United States District Court, District of Columbia
RICHARD J. LEON United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court on petitioner's "Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 USC § 1651(a);
28 USC § 2254(a), " ECF No. 1, the United
States' Opposition to Petitioner's Pro Se
"Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 USC
§ 1651(a); 28 USC § 2254(a), " ECF No. 12, and
"Petitioner's Reply Pursuant to Rule 5(e) of Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases, " ECF No. 26. For the
reasons discussed below, the Court will deny the petition as
Court construes the petition as one filed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, and the sole claim this Court may entertain is
Count II, see Pet. ¶ 132, ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, see Williams v.
Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998-1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In
relevant part, § 2254 provides:
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated
on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A federal court does not grant a
habeas petition to a state prisoner unless it appears that:
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State; or
(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective
process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
Id. § 2254(b)(1). An individual convicted in
and sentenced by the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia is considered a state prisoner for purposes of
§ 2254. See Smith v. United States, No.
00-5181, 2000 WL 1279276, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 23, 2000)
April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA). . . impose[d] ¶ 1-year period of limitation
on motions brought under [28 U.S.C. § 2255], "
United States v. Saro, 252 F.3d 449, 451 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (citation omitted), and "[c]ourts have generally
applied the same analysis to the time limitations in §
2254, " United States v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199,
203 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). The limitation
period for the filing of a petition under § 2254 is set
forth in § 2244. See Wright v. Wilson, 930
F.Supp.2d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2013). It runs from the latter of four
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made