United States District Court, District of Columbia
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge
without counsel, plaintiff has sued the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) and a property management company from
which he leases an apartment under the federal public housing
program commonly referred to as Section 8 housing.
See Compl. ¶ 8; 42 U.S.C. § 1437f
(“Low-income housing assistance”). Plaintiff
seeks money damages exceeding $571 million for breach of
contract, breach of warranty and negligence. See
Compl. at 5-8. Pending before the Court are HUD's motion
to dismiss [Dkt. 7] and the property management
defendants' motion to dismiss [Dkt. 8].
12, 2016, the Court informed plaintiff about his obligation
to respond to each motion by September 6, 2016, and the
potential consequence of dismissal if he did not respond.
See Order [Dkt. 9]. The deadline was extended, at
plaintiff's request, to October 31, 2016. See
Aug. 31, 2016 Min. Order. Plaintiff has not complied with
either order, and he has not sought additional time to
comply. For the reasons summarized below, the Court will
grant each motion and dismiss the complaint without
HUD's Motion to Dismiss
argues, among other grounds for dismissal, that the complaint
is barred by sovereign immunity. See Def.'s Mem.
of P. & A. at 7-9. Under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, “the United States may not be sued without
its consent and . . . the existence of consent is a
prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). Such consent may not
be implied; it must be “unequivocally expressed in
statutory text.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187,
burden of proving that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction lies with the plaintiff, even if he is acting
pro se. Woodyard v. Harper, 162 F.Supp.3d
3, 6 (D.D.C. 2016). By not responding in any way to the
motion, plaintiff has conceded HUD's valid jurisdictional
argument. See July 12, 2016 Order at 1 (citing
Hopkins v. Women's Div., General Bd. of Global
Ministries, 284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003),
aff'd, 98 Fed.Appx. 8 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
“As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts must
assure themselves of jurisdiction over any controversy they
hear.” Woodyard, 162 F.Supp.3d at 6. And when
jurisdiction is lacking, “the court [can] no more rule
in favor of the government than against it.”
Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C.
Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the claims against HUD will be
dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for want of subject
Property Managers' Motion to Dismiss
property management defendants contend first that
plaintiff's claim for “damages from 2003 to present
day” is barred by the District's three-year statute
of limitations. Mem. of P. & A. at 4-5 [Dkt. 8] (citing
D.C. Code § 12-301(7)). But plaintiff alleges in the
complaint filed on April 12, 2016, that “a few years
ago, in the beginning of his lease, ” he
“realized that his ‘Utility Reimbursements'
were not right to his estimation, ” and he complained
to management in writing. Compl. ¶ 10. In
“[e]ither late 2013 or early 2014, [plaintiff]
realized, finally . . . [that] Management was adding the
amount of his ‘Utility Allowance' as . . . part of
his rent.” Id. Accepting plaintiff's
allegations as true, as the Court must at this stage of
litigation, the complaint appears to have been filed within
three years of plaintiff's alleged discovery of
wrongdoing; therefore, the Court cannot grant defendant's
motion on statute of limitations grounds. See Firestone
v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(reiterating that “because statute of limitations
issues often depend on contested questions of fact, dismissal
is appropriate only if the complaint on its face is
conclusively time-barred”) (citing Richards v.
Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see
accord Hagan v. United States, __ F.Supp.3d __, __, 2016
WL 3688426, at *3 (D.D.C. July 7, 2016) (denying motion to
dismiss where “the Court [could not] conclude based on
the face of the complaint alone that the applicable statute
of limitations bars the claims in this case”).
property management defendants contend next that
plaintiff's conclusory allegations that he is entitled to
more than $45, 000 in unpaid utility allowances fail to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Mem.
of P. & A. at 5-6. Plaintiff has not responded to this
argument by clarifying his claim with actual facts, and a
pleading, such as presented here, that merely offers “
‘labels and conclusions[, ] . . . a ‘formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action' . . .
[or] ‘naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement' ” cannot withstand a motion to
dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citations and alterations omitted). Accordingly, the claims
against the property management defendants will be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6).
 The latter motion to dismiss is
brought on behalf of named defendants Winn Managed
Properties, LLC, and Southern Hills L.P. See
Counsel's Errata [Dkt. 12].
 A separate order accompanies this