United States District Court, District of Columbia
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge.
a breach of contract suit in which Plaintiff, proceeding
pro se, alleges that Defendant AlliedBarton Security
Services LLC (“AlliedBarton”) violated certain
contractual promises in relation to the manner in which
Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment as a security
guard. Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated for allowing
an unauthorized person to enter the school at which he was
stationed. Plaintiff claims that this charge is inaccurate
because he recognized this person as a parent of one of the
students at the school.
the Court is Defendant's  Motion to Dismiss. Defendant
argues that Plaintiff's claim is preempted by Section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”).
Upon consideration of the pleadings,  the relevant legal
authorities, and the record for purposes of this motion, the
Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion. The Court agrees that
Plaintiff's claim is not meaningfully independent from
the Collective Bargaining Agreement that was in place during
his employment, and is accordingly preempted by Section 301.
purposes of the motion before the Court, the Court accepts as
true the well-pleaded allegations in Plaintiff's
Complaint. The Court does “not accept as true, however,
the plaintiff's legal conclusions or inferences that are
unsupported by the facts alleged.” Ralls Corp. v.
Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C.
Cir. 2014). Further, because Plaintiff proceeds in this
matter pro se, the Court must consider not only the
facts alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint, but also the
facts alleged in the various other documents Plaintiff has
filed in response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
See Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d
146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“a district court errs in
failing to consider a pro se litigant's
complaint ‘in light of' all filings, including
filings responsive to a motion to dismiss”) (quoting
Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C.
Cir. 1999)); Fillmore v. AT & T Mobility Servs.
LLC, 140 F.Supp.3d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2015) (“the Court,
as it must in a case brought by a pro se plaintiff,
considers the facts as alleged in both the Complaint and
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.”). Although Plaintiff's pleadings are far
from a model of clarity, the Court can ascertain the
was hired by Defendant as a security officer in 2012.
Pl.'s Second Opp'n at 4. Before being employed by
Defendant, Plaintiff worked for a company called U.S.
Security Associates Inc. Id. While working for U.S.
Security, Plaintiff complained to his superiors, including a
Major Jenkins, that assignments were not being made on the
basis of employees' seniority. Id. at 4, 8.
Plaintiff also complained about his superiors' refusal to
allow Plaintiff to see the company's “seniority
list, ” which Plaintiff alleges must be given to a new
contractor within ten days when a contract changes hands.
Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges that his superiors
retaliated against him for making these complaints.
being hired by Defendant in 2012, Plaintiff was stationed at
Johnson Middle School in Washington D.C. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff alleges that Major Jenkins was responsible for this
placement, and that she placed Plaintiff there in retaliation
for Plaintiff's previous complaints while at U.S.
Security. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that this
placement was wrongful because his seniority demanded that he
be given a better assignment. Id.
2013, Plaintiff was fired for allowing an unauthorized
individual to enter the school. Id. at 4. Plaintiff
alleges that his termination was wrongful, because the
individual was a parent of one of the students at the school
and therefore authorized to enter. Id. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant lied on a Disciplinary form that
states that Plaintiff allowed an unauthorized person on to
school premises. Id. at 4, 6. Plaintiff also takes
issue with the fact that the Disciplinary form was unsigned.
Id. at 6.
suggests that these actions violate a number of policies or
documents. Primarily, Plaintiff refers to a
“disciplinary policy” or “progressive
disciplinary policy” and a “Dos and
Don'ts” list prepared by a company hired by
Defendant to handle employment issues. Id. at 3, 6.
Plaintiff also makes reference to a collective bargaining
agreement, in the context of arguing that he has a right to
bypass its grievance procedures. Id. at 3.
also makes various other miscellaneous allegations of
wrongdoing, such as allegations that Defendant violated the
Occupational Safety and Health Act by not posting security
guards at broken doors at the Middle School at which he
worked, which allowed students to come and go freely, and
various other references to unspecified “DC
filed this lawsuit in the Superior Court for the District of
Columbia and Defendant removed it to this
Court. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that Plaintiff's claims were completely preempted
by Section 301(a) of the LMRA. Def.'s Mot. at 2. The
Court granted Plaintiff leave to file two oppositions to
Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint on the
grounds that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
“[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Rather, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted
as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.