United States District Court, District of Columbia
BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge.
Luis Ivan Poblete has filed this pro se actio n
against the United States Marshals Service, Chief Judge Beryl
A. Howell, the law firm Hessler Bianco, attorney Patrick
Jules, and Channing D. Phillips, the United States Attorney
for the District of Columbia. Writ of Mandamus/Prohibition
[Dkt. # 1-1] (“Writ”). This case appears to arise
out of a civil foreclosure action brought by Residential
Credit Opportunities Trust (“the Trust”) against
Poblete, which is currently pending before Chief Judge
Howell. Id. ¶ 3; see also Public
Docket, Res. Credit Opportunities Trust v. Poblete,
No. 16-cv-0561-BAH (D.D.C.). In the foreclosure action, the
plaintiff, Residential Credit Opportunities Trust, is
represented by Patrick Jules of Hessler Bianco, and it has
filed a motion for summary judgment, which is pending.
See Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 6], Res. Credit
Opportunities Trust v. Poblete, No. 16-cv-0561-BAH.
initiated this civil action on August 19, 2016 in Superior
Court. See Writ. The Marshals Service, Chief Judge
Howell, and U.S. Attorney Phillips removed the matter to this
Court on September 8, 2016. Notice of Removal [Dkt. # 1].
writ, Poblete appears to be asserting that the District Court
lacks jurisdiction over the foreclosure action brought by the
Trust, and he seeks a “writ of
mandamus/prohibition” “immediately arresting
action of the inferior Court” “under the
authority of the Common Law of England.” Writ
¶¶ 2-3. He asserts that the Trust's law firm,
Hessler Bianco, “entered a Void Summons and
Complaint” in the foreclosure action, and he
“demand[s] the involuntary dismissal and the quashing
of said service of process of the said instant matter.”
Id. ¶¶ 6, 10. He further alleges that the
defendants “are acting in fraud and in violation of
God's covenant . . . by attempting to enforce an unlawful
lien on said real and personal property of [his] estate, in
violation of 17 C.F.R. 450 et. seq. and the Holy Covenant of
the Creator God, ” and that “[t]he Federal Court
of the District of Columbia is a criminal enterprise.”
Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 16. Specifically, he claims
that the District Court “is under the direct
supervision of a Judge known to have acted without
jurisdiction” - Chief Judge Beryl Howell - and that
“any and all Judges and state officers . . . who are
under her authority are acting without jurisdiction [and] are
acting in conflict with the Federal Constitution.”
Id. ¶ 17.
also contends that “[t]he Court and the Court officers
including but not limited to Plaintiffs [sic] attorney has
joined into the action that was conspired against [him] and
[his] parents that deprived [them] of [their] citizenship by
changing [their] citizenship status from American State
Citizens to a U.S. Citizenship, ” which Poblete insists
“is punishable by death pursuant to the 1949 Geneva
Convention, Article 3.” Writ ¶ 18. He further
alleges that “[t]he courts and its officers including
but not limited to Plaintiffs [sic] attorney is involved in
the act of ‘inland piracy' and
‘PRESS-GANGING' which is a criminal offense
pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Convention, Article 3.”
Id. ¶ 19. He supports his writ with an
affidavit, in which he avers that “the flesh lives and
the blood flows and nothing stands between the Affiant and
the divine.” Aff. of Luis Ivan Poblete [Dkt. # 1-1]
this matter proceeds any further, the Court must determine
whether it has jurisdiction to hear it. “Federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to
be expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a
cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden
of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations
omitted). In addition, “‘[i]t is axiomatic that
subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and that
courts may raise the issue sua sponte.'”
NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir.
2008), quoting Athens Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v.
Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Indeed, a
federal court must raise the issue because it is
“forbidden - as a court of limited jurisdiction - from
acting beyond [its] authority, and ‘no action of the
parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal
court.'” Id., quoting Akinseye v.
District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir.
2003). Therefore, a district court may dismiss a complaint
sua sponte pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(h)(3) when it is evident that the court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Evans v. Suter, No.
09-5242, 2010 WL 1632902, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2010),
citing Hurt v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Cir., No. 07-5019, 2008 WL 441786 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24,
2008); Scholastic Entm't, Inc. v. Fox Entm't
Grp., Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003);
Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th
matter jurisdiction is lacking where a complaint “is
‘patently insubstantial, ' presenting no federal
question suitable for decision.” Tooley v.
Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009),
quoting Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir.
1994). A claim is “patently insubstantial” when
it is “flimsier than doubtful or questionable . . .
[and] essentially fictitious.” Best, 39 F.3d
at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)
(“[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain
claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so
attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of
merit, wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous . . .
.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);
see, e.g., Peters v. Obama, Misc.
No. 10-0298 (CKK), 2010 WL 2541066 (D.D.C. June 21, 2010)
(sua sponte dismissing complaint alleging that
President Obama had been served with and failed to respond to
an “Imperial Writ of Habeas Corpus” by the
“Imperial Dominion of Amexem, ” requiring the
plaintiff's immediate release from a correctional
the Court is mindful that complaints filed by pro se
litigants must be held to less stringent standards than those
applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Brown v.
District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir.
2008), plaintiff's allegations in this case present
“no federal question suitable for decision.”
Best, 39 F.3d at 330. Insofar as the complaint is
even intelligible, it lacks a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
extent plaintiff's complaint asks this Court to make a
jurisdictional determination or otherwise intervene in the
foreclosure action, the Court cannot do so, because
“one district court does not have jurisdiction to
review the decisions of another district court or federal
appellate court, or to take disciplinary action against other
federal judges.” Klayman v. Kollar-Kotelly,
No. 12-5340, 2013 WL 2395909, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 2013)
(citations omitted). Any challenge to the decision that is
eventually rendered in the foreclosure action must be brought
by filing an appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (the courts of appeals
“shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United
States”). Finally, Poblete's claim against Chief
Judge Howell fails because a federal district judge enjoys
absolute immunity from suit for acts committed within her
judicial jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
the Court will dismiss this case sua sponte pursuant
to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
lack of subject ...