Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Arias v. Marriott International, Inc.

United States District Court, District of Columbia

November 14, 2016

ROSA ARIAS, Plaintiff,



         Plaintiff Rosa Arias, ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Defendant, Marriott International, Inc., ("Defendant, " or "Marriott"), for herself and others similarly situated. Ms. Arias alleges violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 for discrimination based on race, national origin and retaliation (Count 1), breach of contract (Count 2), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count 3), wrongful termination (Count 4), negligence and negligent misrepresentation of material facts (Count 5), aggravated assault (Count 6), fraudulent concealment of material fact (Count 7), and violation of D.C. Code § 32-1103 (Count 7[1]) .

         This matter is presently before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("Mot.") [Dkt. No. 33].

         Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, and Reply, the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

         I. BACKGROUND

         A. Factual Background

         Plaintiff Rosa Arias, a Spanish American, has been employed in the Housekeeping Department at the Defendant's Washington Marriott at Metro Center ("the Hotel") since 2003. Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 3, 16, 19 ("SAC") [Dkt. No. 31] . As a housekeeper, Ms. Arias' duties included cleaning hotel rooms and bathrooms. Id. ¶ 3.' These duties required her to work with hazardous chemicals such as furniture polish and antibacterial all-purpose cleaning agents. Id. ¶¶ 3, 17. Ms. Arias asserts that the chemicals required the use of Personal Protective Equipment ("PPE"), and that Marriott withheld the required PPE. Id. ¶¶ 3, 16.

         Ms. Arias asserts that at some point during her employment, she experienced severe eye irritation, headaches, respiratory illness and chest pain. SAC ¶4. Although Ms. Arias did not initially know the cause of her illnesses, she now believes that they were related to the hazardous chemicals that she used at work. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 7.

         In early 2 015, Ms. Arias requested and was granted a four month medical leave of absence. SAC ¶ 5. She was scheduled to return to work on May 15, 2015. Id. While on leave, Ms. Arias was diagnosed with either heart or respiratory complications. Id. ¶ 6.

         On March 31, 2015, while still on leave, Ms. Arias gave deposition testimony in another case, Sanchez v. Mariott Corporation, 12-cv-1577, (D.D.C.), a separate Title VII suit against Defendant's affiliate Marriott Corporation, about the chemicals she used at the Hotel and the use of those chemicals without PPE. SAC ¶¶ 7-12. Her testimony included statements that she and her coworkers told Marriott that the chemicals were making them sick and that Marriott never trained the Housekeeping Department on the hazards of the chemicals. Id. ¶ 9. Ms. Arias asserts that Defendant obviously had notice of her deposition testimony in the Sanchez case. Id. ¶ 30.

         On May 14, 2015, one day before Ms. Arias was scheduled to return to work, she received a phone message from the Defendant's representative informing her that her employment was terminated and someone else had taken her position. SAC ¶ 14. However, later[2], she was told that her termination was rescinded. Id.

         In July, August and September 2015, Ms. Arias communicated with the Hotel about returning from her leave of absence, and whether she would have access to PPE upon her return. SAC ¶¶ 15-16, 19. Ms. Arias asserts that at this point, her leave of absence was unpaid. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. On September 20, 2015, Ms. Arias returned to work, and she remains employed by the Hotel. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 3 ("Mot.") [Dkt. No. 33-1].

         B. Procedural Background

         On or about June 15, 2015, Ms. Arias filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See Corrected Notice of Removal at 1 [Dkt. No. 2]. On August 8, 2015, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal from D.C. Superior Court [Dkt. No. 1] .

         On August 26, 2015, Ms. Arias filed a Consent Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint ("Consent Motion to Amend") [Dkt. No. 8] . On August 27, 2015, the Court granted Ms. Arias' Consent Motion to Amend [Dkt. No. 9], and she filed the First Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 10]. On April 21, 2016, this Court granted Ms. Arias' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. April 21, 2016 Order [Dkt. No. 30] . That same day, she filed the Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative Complaint.

         On May 5, 2016, Marriott filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 33]. On June 1, 2016, Ms. Arias filed her Opposition ("Opp.") [Dkt. No. 37]. On June 13, 2016, Marriott filed its Reply ("Reply") [Dkt. No. 38].

         On August 12, 2016, Ms. Arias filed a Notice of Dismissal of Claims from Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("Notice of Dismissal") [Dkt. No. 40-1] and voluntarily dismissed three of her eight claims.


         To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" and to "nudge [ ] [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). " [O] nee a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563.

         Under the Twombly standard, a "court deciding a motion to dismiss must not make any judgment about the probability of the plaintiffs' success... [, ] must assume all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)... [, and] must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged." Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A complaint will not suffice, however, if it "tenders 'naked ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.