United States District Court, District of Columbia
S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge
Vincent Edwards brings this action against the United States
of America asserting that the District of Columbia Court
Services and Offender Supervision Agency ("CSOSA")
negligently detained him for thirty days after a no probable
cause parole violation finding. Defendant has filed a Motion
to Dismiss. (ECF No. 9). For the reasons set forth below, the
court will GRANT the motion.
United States Marshals Service arrested Plaintiff on October
29, 2013 for an alleged probation violation. (Compl. ¶
5). On November 12, 2013, a court found that there was no
probable cause to support a finding that Plaintiff had
violated his parole and ed his immediate release, but he
ended up being held for an additional thirty days and was
released on December 13, 2013. (Id. ¶¶
7-8). Plaintiff alleges that CSOSA "negligently caused
his over detention by losing his paperwork" and he
brings claims pursuant to the "tort claims act."
(Id. ¶¶ 4, 9).
seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing
that the government has not waived its sovereign immunity for
Plaintiff s "negligence" claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1), a court "must review the complaint
liberally, granting the plaintiff the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged."
Disner v. United States, 888 F.Supp.2d 83, 87
(D.D.C. 2012)(citing Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196,
1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). However, "the Court need not
accept factual inferences drawn by plaintiffs if those
inferences are not supported by facts alleged in the
complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiffs legal
conclusions." Speelman v. United States, 461
F.Supp.2d 71, 73 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted). "The
party claiming subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden
of demonstrating that such jurisdiction exists."
Stoddard v. Wynn, 68 F.Supp.3d 104, 110 (D.D.C.
2014) (citing Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
the United States is
immune from suit unless there is explicit statutory waiver of
its sovereign immunity. F.D.I.C v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) ("Absent
a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government
and its agents from suit."). "Sovereign immunity is
jurisdictional in nature, " so a claim barred by
sovereign immunity lacks subject matter jurisdiction and may
be dismissed under a 12(b)(1) motion. Id.
One avenue for statutory waiver of sovereign immunity is the
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). The FTCA operates
as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, rendering the
United States amenable to suit for certain . . . claims,
subject to various exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
Scruggs v. Bureau of Engraving & Printing, Civil
Case No. 15-2205 (RJL), 2016 WL 4098314, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug.
1, 2016) (footnote and some citations omitted). Thus, as a
general proposition, the government is liable for some claims
under the FTCA "in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like
circumstances." Hornbeck Offshore Transp.,
LLC v. United States, 563 F.Supp.2d 205, 210 (D.D.C.
2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 1346(b)(1)),
aff'd, 569 F.3d 506 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
are exceptions, however, to this general proposition that the
government is subject to suit "in the same manner"
as a private individual. One of those exceptions
preserves sovereign immunity in claims against the government
for certain intentional torts, See 28 U.S.C. §
2680(h) (sovereign immunity bars "any claim arising out
of assault, battery, false imprisonment false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights"). This is known ...