United States District Court, District of Columbia
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss [Dkt. No. 15] and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
File Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 28]. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will grant the former and deny the
Sunday, October 11, 2015, there allegedly was “a
collision between a pedestrian (Plaintif[f]) and a motor
vehicle” in the Unit Block of E Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. Compl. [Dkt. No. 1] at 2 (page numbers
designated by ECF). Metropolitan Police Department
“Officer Charles Monk responded to a 911 call.”
Id. at 1. Officer Monk prepared an incident report
describing the incident as follows:
On 10/11/15 at about 0715 hours, [Plaintiff] reports that she
was walking east bound in the Unit Block of E Street N.W.
along the south side of the street directly across from the
alley sep[a]rating 15 and 25 E Street N.W. She stepped from
the sidewalk/driveway area and began to walk across the open
lanes of traffic northbound[.] [Plaintiff] was attempting to
cross the roadway and reach the north sidewalk.
[The driver] was . . . backing from the alley between 15 and
25 E Street on the north side of the roadway[.] [She] stated,
she signaled and waited for vehicular traffic to pas[s] in
both directions. When it was safe to do so, she began to back
[her vehicle] out of the alley[.]
[The driver] heard a female voice yelling and screaming.
[Plaintiff] began to state, “you hit me.” Further
investigation revealed no damage to [the vehicle].
[Plaintiff] was observed walking around by the reporting
officer. She was carrying several heavy bags on her person.
[She] displayed no signs of physical injury. [Plaintiff]
further explained the right rear bumper area of [the vehicle]
brushed against her left upper arm, knee and left side. [She]
refuse[d] medical treatment. [The driver] stated, [“]I
didn't see her in my mirrors nor did I believe I hit
[The driver] had legal usage and obeyed all traffic laws . .
. while operating [her vehicle]. [Plaintiff] failed to use
the proper crosswalk to cross the [street and she] was
advised of the law for pedestrian's use of public space
No NOI issued or further actions taken[.]
After further investigation of [Plaintiff's statements]
and additional visits to the scene, “it's the
investigating officer[']s op[in]ion that a[n] accident
did not occur[.] Statements and actions are inconsistent.
Id., Ex. (CCN #15161351 - Traffic Crash Report) at
to Plaintiff, Officer Monk made “several errors on the
police report.” Id. at 2. For example, the
report allegedly misidentified the hotel in front of which
the collision occurred, id., misstated
Plaintiff's actions before and during the alleged
collision, id., omitted Plaintiff's address,
see Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot.
to Dismiss [ECF No. 19] (Pl.'s Opp'n) at 8, and
indicated that Plaintiff “was in the street improperly,
” id. Officer Monk allegedly “focused on
details pertaining to [Plaintiff's] person that had no
bearing on the incident, ” particularly by referring to
the bags she was carrying thus “shift[ing] the
narrative away from the collision to his perception of
[her].” Compl. at 2. Plaintiff has asserted that
“Officer Monk exhibited bias in his handling of the
investigation and reporting of the incident, ” and as a
result of his biased policing, she “was deprived of
[her] right to fair and impartial due process.”
has had other encounters with MPD officers. She allegedly
“sought assistance in dealing with and reporting a
verbal threat on [her] life (Oct. 4, 2015) and an actual
battery (Oct. 11, 2015), ” and based on the
officers' responses she alleges “a pattern of bias
by the [MPD that] has put [her] life at risk.”
Id. at 3. “In each case officers'
selective hearing prevented them from fully grasping the
facts as [Plaintiff] stated them, letting a single word or
phrase determine the validity of the enter account of the
events.” Id. “As a result of [her]
encounters with the [MPD] and the bias that is apparent,
[Plaintiff] chose not to report a [third] incident . . . on
October 18, 2015.” Id.; see Pl.'s
Opp'n at 5. Plaintiff “no longer feel[s] as if
[she] can get the protection [and] justice from the [MPD],
” and for this reason she “is suing for
deprivation of rights, intentional interference, defamation
[and] negligence.” Compl. at 4. Among other relief,
Plaintiff demands damages of $10 million. Id.
Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
plaintiff's complaint need only provide a “short
and plain statement of [her] claim showing that [she] is
entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), that
‘“give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the .
. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,
'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In
other words, it must set forth “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp., 683 F.3d 397, 403
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not
‘shown'-‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). For purposes of this discussion, the
Court construes Plaintiff's complaint liberally, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and presumes
that its factual allegations are true, see Gray v.
Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2006). With these
considerations in mind, the Court concludes that the
complaint must be dismissed.
Proper Party Defendants
Metropolitan Police ...