegation that
the employees were threatened and coerced into signing the
agreements also lacks evidentiary support.").
unsurprisingly, appealed the Regional Director's
dismissals to the NLRB's Office of Appeals. See
Declaration of Ritchie Brooks, Exh. 8 (ECF No. 134-18) (Feb.
19, 2013, NLRB Appeal Acknowledgment) atl. On April 17, 2013,
the NLRB Office of Appeals affirmed the Regional
Director's dismissals of Plaintiffs' three charges,
"substantially for the reasons in the Regional
Director's letters of January 31, 2013."
Id. at 3 (Apr. 17, 2013, NLRB Denial Letter).
after Plaintiffs filed their NLRB Charges - but before those
charges could be adjudicated - they filed suit in this Court
against Giant and the Unions. See Complaint (ECF No.
1) (filed Dec. 27, 2012). The Complaint asserted six causes
of action and sought monetary damages to compensate for lost
wages, benefits, and emotional distress; reinstatement to
their positions at Giant; attorney fees and costs;
pre-judgment interest; and punitive damages. Id. at
7-16. With leave of court, Plaintiffs subsequently filed a
68-page Amended Complaint that asserted eight causes of
action: breach of the duty of fair representation by the
Unions (Counts I and II) and six counts against Giant,
including breach of contract (Count III),
"misrepresentation" (Count IV), fraud and
constructive fraud (Counts V and VI), "detrimental
reliance" (Count VII), and retaliation (Count VIII).
See Amended Complaint (ECF No. 39). Defendants then
moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint and alternatively
sought summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 40-42.
February 12, 2014, this Court issued an Order granting in
part and denying in part Defendants'motions. See ECF No.
53. In an accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the Court
dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims against Giant except
for one: breach of contract. Jackson v. Teamsters Local
Union 922, 991 F.Supp.2d 71, 86 (D.D.C. 2014). It
further concluded that the breach-of-contract cause of action
was in fact only viable as a claim under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, and so should proceed under
that statute. Id. at 81. The Court also held that it
was premature to enforce the waiver of claims against Giant
in the Separation and Release Agreements given that discovery
had not yet fully fleshed out the circumstances surrounding
those releases. Id. at 82-83.
Court then examined Plaintiffs' § 301 claim against
Giant and their breach-of-duty-of-fair-representation claims
against the Unions and concluded that these did not stand
alone, but were, in fact, pled as a "hybrid
section-301/fair-representation suit against both Giant and
then-Unions." Id. at 81. As this hybrid claim
was sufficiently pled to defeat a motion to dismiss, the
Court permitted that sole cause of action to proceed against
all three Defendants. Id. The parties next traveled
through the discovery phase, during which they had a number
of substantial disagreements over deposition testimony and
expert witnesses. See Jackson v. Teamsters Local Union
922, 310 F.R.D. 179 (D.D.C. 2015) (striking portions of
employees' errata sheets that made substantive changes or
contradictions to prior deposition testimony); Jackson v.
Teamsters Local Union 922, No. 12-2065, 2015 WL 11023790
(D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2015) (denying Plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider Court's prior ruling on errata sheets);
Jackson v. Teamsters Local Union 922, 312 F.R.D. 235
(D.D.C. 2015) (denying Plaintiffs' motion for leave to
supplement expert reports). Eventually, Defendants each moved
for summary judgment. See ECFNos. 128 (Local 922
MSJ), 129 (Local 730 MSJ), 130 (Giant MSJ). Those Motions are
judgment may be granted if "the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Holcomb v.
Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A fact is
"material" if it is capable of affecting the
substantive outcome of the litigation. See Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3dat
895. A dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007); Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248;
Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. "A party asserting
that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support
the assertion" by "citing to particular parts of
materials in the record" or "showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed.R.Civ.P.
motion for summary judgment is under consideration,
"[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; see
also Mastro v. PEPCO, 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir.
2006); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Or., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). On a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must "eschew making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence." Czekalski
v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
nonmoving party's opposition, however, must consist of
more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be
supported by affidavits, declarations, or other competent
evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
The nonmovant is required to provide evidence that would
permit a reasonable jury to find in his favor. See
Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir.
"hybrid" section-301/fair-representation claim is
composed of two parts: A claim against Giant for breach of
its collective-bargaining agreements (CBA) and a claim
against the Unions for breach of their duty of fair
representation. See Cephas v. MVM, Inc., 520 F.3d
480, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing DelCostello v.
Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 &
n.14 (1983)). Because these components are "intertwined,
" Jackson I, 991 F.Supp.2d at 81, Plaintiffs
must succeed on both in order to prevail.
seeking summary judgment, Giant first contends that by
signing Separation and Release Agreements, Plaintiffs have
expressly waived their right to assert that the company
violated the CBAs. Should its waiver argument fail to
persuade, Giant also maintains that it did not breach the
CBAs and that the Unions did not breach their duty of fair
representation. The Unions similarly argue that Plaintiffs
cannot succeed on either prong of their hybrid claim.
Court first finds that the Agreements are valid and thus
release Giant from all claims Plaintiffs raise against the
company. It next turns to the question of whether, as
Plaintiffs assert, they may nevertheless bring a stand-alone
claim against the Unions and the viability of such a claim.
Waiver of Claims Against Giant
first line of defense is its waiver argument: It insists that
Plaintiffs waived then-right to bring any claim
relating to their termination of employment with Giant,
including any breach-of-CBA or hybrid claim, when they signed
their Separation and Release Agreements with the company in
Agreements, offered to employees "considered for
separation pursuant to the number of positions available and
the seniority process established in the Collective
Bargaining Agreements, " Acknowledgements at 1, required
that employees, in exchange for severance pay, "fully
release, waive, and forever discharge the Company, [and] all
affiliated or related companies .. . from any and all
administrative claims, actions, suits, debts, demands,
damages, claims, judgments, or liabilities of any nature,
including costs and attorneys' fees, whether known or
unknown, arising prior to the Effective Date of this
Agreement." Agreement, ¶ 3. The Agreement expressly
noted that this "General Release" applied
"whether or not the claims ar[o]seout of your employment
with or termination of employment from" Giant.
terms, Giant insists, clearly cover the breach-of-CBA claim,
which is based on the company's layoffs and recalls that
Plaintiffs believe violated the CBA. The Agreements were
Dated: June 28 or 29, 2012, depending on the Plaintiff, and
their effective dates were eight days after Plaintiffs signed
them. See id., ¶ 12(g). As the layoffs occurred
on June 30, 2012, see Id. ¶ 1, predating the
effective dates of the Agreements, Defendants believe any
breach claims are waived. Plaintiffs do not dispute that if
the waivers are valId. they are out of luck with respect to
their suit against Giant. Instead, they rejoin that they were
induced to sign the ...