United States District Court, District of Columbia
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge.
Johnnie Parker (“Plaintiff Parker”) and
Starrelette Gail Jones-Parker (“Plaintiff
Jones-Parker”) bring this action against
Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff John Moriarty &
Associates of Virginia LLC (“JMAV”). Plaintiffs
allege that JMAV, as general contractor of a construction
project, was negligent resulting in serious injury to
Plaintiff Parker, a construction worker on the project site.
Defendant JMAV subsequently filed a Third Party Complaint
against Third Party Defendant Strittmatter Metro, LLC
(“Strittmatter”), and Strittmatter, in turn,
filed a Fourth Party Complaint against Fourth Party Defendant
Environmental Consultants and Contractors, Inc.
(“ECC”). Presently before the Court is the 
Motion to Intervene filed by Deborah Khalil-Ambrozou
(“Movant”), Plaintiff Parker's mother, which
is opposed by Plaintiffs, and Movant's  Motion to
Retain Right of Party to Intervene, which the Court shall
treat as a reply to Movant's original
motion. Upon consideration of the parties'
submissions,  the applicable authorities, and the record
as a whole, the Court shall DENY Movant's  Motion to
Intervene and shall DENY Movant's  Motion to Retain
Right of Party to Intervene.
purposes of resolving the motion to intervene presently
before the Court, the well-pleaded allegations in the
Complaint are assumed to be true. Secs. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Prudential Secs. Inc., 136 F.3d 153, 156
n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Williams & Humbert Ltd.
v. W. & H. Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd., 840 F.2d 72,
75 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Additionally, where appropriate, the
Court shall refer to the non-conclusory allegations and
record evidence offered by the Putative Intervenor in support
of her motion to intervene. See Foster v. Gueory,
655 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[M]otions to
intervene are usually evaluated on the basis of well pleaded
matters in the motion, the complaint, and any responses of
opponents to intervention.”); Sw. Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th
Cir. 2001) (“Courts are to take all well-pleaded,
nonconclusory allegations in the motion to intervene, the
proposed complaint or answer in intervention, and
declarations supporting the motion as true absent sham,
frivolity or other objections.”). The Court recites the
principal facts pertaining to the issues raised in the
pending motion, reserving further presentation of the facts
for the discussion of the individual issues below. This
action arises out of the construction work completed on the
Apollo H Street project (“the project”), located
at 600 and 624 H Streets, NE, Washington, D.C. Compl. ¶
8. JMAV was the general contractor hired to perform
construction on the project. Id. Plaintiff Johnnie
Parker alleges that on December 18, 2014, he was instructed
to excavate between 600 and 624 H Street, NE, as part of his
regular duties of employment while employed by Strittmatter.
Id. ¶¶ 7, 9. Mr. Parker further alleges
that the Department of Environment for the District of
Columbia publicly released information that the area between
601 and 645 H Street, NE, is contaminated by a leaking
underground storage tank, and that JMAV knew or should have
known about the leaking underground storage tank, which
contained toxic chemicals. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
Mr. Parker asserts that JMAV did not warn him regarding the
leaking underground storage tanks, that Strittmatter did not
instruct him to wear protective gear, and that Mr. Parker was
not wearing any protective gear during the excavation work.
Id. ¶¶ 12-14. Mr. Parker alleges that as a
result of this excavation work, he has sustained serious,
permanent, and debilitating injuries. Id. ¶ 15.
On September 16, 2015, Mr. Parker and his wife filed the
underlying Complaint in the instant action with a claim of
negligence by and against JMAV, along with a claim for
punitive damages based on JMAV's alleged willful,
reckless, and wanton conduct. Id. ¶¶
16-28. Movant, Mr. Parker's mother, now seeks to
intervene in this action in order to “protect her
interest in this case to provide restitution, punitive and
other relief . . . for Intentional Personal Injury Tort and
other torts.” Movant's Mot. at 2. Movant seeks $2,
500, 000 and punitive damages or restitution. Id. at
10. The Court shall further discuss Movant's claims in
its discussion below.
in a civil action, whether as of right or permissive, is
governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. The standard
for intervention as of right is governed by Rule 24(a):
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene
who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect
its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Unequivocally, the recognized
requirements for intervention as of right in this Circuit
are: (1) timeliness; (2) a cognizable interest; (3)
impairment of that interest; and (4) lack of adequate
representation by existing parties. See Smoke v.
Norton, 252 F.3d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Williams
& Humbert Ltd. v. W.&H. Trademarks Ltd., 840
F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Dimond v. District
of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986). On the
issue of lack of adequate representation by the existing
parties, the movant need only “sho[w] that
representation of his interest ‘may be'
inadequate.” Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of
Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972). A party seeking
leave to intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a) must
further demonstrate that it has both constitutional and
prudential standing to participate as a party in the case.
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1074
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Thus, a party that seeks to
intervene as of right must demonstrate that it has standing
to participate in the action.”).
Rule 24(b) authorizes permissive intervention for anyone who
files a timely motion and “has a claim or defense that
shares with the main action a common question of law or
fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(1)(B). In exercising its
discretion to permit intervention, “the court must
consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the original parties'
rights.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(3).
seeks to intervene as of right in this action pursuant to
Rule 24(a) and, alternatively, seeks permissive intervention
pursuant to Rule 24(b). For the reasons described below, the
Court finds that Movant has not established either Article
III or prudential standing and, as such, this Court is
required to deny her request to intervene as of right.
Moreover, the Court shall deny Movant's request for
permissive intervention because Movant's claims do not
share a common question of law or fact with any of the claims
or defenses in this main action before the Court and because
permitting intervention would cause undue delay.
Court must first start its analysis with a discussion of
standing because it implicates this Court's jurisdiction
to consider the merits of Movant's claims. See
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. FDIC, 717 F.3d 189,
191 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Movant is required to show that she has
both Article III and prudential standing in order to
intervene in this case as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a).
Id. at 193-95. In order “[t]o establish
standing under Article III, a prospective intervenor- like
any party-must show: (1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and
(3) redressability.” Fund for Animals, Inc. v.
Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 732-33 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992)). “Injury in fact is the ‘invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.'” Arpaio v.
Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560) (alterations in original).
“The ‘causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of' must be ‘fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not
the result of the independent action of some third party not
before the court.'” Id. (quoting
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). Finally, “it must be
‘likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.'”
Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
Court first considers the nature of the injury asserted by
Movant and the causal connection between Movant's
asserted injury and the conduct at issue in this matter. The
instant action involves claims for negligence and punitive
damages that arise out of an alleged injury that Plaintiff
Parker incurred while working for a subcontractor on a
construction site in Washington, D.C., on December 18, 2014.
Movant's claims arise out of an alleged physical
altercation between Movant and Plaintiff Parker that occurred
on April 16, 2016, at her home in Maryland where Plaintiffs
also were residing at the time, and an incident that occurred
on June 13, 2016, after Movant filed the instant motion, when
Movant allegedly was subjected to a mental and physical
evaluation pursuant to a court order sought and obtained by
Plaintiff Parker in Maryland state court. As a result of
these incidents, Movant alleges that she suffered physical,
emotional, and mental pain and suffering and seeks to recover
for medical expenses, lost income, and other losses.
Movant's Mot. at 8-10; Movant's Addendum at
the Court accepts that Movant has establishing injury-in-fact
for the purposes of standing, both of the incidents cited in
Movant's pending motion are unrelated to Plaintiffs'
negligence claims arising out of the injuries he allegedly
sustained while working as a construction worker. Movant now
seeks to intervene in this matter “in order to protect
her interest in this case to provide restitution, putative
and other relief deemed just by . . . [this Court] for [her]
Intentional Personal Injury Torts and other torts.”
Movant's Mot. at 2. Here, there is no causal connection
between Movant's asserted injury arising out of the
altercation at her house and the court-ordered evaluation in
2016, and ...