United States District Court, District of Columbia
Charles H. Rogers, Jr., Plaintiff,
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 689, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
P. Mehta United States District Judge
before the court is a Motion for Attorney's Fees filed by
Defendant Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689. The court
previously entered judgment in Defendant's favor on the
merits of the parties' dispute after Plaintiff Charles H.
Rogers, Jr. failed to respond to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 43
[hereinafter S.J. Mem. Op.]; Order, ECF No. 44. Shortly
thereafter, on October 19, 2016, Defendant moved for an award
of attorney's fees and costs ("Motion"),
asserting that such an award was warranted because the
litigation was frivolous and conducted in bad faith.
Defi's Mot., ECF No. 45. Then, repeating a practice seen
throughout this case, Plaintiff failed to timely respond. He
did file an Opposition, but not until November 29, 2016, more
than three weeks after the deadline to do so had passed.
Pl.'s Opp'n, ECF No. 46. Because Plaintiff filed an
untimely response, the court will treat Defendant's
Motion as conceded and grant it.
the Local Rules, if a party fails to oppose a motion within
the prescribed time of 14 days "the Court may treat the
motion as conceded." LCvR 7(b). "This rule is not
some obscure technicality; it is regularly enforced in this
district, " including with respect to motions for
attorney's fees. See Robinson v. Ergo Solutions
LLC, 4 F.Supp.3d 181, 187 (D.D.C. 2014) (applying Rule
7(b) to an unopposed motion for attorney's fees);
Barton-Smith v. District of Columbia, No. 98-3026,
1999 WL 1442343, at *1 (D.D.C. June 1, 1999) (treating
unopposed motion for attorney's fees as conceded).
"motion for attorney's fees [is] a perfect candidate
for enforcement of Local Rule 7(b)." Robinson,
4 F.Supp.3d at 187. This is not the first time Plaintiff has
missed a filing deadline. It is his fifth. See Id.
(treating attorney's fees motion as conceded where the
defendant "had already exhibited a pattern of
intentionally ignoring [the plaintiff s] filings").
Moreover, when he filed his Opposition more than three weeks
after the deadline, he offered no reason for its
untimeliness. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B)
(requiring a party to show "excusable neglect" to
warrant an extension of time after a deadline has passed).
Finally, Plaintiffs untimely response came even after the
court had observed that he had "shown a remarkable lack
of diligence in prosecuting this matter since its
inception." S.J. Mem. Op. at6. Evidently, the
court's words and admonishments had no impact. He
apparently believes that deadlines are merely advisory and
that he can file a response whenever he pleases. To accept
Plaintiff s late filing and not treat Local 689's Motion
as conceded would only reward his impertinence.
Court of Appeals' recent decision in Winston &
Str'awn LLP v. McLean, No. 14-7197, 2016 WL 7174125
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 2016), does not compel a contrary result.
That decision addressed the interplay between Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 and Local Civil Rule 7(b). See
Id. at *1. In Winston & Str awn, the court
held that "a motion for summary judgment cannot be
'conceded' for want of opposition" under Local
Rule 7(b). See Id. Such a practice, the court held,
is inconsistent with Rule 56(a), which provides that a court
may enter summary judgment only if there is no genuine
dispute of material fact and the movant demonstrates that she
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See
Id. at *3. It also is inconsistent with Rule 56(e),
which directs courts how to proceed if a party fails to
address another party's assertion of facts, including
"giv[ing] [the party] an opportunity to properly support
or address the fact." See Id. at *3;
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(1). The Court of Appeals explained that
Rule 56's "standards cannot be satisfied if, as
allowed by Local Rule 7(b), the District Court simply grants
judgment 'as conceded' when the nonmoving party fails
to meet a deadline." Id.
& Strawn does not preclude applying Local Rule 7(b)
in this case for two reasons. First, that case is expressly
limited to motions for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals
made "clear that nothing in [its] opinion [was] meant to
address the applicability of Local Rule 7(b) to motions other
than motions for summary judgment." Id. at *4.
Rule 56 is not at issue here.
Rule 54(d)-the Rule that deals with attorney's fees and
costs-does not impose the same kinds of stringent evidentiary
and legal standards as Rule 56, which the court in
Winston & Strawn found incompatible with Local
Rule 7(b). To apply for attorney's fees, the prevailing
party need only file a motion with the court within 14 days
after entry of judgment that specifies the ground entitling
the movant to an award, states the amount sought, and
discloses, if the court so orders, any agreement about fees
between lawyer and client. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2). The process
and standard for granting a petition for costs are even less
demanding. The Rule provides that, unless a statute, rule or
order provides otherwise, costs "should be allowed to
the prevailing party" upon the filing of a notice with
the clerk of the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)
("The clerk may tax costs on 14 days' notice. On
motion served within the next 7 days, the court may review
the clerk's action."). In short, unlike Rule 56,
there is nothing in the text of Rule 54(d) that forecloses a
court from applying Local Rule 7(b) to a motion for
attorney's fees and costs and granting such motion
"as conceded." Winston & Strawn, 2016
WL 7174125, at *4.
the court will grant Defendant's Motion, it is not
prepared at this time to enter a final award on
attorney's fees. "In the preparation of fee
applications it is insufficient to provide the District Court
with very broad summaries of work done and hours
logged." Nat 7 Ass 'n of Concerned
Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (per curiam). "The better practice is to
prepare detailed summaries based on contemporaneous time
records indicating the work performed by each attorney for
whom fees are sought." Id. "Very broad
summaries, " however, is all Defendant has provided to
the court. In its Motion, Defendant provides a summary chart
of the fees it incurred by month, plus a description of the
month's work. See Def's Mot. at 12-13. The summary
chart is not, however, "sufficiently detailed to permit
the District Court to make an independent determination
whether or not the hours claimed are justified."
Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d
at 1327. The chart does not, for example, specify the hours
spent on a particular task or who performed that task. The
court cannot determine at this time whether the charges are
reasonable absent such detail.
within 14 days of this date Defendant shall submit
"detailed summaries" of the work performed by its
counsel "based on contemporaneous time records
indicating the work performed by each attorney for whom fees
are sought." Id. Any such detailed summary
shall be accompanied by counsel's monthly invoices to
Defendant. Any privileged portion of the monthly invoices may
be redacted, with the unredacted invoice provided to the
court in camera.
foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Attorney's
Fees is granted. The court will enter a final fees and costs
award after the court receives from Defendant a more detailed
summary of and supporting documentation for the fees and
 Plaintiff twice missed deadlines to
oppose Defendant's successive motions to dismiss, and he
responded to those motions only after the court reminded him
of the missed deadlines. See Minute Order, Feb. 4,
2015; Minute Order, May 11, 2015. Additionally, Plaintiff
failed altogether to respond to a motion for sanctions, which
Defendant filed after Plaintiffs counsel did not appear for a
deposition that he had noticed. See Mot. for
Expenses, ECF No. 32. The court treated the unopposed motion
as conceded. Order, ECF No. 33. Last, Plaintiff did not
respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
See S.J. Mem. Op. at 1.
 Because the court has treated
Defendant's Motion as conceded, it need not consider its
contention that it should be awarded attorney's fees
because Plaintiff filed a frivolous complaint and acted in