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Ingram v. Shipman-Meyer

United States District Court, District of Columbia

March 20, 2017

Dayshawn Ingram, Plaintiff,
v.
Michael Shipman-Meyer, et al., Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Gladys Kessler United States District Judge

         Plaintiff is Dayshawn Ingram, the son of the decedent, Anthony-Chambers. Mr. Chambers died immediately after a violent encounter with the police. Plaintiff alleges that one of the police officers, Officer Michael Shipman-Meyer, illegally used a chokehold on his father, which caused his death. Plaintiff brings several claims against Officers Shipman-Meyer, William Karabelas, Stephen Rose, and Elizabeth LaDuca, as well as the District of Columbia, stemming from the death of his father.

         Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's and Defendants' Cross-motions for Summary Judgment. Having reviewed the parties' respective Motions, Oppositions, Replies, and Surreplies, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied in its entirety and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

         I. BACKGROUND

         A. Procedural Background

         On September 19, 2012, Plaintiff commenced this action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Subsequently, Defendants removed the case from Superior Court to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seg.

         After extensive discovery, Plaintiff amended the Complaint he originally filed in Superior Court. First Amended Complaint ("FAC") [Dkt. No. 37]. Count One alleges that the four officers acted negligently, violating an applicable national standard of care, resulting in Mr. Chamber's injury and death. FAC ¶¶ 8-13. Count Two alleges that the officers committed assault and battery, resulting in in Mr. Chamber's injury and death. Id. ¶¶ 14-17. Count Three alleges that the officers used excessive force in violation of Mr. Chamber's constitutional rights. Id. ¶¶ 18-22. Count Four alleges that the officers engaged in tortious conduct, and thereby violated the District's wrongful death statute. Id. ¶¶ 23-25. Finally, Count Five alleges that the District negligently failed to train the officers in the proper use of chokeholds, resulting in Mr. Chamber's injury and death. Id. ¶¶ 26-32. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of $5, 000, 000 on each count.

         On January 15, 2016, Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s MSJ") [Dkt. No. 56] . Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on parts of Counts One, Two, Three, and Five of his First Amended Complaint, but does not seek summary judgment as to any part of Count Four. See Id. Plaintiff concedes that there is a genuine dispute as to whether or not the officers' actions caused the death of Mr. Chambers, and therefore that he cannot fully prevail on any of his claims at the summary judgment stage. Id. at 25 n.6. Instead, he essentially asks the Court to hold that he is entitled to judgment on all the other elements necessary to succeed on those claims, leaving only the issue of causation for trial. See id. Defendants filed an Opposition. Defendants' Opposition ("Defs.' Opp'n") [Dkt. No. 59] .

         The Defendants also cross-moved for summary judgment on all counts. Defs.' MSJ at 1. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition, to which Defendants filed a Reply, and both parties filed Surreplies. Plaintiff's Opposition ("Pl.'s Opp'n") [Dkt. No. 63], Defendants' Reply ("Defs.' Reply") [Dkt. No. 65], Plaintiff's Surreply ("Pl.'s Surreply") [Dkt. No. 68], and Defendants' Surreply ("Defs.' Surreply") [Dkt. No. 69].

         B. Factual Background

         1. The Court Will not Rely on Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

         As a preliminary matter, Defendants argue that their statement of material facts should be accepted, virtually in its entirety, because Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 7. Defs.' Analysis of Material Facts, Exh. 1 to Defs.' Reply at 1 n.l (citing LCvR 7) [Dkt. No. 65-1] . Defendants argue that, if the Court were to do so, there are essentially no material facts in dispute in this case. Defs.' Reply at 2 n.2. In other words, Defendants ask the Court to decide this case based almost exclusively on their characterization of what occurred.

         Local Rule 7 requires a party moving for summary judgment to file a "statement of material facts" that it contends are undisputed. LCvR 7(h)(1). In addition, it requires that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must respond to the moving party's statement of facts with "a concise statement" of "all material facts" that remain in dispute. Id. Where the non-movant fails to "controvert" a statement of undisputed fact made by the movant, the Court may assume that the statement is admitted. Id.; see also Broady v. Zanzibar on the Waterfront, LLC, 576 F.Supp.2d 14, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2008) .

         Both Plaintiffs and Defendants filed the required Rule 7 statement with their respective motions for summary judgment. Defendants, in their Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary-Judgment, filed the required response to Plaintiff's statement of material facts, indicating what facts Defendants believed remain in dispute. Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' statement of material facts in his Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Instead, he simply resubmitted his original statement of material facts with only a few additional facts added. Given Plaintiff's failure to comply with Local Rule 7, Defendants argue that their statement of material facts should be admitted in its entirety. See Defs.' Analysis of Material Facts (asserting that all but one of Defendants' statement of material facts not in dispute have been admitted by failure to comply with the local rule).

         Though "strict compliance with the local rule" is the norm, Broady, F.Supp.2d at 16, there are cases in which it is unwarranted. See Hedgpeth v. Rahim, 2016 WL 5720699, *5-6 (D.D.C. October 3, 2016) (refusing to admit Defendant's uncontradicted statement, where the statement was so biased that it did not accurately reflect what material facts were and were not in dispute). This is one such case.

         In cases involving deadly force, "where the witness most likely to contradict the officer's story - the person [killed] - is unable to testify, courts . . . may not simply accept what may be a self-serving account by the police officer. Instead, courts must carefully examine all the evidence in the record ... to determine whether the officer's story is internally consistent and consistent with other known facts. Courts must also look at the circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to discredit the police officer's story, and consider whether this evidence could convince a rational factfinder that the officer acted unreasonably." Flythe v. District of Columbia, 791 F.3d 13, 19 (2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

         Heeding the directive of the Court of Appeals, the Court carefully examined the evidence in the record to determine whether the account provided by Defendants, or any portions thereof, were contradicted by other record evidence. Flythe, 791 F.3d at 19. Having done so, the Court concludes that Defendants' Statement of Material Facts not in dispute is materially inaccurate. It presents - as undisputed - facts that Defendants' own witnesses contradict, and it omits facts that are inconvenient to its overall narrative. Consequently, the Court cannot simply rely on Defendants' version of what occurred in deciding these Motions.

         Instead, the Court will present the relevant facts it has culled from the record and then identify the key issues of material fact that remain in dispute.

         2. Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts

         Anthony Chambers was 38 years old on June 8, 2012. That day he was staying with his sister, Valentina Chambers. Mr. Chambers was experiencing some sort of mental disturbance, possibly brought on by his use of PCP. Seeking assistance, Mr. Chambers contacted the Mayor's office.

         Two employees of the Department of Behavioral Health ("DBH"), Linda Miller and Gary Yingling, were dispatched to the Chambers' residence to assist him. Mr. Chambers appeared agitated, telling them that a chip had been planted inside him by the government. The DBH employees asked Mr. Chambers to accompany them so that he could receive treatment, but he refused and then demanded that they leave. He threatened violence if they did not.

         Believing Mr. Chambers to be a potential danger to himself or others, Miller and Yingling sought assistance from the police. They went to the First District police station, where Miller prepared a document authorizing the detention of Mr. Chambers for a psychiatric evaluation. Given Mr. Chamber's size, he stood 6' 4" tall and weighed more than 370 pounds, and prior behavior, they asked that multiple officers accompany them to assist in detaining and transporting him.

         Four officers were assigned the task - William Karabelas, Stephen Rose, Michael Shipman-Meyer, and Elizabeth LaDuca. Exactly what the officers were told about their assignment is unclear. All the officers understood that they were acting on a civil matter, dealing with a mentally disturbed individual, and not there to make an arrest. The evidence suggests that neither the DBH employees nor the officers were aware that Mr. Chambers' mental health episode was drug-related. Deposition of Linda Miller ("Miller Dep.") at 19:1-4 [Dkt. No. 61-10]. However, prior to heading to the Chambers' residence, some of the officers were apparently informed that Mr. Chambers was a butcher by trade, and therefore known to carry knives, and had threatened violence earlier that day. Significantly, Officer Shipman-Meyer was not made aware of either of these facts. See Deposition of Officer Shipman-Meyer ("Shipman-Meyer Dep.") at 71:19-73:2 [Dkt. No. 61-12], - Defs.' Analysis of Material Facts at ¶ 5.

         These six people then set out for the Chambers' apartment. Upon arriving they ascended the staircase that led to the landing outside the apartment unit. The DBH employees and MPD officers stood at various points outside - on the stairs above the landing, on the landing itself, and on the stairs below the landing - and called for Mr. Chambers to come outside. These six are the only-living eyewitnesses to what took place on the landing.

         When Mr. Chambers presented himself at the door of the apartment he was shirtless, sweaty, and appeared highly agitated. He quickly became verbally combative with the officers. As a result, the Officers indicated that they wanted to put him in handcuffs before transporting him for treatment. Deposition of Valentina Chambers ("Chambers Dep.") at 31:10-32:2 [Dkt. No. 61-5] . All of this was consistent with what the Officers already believed - that they were dealing with an agitated, mentally-ill individual who was in need of assistance. Up to this point, there was no reason for them to use force against Mr. Chambers, nor did they do so.

         The scene then quickly changed. Without provocation Mr. Chambers attacked the officers. First, he punched Officer Karabelas, causing him to fall backwards and hit his head on the wall behind him. Next he punched Officer Rose several times in the head. Finally, he punched Officer Shipman-Meyer in the face, causing a fracture to his left orbital bone.

         It is uncontroverted that, at this point, Mr. Chambers had assaulted two of the officers, likely in violation of D.C. Code § 22-405(b), a misdemeanor, and had assaulted Officer Shipman-Meyer and likely caused him "significant bodily injury" in violation of D.C. Code § 22-405(c), a felony.[1] At that moment, the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Chambers for a crime and, given the violent nature of the crime, to use force to seize him.

         They did so, though precisely what occurred is obscured by the haze of battle and inconsistent testimony. Officers Karabelas, Rose, and Shipman-Meyer attempted to restrain and subdue Mr. Chambers, while Officer LaDuca deployed her pepper spray on Mr. Chambers. Three of the officers, Karabelas, Rose, and Shipman-Meyer, all grabbed hold of Mr. Chambers and tried to restrain him. Officer Karabelas testified to grabbing hold of Mr. Chambers' right arm, while both Officers Rose and Shipman-Meyer claim to have grabbed hold of his left arm. While holding on to one of Mr. Chambers' arms, Officer Shipman-Meyer punched Mr. Chambers in the face multiple times with no success of calming him. Officer LaDucca, who had been standing further from Mr. Chambers when the altercation began and had not been attacked, approached and sprayed Mr. Chambers in the face with pepper spray.

         After she sprayed Mr. Chambers with pepper spray, it is undisputed that the struggle between the officers and Mr. Chambers then moved from the landing into the apartment. Additionally, it is undisputed that this transition took only a matter of seconds from the time that Mr. Chambers first attacked the officers. Defs.' MSJ at 9 (quoting the various officers' depositions). There is, however, a significant dispute as to how the officers and Mr. Chambers arrived in the apartment.

         According to the account presented by Defendants, they were unable to control Mr. Chambers, who used his superior strength to drag Officers Rose and Shipman-Meyer - both of whom had grabbed on to some part of his body - backwards into the apartment. Defs.' Analysis of Material Facts at ¶ 16 (Mr. Chambers "overpowered" the two officers and "dragged them backwards... against their will"); Defs.' MSJ at 8. Yet, that account does not comport with much of the evidence in the record.

         First for example, Officer Karabelas, who had a hold of Mr. Chamber's right arm, makes no appearance in the Defendants' story. See Deposition of Officer Karabelas ("Karabelas Dep.") at 41:11-52:20 [Dkt. No. 61-8] (making clear that he had a hold on Mr. Chambers' right arm from the time they were on the landing until after they entered the apartment). Perhaps that was because, unlike the other officers, he did not testify that Mr. Chambers dragged them backward, but simply that they all "fell" together. Id. at 49:1-8; see also "Miller Dep." at 26:9-28:11 ("they all fell in").

         Second, the testimony of Mr. Yingling directly contradicts the Defendants' account. He testified that the officers were able to successfully restrain Mr. Chambers' arms and knock him "off balance, " sending him backwards into the apartment and down to the ground. Deposition of Gary Yingling ("Yingling Dep.") at 25:2-26:13 [Dkt. No. 61-13]. That testimony is partially confirmed by the depositions of Officers Karabelas and Rose, in which they describe having "locked-up" Mr. Chambers' right and left arms, respectively. Karabelas Dep. at 41:11-42:22, 48:5-13, 52:16-20; Deposition of Officer Rose ("Rose Dep.") at 22:7-11, 23:10-14 [Dkt. No. 61-11].

         The significance of this dispute cannot be overstated. Central to the Defendants' narrative is the contention that Mr. Chambers was so strong and so violent that he was virtually uncontrollable throughout the encounter. Accordingly, Defendants assert that each of the progressively forceful measures deployed by the officers up to this point - punches, pepper spray, arm holds - failed to subdue Mr. Chambers. Defs.' MSJ at 16-17. Despite these efforts, they claim he was able to use his "super-human" strength to "drag [the officers] backwards into his apartment against their will." Id. at 16.

         However, when viewed in its entirety, there is contradictory-record evidence. The record plausibly establishes that after the surprise of Mr. Chambers' attack had worn off, the officers were immediately able to gain a tactical advantage over him through a combination of their superior numbers and their own use of force - punches and pepper spray. It suggests that rather than Mr. Chambers dragging them backwards, the officers knocked him back; in other words, rather than their use of force being ineffective, it was a success.

         The fight then spilled into the apartment. Valentina Chambers, Mr. Chambers' sister, and two other individuals were already inside the apartment, and came into the living room to see the commotion that was taking place.

         Once inside the apartment the struggle continued, though, again, exactly what transpired is unclear.[2] Two things appear consistent from the testimony of all individuals. First, from this point forward, there is no evidence that Mr. Chambers ever attempted to kick or strike any of the officers again. See Yingling Dep. at 26:6-9; Rose Dep. at 25:2-26:4; Chambers Dep. at 42:19, 44:12-15 (describing Mr. Chambers as physically unable to fight back or move). This contradicts Defendants' suggestion that Chambers was violent throughout the encounter. Defs.' MSJ at 10.

         Second, upon entering the apartment the officers almost immediately brought Mr. Chambers down to his knees. Chambers Dep. 20:15 ("[The officers] wrestled him to the ground."); Id. at 42:9; Yingling Dep. at 25:22-27:19. That the officers were able to get Mr. Chambers down on the ground so quickly further undermines Defendants' assertion that they found it impossible to control him. See also Karabelas Dep. at 54:4-6 ("[Mr. Chambers] began to weaken" once they entered the apartment).

         According to Defendants, at the point that Mr. Chambers was knocked to the ground but before he was placed in a chokehold, they became "separated" and lost sight of one another, with the mass of Mr. Chambers blocking the view of one of the Officers and any means of escape. Defs.' Reply at 7; Defs.' MSJ at 9. But Mr. Chambers was brought down almost instantaneously after entering the apartment, and it is not clear how he could block any of the officer's vision while on the ground. Furthermore, the room was quite small, so it is unclear how the officers could become "separated" or "fragmented" as they were no more than a few feet from one another. See Defs.' Reply at 7; Defs.' MSJ at 9; Karabelas Dep. at 50:21-22 (describing the living room as "not a big room").

         From this kneeling position the officers were able to tackle Mr. Chambers to a prone position on the ground. By the time Mr. Chambers was in this prone position, Officer Shipman-Meyer had placed him in a chokehold. It is difficult to determine from the various participants' testimony how long he held Mr. Chambers in the chokehold, but it was likely no less than 20 or 30 seconds and may have been minutes.[3]

         According to Defendants, Mr. Chambers continued to resist after Officer Shipman-Meyer had placed him in the chokehold, and this necessitated the continued use of the chokehold until he was incapacitated and non-responsive.[4] Defs.' MSJ at 12. Officer Shipman-Meyer testified that he was in a vulnerable position -face down on the floor and unable to see what was transpiring and that Mr. Chambers was attempting to roll on top of him. Shipman-Meyer Dep. at 78:14-88:4.

         In contrast, testimony from Ms. Chambers, Mr. Yingling, and several of the other officers suggests that the officers already had the upper hand and that Mr. Chambers was effectively subdued by this time. Chambers Dep. at 42:16-45:5 (stating that Mr. Chambers "couldn't fight back" because he was being held in a chokehold by one officer, with multiple other officers on top of him) . Similarly, Officer LaDuca testified that Mr. Chambers was face down on his stomach with Officer Shipman-Meyer on top of Mr. Chambers' back, and that Mr. Chambers was completely surrounded by the other officers. Deposition of Officer LaDuca Dep. ("LaDuca Dep") at 41:22 - 45:22, 51:3-7 [Dkt. No. 61-9]. Indeed, she describes an extended sequence in which she attempted to strike Mr. Chambers with her ASP baton while he was on the ground and then repeatedly tried to pry his arms out from under him, using the baton as a lever. LaDucca Dep. at 41:8-43:2.

         Officer Karabelas, in addition to Officer LaDuca, also saw Officer Shipman-Meyer on top of Mr. Chambers and testified that he had hold of one of Mr. Chambers arms. Karabelas Dep. at 57:3-8, 58:4-5. Similarly, Mr. Yingling testified that as soon as Mr. Chambers was taken to the ground he saw multiple officers restraining both of his arms. Yingling Dep. at 27:22-28:1.

         None of the other officers - nor Mr. Yingling - saw Officer Shipman-Meyer place and maintain a chokehold on Mr. Chambers. This despite the fact that they were mere feet from Officer Shipman-Meyer when he was using the chokehold and that the use of the chokehold may well have lasted at least 3 0 seconds - which is at least as long as all the prior events in the encounter - if not several minutes longer.

         For example, despite being directly above the two and with a clear vantage point, Officer LaDuca claims to have never seen Officer Shipman-Meyer place his arms around Mr. Chambers' neck. LaDuca Dep. at 50:21-51:1-2. Similarly, Officer Rose claims not to have seen Officer Shipman-Meyer with an arm around Mr. Chamber's neck, despite being mere inches or feet away from him. Rose Dep. at 29:19-21. Officer Karabelas did see Officer Shipman-Meyer with his arms around Mr. Chambers' neck or shoulder area, but was unable to see whether or not Officer Shipman-Meyer had placed him in a chokehold. Id. at 56:21-59:2. Similarly, Mr. Yingling, who claims to have a "clear, unimpeded view" throughout the encounter, Yingling Dep. at 32:13-17, nonetheless states that he never saw Officer Shipman-Meyer use a chokehold. Id. at 31:9-12. All of this testimony is implicitly contradicted by that of Ms. Chambers, who was present for the same events, but had no trouble seeing her brother being choked. Chambers Dep. at 42:21-45:5.

         Officer Shipman-Meyer maintained the hold for some indeterminate amount of time, eventually releasing Mr. Chambers when he determined that Mr. Chambers had stopped moving. At this time the other officers who had been attempting to handcuff Mr. Chambers were finally able to do so. Very shortly after placing him in handcuffs, the officers noticed Mr. Chambers was non-responsive and in apparent medical distress. The officers agree that they rolled him into an upright position on the floor and checked his pulse and breathing, but none provided emergency first-aid assistance. One of the officers, possibly Officer LaDuca, called for an ambulance. Other officers arrived on the scene, and the four officers who were involved in the melee left the apartment. Some amount of time passed before an ambulance arrived and took Mr. Chambers for treatment, but he died en route to the hospital.

         None of the following material questions are conclusively resolved by the record. Did Mr. Chambers possess such "superhuman" strength, that it was impossible to control him, or did the officers immediately gain an advantage in their battle with him after the surprise of his attack had faded? Did Officer Shipman-Meyer use the chokehold as a last-ditch effort to gain control of Mr. Chambers or had he already been subdued at that point? Did Officer Shipman-Meyer maintain the chokehold for only the bare minimum of time necessary to handcuff Mr. Chambers, or did he maintain it for a significant period of time after Mr. Chambers had been subdued?

         Having reviewed in great detail the testimony presented, by the various witnesses, the Court has no trouble concluding that there are material facts in dispute.

         II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Summary judgment may be granted only if the pleadings, the discovery materials, and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A dispute over a material fact is 'genuine' if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Arrington, 473 F.3d at 333 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under the substantive governing law. Id.

         The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When a moving party successfully does so, the nonmoving party must show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact by providing "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, " and "may not rest on mere allegations or denials" to prevail. Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence sufficient to establish an essential element of a claim on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

         In reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all inferences in her favor. Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge at summary judgment." Barnett v. PA Consulting Grp. Inc., 715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court's role is "not [to] determine the truth of the matter, but instead [to] decide only whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.

         III. ANALYSIS

         Plaintiff brings two distinct sets of claims in this action. First, he brings claims based on a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all four officers alleging that they violated his father's constitutional rights. Second, he brings a number of claims based on the laws of the District of Columbia against the officers and the District itself. The Court begins with Plaintiff's federal claims before turning to his claims based on the laws of the District.

         A. Federal Section 1983 Claims against the Four Officers

         Count Three of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the four officers violated his father's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be free from excessive force. First, Plaintiff argues that Officer Shipman-Meyer violated his father's rights by using a chokehold on him. Second, Plaintiff argues that the other three officers violated his father's rights by failing to stop Officer Shipman-Meyer. The Court will deal with each claim in turn.

         1. Neither Party Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Claims against Officer Shipman-Meyer

         Plaintiff claims that Officer Shipman-Meyer used excessive force against Mr. Chambers and thereby violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has moved for summary judgment. Defendants have also moved for summary judgment arguing that the claim is barred under the doctrine of qualified immunity. The Court begins with the issue of qualified immunity.

         a. Officer Shipman-Meyer Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity for his Use of a Chokehold

          i. Qualified Immunity Standard

         "In order to protect officers from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability, qualified immunity shields federal officials from damages suits for actions taken while carrying out their official duties." Fenwick v. Pudimott, 778 F.3d 133, 136-37 (D.C. Cir. 2015). "To defeat a defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show not only that an official 'violated a constitutional right' but also that 'the right was clearly established' at the time of the violation. Id. at 137 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001)); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014). Both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis present pure questions of law. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n. 8 (2007).

         In deciding a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the plaintiff is the non-moving party, and the Court resolves all issues of material fact in her favor. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-79. In cases involving deadly force, the Court does not simply accept the account of the officers, but instead, carefully examines all the evidence to determine whether a rational jury could conclude that the officer acted unreasonably. Flythe, 791 F.3d at 19.

         ii. Prong 1: Officer Shipman-Meyer Violated ...


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