United States District Court, District of Columbia
RICHARED J. LEON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on petitioner's, pro
se petition for a writ of habeas corpus
("Pet.") and the United States Parole
Commission's Opposition to Defendant's Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
("Comm'n Opp'n"). For the reasons discussed
below, the petition will be denied.
March 8, 1989, on petitioner's conviction for
distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia imposed a sentence of 40 months to 10 years'
incarceration. Comm'n Opp'n at 1; see id.,
Ex. 2 (Judgment and Commitment Order, United States v.
Richardson, No. F-4054-88 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 8,
1989)). Although the former Board of Parole of the District
of Columbia granted petitioner parole through work release in
1992, it rescinded the grant and denied parole. See
id., Exs. 3-4 (Notices of Board Order dated May 21, 1992
and September 17, 1992, respectively). On March 22, 1993, on
petitioner's conviction for distribution of cocaine, the
Superior Court imposed a consecutive sentence of four to
twelve years' incarceration. See id., Ex. 5
(Judgment and Commitment Order, United States v.
Richardson, No. F-5793-92 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 22,
1993)). His aggregate sentence, then, was 22 years'
incarceration. See id., Ex. 1 (Sentence Monitoring
Computation Data) at 16. Since petitioner's parole
release in 1996, see id., Ex. 6. (Certificate of
Parole), his parole has been revoked seven times, see
Id. at 2-4. As of petitioner's most recent parole
release on October 31, 2015, he was to remain under
supervision until January 13, 2019. See id., Ex. 24
(Certificate of Parole) at 1.
to petitioner, "the sentence the court handed down has
long since passed and/or expired[.]" Pet. at 1 (page
numbers designated by ECF). "The sentence here should
have expired in 2010, " or 22 years after he was taken
into custody in 1998, id., yet he remains in custody
six years later, see Id. at 9. He attributes this
circumstance to the Parole Commission's actions
"extending the court[']s sentence."
Id. at 1. His sentences "were handed down by
the Court the Judicial Branch, " id. at 8, and
he claims that the Parole Commission violates the separation
of powers doctrine by acting outside of its executive branch
functions, id., causing him to "serve a longer
sentence than the court intended, " id. at 1.
"This claim is a non-starter." Rahim v. U.S.
Parole Comm 'n, 77 F.Supp.3d 140, 145 (D.D.C. 2015);
see Hammettv. U.S. Parole Comm 'n, 2010 WL
1257669, at * 1 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2010) (observing that
"[t]his argument, and similar separation of powers
arguments, have been raised often and rejected each
Parole Commission is not a court, and it cannot impose a
criminal sentence. This authority rests with the Superior
Court. See D.C. Code § ll-923(b). Rather, the
Parole Commission is authorized "to grant, deny, or
revoke a District of Columbia offender's parole and to
impose or modify his parole conditions." Brown v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 190 F.Supp.3d 186, 189
(D.D.C. 2016) (citing D.C. Code § 24-131(a), (c));
see also Franklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d
625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing the transfer of parole
jurisdiction for District of Columbia prisoners to the Parole
Commission). "Its jurisdiction instead extends only to
the execution of a judicially imposed
sentence[.]" Rahim, 77 F.Supp.3d at 145 (citing
Smallwood v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 111 F.Supp.2d
148, 150 (D.D.C. 2011)); see also Maddox v. Elzie,
238 F.3d 437, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Thus, "[a]s the duly
authorized paroling authority, the [Parole] Commission does
not usurp a judicial function when, as here, it acts pursuant
to the parole laws and regulations of the District of
Columbia." Thompson v. D.C. Dep't o/Corr.,
511 F.Supp.2d 111, 114 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In short, the Parole Commission
"exercises no judicial function, and its decisions do
not violate the separation of powers doctrine."
Ramsey v. Faust, 943 F.Supp.2d 77, 81 (D.D.C. 2013)
also argues that the Parole Commission's actions violate
the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses.
See Pet. at 1. He is mistaken. "The double
jeopardy clause prohibits the executive branch from doubling
down, bringing multiple prosecutions or seeking successive
punishments against a defendant for the same criminal
offense." Brown, 190 F.Supp.3d at 189 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Parole proceedings
are not criminal prosecutions. Rather, they are the
"continuation of the original sentence that resulted in
parole, " and jeopardy therefore does not attach.
Id. (citations omitted); Campbell v. U.S. Parole
Comm'n, 563 F.Supp.2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding
the double jeopardy clause "simply not applicable to
ex post facto violation occurs when a law
"retroactively alter[s] the definition of crimes or
increase[s] the punishment for criminal acts."
Brown, 190 F.Supp.3d at 190 (quoting Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)). The Court presumes
that petitioner's ex post facto claim arises
from the recalculation of his aggregate sentence upon each
revocation of parole. "Under District of Columbia law,
[petitioner] cannot receive credit for time on parole,
commonly known as 'street time, ' after his parole
has been revoked." Jones v. Bureau of Prisons,
No. 02-5054, 2002 WL 31189792, *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 2002)
(per curiam) (citation omitted). Accordingly, "there is
no ex post facto violation when [petitioner's]
sentence was recalculated to exclude any credit previously
given for street time." Id. (citing Davis
v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 214-15 (D.C. 2001) (en banc));
see also Thompson, 511 F.Supp.2d at 113 (finding
that forfeiture of street time "simply returned
[petitioner] to the position he would have been but for his
release to parole").
fails to show that he is "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). His petition for a writ of