United States District Court, District of Columbia
Kessler United States District Judge
is Dayshawn Ingram, the son of the decedent,
Anthony-Chambers. Mr. Chambers died immediately after a
violent encounter with the police. Plaintiff alleges that one
of the police officers, Officer Michael Shipman-Meyer,
illegally used a chokehold on his father, which caused his
death. Plaintiff brings several claims against Officers
Shipman-Meyer, William Karabelas, Stephen Rose, and Elizabeth
LaDuca, as well as the District of Columbia, stemming from
the death of his father.
before the Court are Plaintiff's and Defendants'
Cross-motions for Summary Judgment. Having reviewed the
parties' respective Motions, Oppositions, Replies, and
Surreplies, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied in its entirety and Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
September 19, 2012, Plaintiff commenced this action in the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Subsequently,
Defendants removed the case from Superior Court to this
Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seg.
extensive discovery, Plaintiff amended the Complaint he
originally filed in Superior Court. First Amended Complaint
("FAC") [Dkt. No. 37]. Count One alleges that the
four officers acted negligently, violating an applicable
national standard of care, resulting in Mr. Chamber's
injury and death. FAC ¶¶ 8-13. Count Two alleges
that the officers committed assault and battery, resulting in
in Mr. Chamber's injury and death. Id.
¶¶ 14-17. Count Three alleges that the officers
used excessive force in violation of Mr. Chamber's
constitutional rights. Id. ¶¶ 18-22. Count
Four alleges that the officers engaged in tortious conduct,
and thereby violated the District's wrongful death
statute. Id. ¶¶ 23-25. Finally, Count Five
alleges that the District negligently failed to train the
officers in the proper use of chokeholds, resulting in Mr.
Chamber's injury and death. Id. ¶¶
26-32. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of $5, 000, 000
on each count.
January 15, 2016, Plaintiff moved for partial summary
judgment. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
("Pl.'s MSJ") [Dkt. No. 56] . Plaintiff seeks
summary judgment on parts of Counts One, Two, Three, and Five
of his First Amended Complaint, but does not seek summary
judgment as to any part of Count Four. See Id.
Plaintiff concedes that there is a genuine dispute as to
whether or not the officers' actions caused the death of
Mr. Chambers, and therefore that he cannot fully prevail on
any of his claims at the summary judgment stage. Id.
at 25 n.6. Instead, he essentially asks the Court to hold
that he is entitled to judgment on all the other elements
necessary to succeed on those claims, leaving only the issue
of causation for trial. See id. Defendants filed an
Opposition. Defendants' Opposition ("Defs.'
Opp'n") [Dkt. No. 59] .
Defendants also cross-moved for summary judgment on all
counts. Defs.' MSJ at 1. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition,
to which Defendants filed a Reply, and both parties filed
Surreplies. Plaintiff's Opposition ("Pl.'s
Opp'n") [Dkt. No. 63], Defendants' Reply
("Defs.' Reply") [Dkt. No. 65], Plaintiff's
Surreply ("Pl.'s Surreply") [Dkt. No. 68], and
Defendants' Surreply ("Defs.' Surreply")
[Dkt. No. 69].
The Court Will not Rely on Defendants' Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts
preliminary matter, Defendants argue that their statement of
material facts should be accepted, virtually in its entirety,
because Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 7.
Defs.' Analysis of Material Facts, Exh. 1 to Defs.'
Reply at 1 n.l (citing LCvR 7) [Dkt. No. 65-1] . Defendants
argue that, if the Court were to do so, there are essentially
no material facts in dispute in this case. Defs.' Reply
at 2 n.2. In other words, Defendants ask the Court to decide
this case based almost exclusively on their characterization
of what occurred.
Rule 7 requires a party moving for summary judgment to file a
"statement of material facts" that it contends are
undisputed. LCvR 7(h)(1). In addition, it requires that a
party opposing a summary judgment motion must respond to the
moving party's statement of facts with "a concise
statement" of "all material facts" that remain
in dispute. Id. Where the non-movant fails to
"controvert" a statement of undisputed fact made by
the movant, the Court may assume that the statement is
admitted. Id.; see also Broady v. Zanzibar on
the Waterfront, LLC, 576 F.Supp.2d 14, 16-17 (D.D.C.
Plaintiffs and Defendants filed the required Rule 7 statement
with their respective motions for summary judgment.
Defendants, in their Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary-Judgment, filed the required response to
Plaintiff's statement of material facts, indicating what
facts Defendants believed remain in dispute. Plaintiff failed
to respond to Defendants' statement of material facts in
his Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. Instead, he simply resubmitted his original
statement of material facts with only a few additional facts
added. Given Plaintiff's failure to comply with Local
Rule 7, Defendants argue that their statement of material
facts should be admitted in its entirety. See
Defs.' Analysis of Material Facts (asserting that all but
one of Defendants' statement of material facts not in
dispute have been admitted by failure to comply with the
"strict compliance with the local rule" is the
norm, Broady, F.Supp.2d at 16, there are cases in
which it is unwarranted. See Hedgpeth v. Rahim, 2016
WL 5720699, *5-6 (D.D.C. October 3, 2016) (refusing to admit
Defendant's uncontradicted statement, where the statement
was so biased that it did not accurately reflect what
material facts were and were not in dispute). This is one
cases involving deadly force, "where the witness most
likely to contradict the officer's story - the person
[killed] - is unable to testify, courts . . . may not simply
accept what may be a self-serving account by the police
officer. Instead, courts must carefully examine all the
evidence in the record ... to determine whether the
officer's story is internally consistent and consistent
with other known facts. Courts must also look at the
circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to
discredit the police officer's story, and consider
whether this evidence could convince a rational factfinder
that the officer acted unreasonably." Flythe v.
District of Columbia, 791 F.3d 13, 19 (2015) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
the directive of the Court of Appeals, the Court carefully
examined the evidence in the record to determine whether the
account provided by Defendants, or any portions thereof, were
contradicted by other record evidence. Flythe, 791
F.3d at 19. Having done so, the Court concludes that
Defendants' Statement of Material Facts not in dispute is
materially inaccurate. It presents - as undisputed - facts
that Defendants' own witnesses contradict, and it omits
facts that are inconvenient to its overall narrative.
Consequently, the Court cannot simply rely on Defendants'
version of what occurred in deciding these Motions.
the Court will present the relevant facts it has culled from
the record and then identify the key issues of material fact
that remain in dispute.
Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts
Chambers was 38 years old on June 8, 2012. That day he was
staying with his sister, Valentina Chambers. Mr. Chambers was
experiencing some sort of mental disturbance, possibly
brought on by his use of PCP. Seeking assistance, Mr.
Chambers contacted the Mayor's office.
employees of the Department of Behavioral Health
("DBH"), Linda Miller and Gary Yingling, were
dispatched to the Chambers' residence to assist him. Mr.
Chambers appeared agitated, telling them that a chip had been
planted inside him by the government. The DBH employees asked
Mr. Chambers to accompany them so that he could receive
treatment, but he refused and then demanded that they leave.
He threatened violence if they did not.
Mr. Chambers to be a potential danger to himself or others,
Miller and Yingling sought assistance from the police. They
went to the First District police station, where Miller
prepared a document authorizing the detention of Mr. Chambers
for a psychiatric evaluation. Given Mr. Chamber's size,
he stood 6' 4" tall and weighed more than 370
pounds, and prior behavior, they asked that multiple officers
accompany them to assist in detaining and transporting him.
officers were assigned the task - William Karabelas, Stephen
Rose, Michael Shipman-Meyer, and Elizabeth LaDuca. Exactly
what the officers were told about their assignment is
unclear. All the officers understood that they were acting on
a civil matter, dealing with a mentally disturbed individual,
and not there to make an arrest. The evidence suggests that
neither the DBH employees nor the officers were aware that
Mr. Chambers' mental health episode was drug-related.
Deposition of Linda Miller ("Miller Dep.") at
19:1-4 [Dkt. No. 61-10]. However, prior to heading to the
Chambers' residence, some of the officers were apparently
informed that Mr. Chambers was a butcher by trade, and
therefore known to carry knives, and had threatened violence
earlier that day. Significantly, Officer Shipman-Meyer was
not made aware of either of these facts. See Deposition of
Officer Shipman-Meyer ("Shipman-Meyer Dep.") at
71:19-73:2 [Dkt. No. 61-12], - Defs.' Analysis of
Material Facts at ¶ 5.
six people then set out for the Chambers' apartment. Upon
arriving they ascended the staircase that led to the landing
outside the apartment unit. The DBH employees and MPD
officers stood at various points outside - on the stairs
above the landing, on the landing itself, and on the stairs
below the landing - and called for Mr. Chambers to come
outside. These six are the only-living eyewitnesses to what
took place on the landing.
Mr. Chambers presented himself at the door of the apartment
he was shirtless, sweaty, and appeared highly agitated. He
quickly became verbally combative with the officers. As a
result, the Officers indicated that they wanted to put him in
handcuffs before transporting him for treatment. Deposition
of Valentina Chambers ("Chambers Dep.") at
31:10-32:2 [Dkt. No. 61-5] . All of this was consistent with
what the Officers already believed - that they were dealing
with an agitated, mentally-ill individual who was in need of
assistance. Up to this point, there was no reason for them to
use force against Mr. Chambers, nor did they do so.
scene then quickly changed. Without provocation Mr. Chambers
attacked the officers. First, he punched Officer Karabelas,
causing him to fall backwards and hit his head on the wall
behind him. Next he punched Officer Rose several times in the
head. Finally, he punched Officer Shipman-Meyer in the face,
causing a fracture to his left orbital bone.
uncontroverted that, at this point, Mr. Chambers had
assaulted two of the officers, likely in violation of D.C.
Code § 22-405(b), a misdemeanor, and had assaulted
Officer Shipman-Meyer and likely caused him "significant
bodily injury" in violation of D.C. Code §
22-405(c), a felony. At that moment, the officers had probable
cause to arrest Mr. Chambers for a crime and, given the
violent nature of the crime, to use force to seize him.
did so, though precisely what occurred is obscured by the
haze of battle and inconsistent testimony. Officers
Karabelas, Rose, and Shipman-Meyer attempted to restrain and
subdue Mr. Chambers, while Officer LaDuca deployed her pepper
spray on Mr. Chambers. Three of the officers, Karabelas,
Rose, and Shipman-Meyer, all grabbed hold of Mr. Chambers and
tried to restrain him. Officer Karabelas testified to
grabbing hold of Mr. Chambers' right arm, while both
Officers Rose and Shipman-Meyer claim to have grabbed hold of
his left arm. While holding on to one of Mr. Chambers'
arms, Officer Shipman-Meyer punched Mr. Chambers in the face
multiple times with no success of calming him. Officer
LaDucca, who had been standing further from Mr. Chambers when
the altercation began and had not been attacked, approached
and sprayed Mr. Chambers in the face with pepper spray.
she sprayed Mr. Chambers with pepper spray, it is undisputed
that the struggle between the officers and Mr. Chambers then
moved from the landing into the apartment. Additionally, it
is undisputed that this transition took only a matter of
seconds from the time that Mr. Chambers first attacked the
officers. Defs.' MSJ at 9 (quoting the various
officers' depositions). There is, however, a significant
dispute as to how the officers and Mr. Chambers arrived in
to the account presented by Defendants, they were unable to
control Mr. Chambers, who used his superior strength to drag
Officers Rose and Shipman-Meyer - both of whom had grabbed on
to some part of his body - backwards into the apartment.
Defs.' Analysis of Material Facts at ¶ 16 (Mr.
Chambers "overpowered" the two officers and
"dragged them backwards... against their will");
Defs.' MSJ at 8. Yet, that account does not comport with
much of the evidence in the record.
for example, Officer Karabelas, who had a hold of Mr.
Chamber's right arm, makes no appearance in the
Defendants' story. See Deposition of Officer
Karabelas ("Karabelas Dep.") at 41:11-52:20 [Dkt.
No. 61-8] (making clear that he had a hold on Mr.
Chambers' right arm from the time they were on the
landing until after they entered the apartment). Perhaps that
was because, unlike the other officers, he did not testify
that Mr. Chambers dragged them backward, but simply that they
all "fell" together. Id. at 49:1-8;
see also "Miller Dep." at 26:9-28:11
("they all fell in").
the testimony of Mr. Yingling directly contradicts the
Defendants' account. He testified that the officers were
able to successfully restrain Mr. Chambers' arms and
knock him "off balance, " sending him backwards
into the apartment and down to the ground. Deposition of Gary
Yingling ("Yingling Dep.") at 25:2-26:13 [Dkt. No.
61-13]. That testimony is partially confirmed by the
depositions of Officers Karabelas and Rose, in which they
describe having "locked-up" Mr. Chambers' right
and left arms, respectively. Karabelas Dep. at 41:11-42:22,
48:5-13, 52:16-20; Deposition of Officer Rose ("Rose
Dep.") at 22:7-11, 23:10-14 [Dkt. No. 61-11].
significance of this dispute cannot be overstated. Central to
the Defendants' narrative is the contention that Mr.
Chambers was so strong and so violent that he was virtually
uncontrollable throughout the encounter. Accordingly,
Defendants assert that each of the progressively forceful
measures deployed by the officers up to this point - punches,
pepper spray, arm holds - failed to subdue Mr. Chambers.
Defs.' MSJ at 16-17. Despite these efforts, they claim he
was able to use his "super-human" strength to
"drag [the officers] backwards into his apartment
against their will." Id. at 16.
when viewed in its entirety, there is contradictory-record
evidence. The record plausibly establishes that after the
surprise of Mr. Chambers' attack had worn off, the
officers were immediately able to gain a tactical advantage
over him through a combination of their superior numbers and
their own use of force - punches and pepper spray. It
suggests that rather than Mr. Chambers dragging them
backwards, the officers knocked him back; in other words,
rather than their use of force being ineffective, it was a
fight then spilled into the apartment. Valentina Chambers,
Mr. Chambers' sister, and two other individuals were
already inside the apartment, and came into the living room
to see the commotion that was taking place.
inside the apartment the struggle continued, though, again,
exactly what transpired is unclear. Two things appear consistent
from the testimony of all individuals. First, from this point
forward, there is no evidence that Mr. Chambers ever
attempted to kick or strike any of the officers again.
See Yingling Dep. at 26:6-9; Rose Dep. at 25:2-26:4;
Chambers Dep. at 42:19, 44:12-15 (describing Mr. Chambers as
physically unable to fight back or move). This contradicts
Defendants' suggestion that Chambers was violent
throughout the encounter. Defs.' MSJ at 10.
upon entering the apartment the officers almost immediately
brought Mr. Chambers down to his knees. Chambers Dep. 20:15
("[The officers] wrestled him to the ground.");
Id. at 42:9; Yingling Dep. at 25:22-27:19. That the
officers were able to get Mr. Chambers down on the ground so
quickly further undermines Defendants' assertion that
they found it impossible to control him. See also
Karabelas Dep. at 54:4-6 ("[Mr. Chambers] began to
weaken" once they entered the apartment).
to Defendants, at the point that Mr. Chambers was knocked to
the ground but before he was placed in a chokehold, they
became "separated" and lost sight of one another,
with the mass of Mr. Chambers blocking the view of one of the
Officers and any means of escape. Defs.' Reply at 7;
Defs.' MSJ at 9. But Mr. Chambers was brought down almost
instantaneously after entering the apartment, and it is not
clear how he could block any of the officer's vision
while on the ground. Furthermore, the room was quite small,
so it is unclear how the officers could become
"separated" or "fragmented" as they were
no more than a few feet from one another. See
Defs.' Reply at 7; Defs.' MSJ at 9; Karabelas Dep. at
50:21-22 (describing the living room as "not a big
this kneeling position the officers were able to tackle Mr.
Chambers to a prone position on the ground. By the time Mr.
Chambers was in this prone position, Officer Shipman-Meyer
had placed him in a chokehold. It is difficult to determine
from the various participants' testimony how long he held
Mr. Chambers in the chokehold, but it was likely no less than
20 or 30 seconds and may have been minutes.
to Defendants, Mr. Chambers continued to resist after Officer
Shipman-Meyer had placed him in the chokehold, and this
necessitated the continued use of the chokehold until he was
incapacitated and non-responsive. Defs.' MSJ at 12.
Officer Shipman-Meyer testified that he was in a vulnerable
position -face down on the floor and unable to see what was
transpiring and that Mr. Chambers was attempting to roll on
top of him. Shipman-Meyer Dep. at 78:14-88:4.
contrast, testimony from Ms. Chambers, Mr. Yingling, and
several of the other officers suggests that the officers
already had the upper hand and that Mr. Chambers was
effectively subdued by this time. Chambers Dep. at 42:16-45:5
(stating that Mr. Chambers "couldn't fight
back" because he was being held in a chokehold by one
officer, with multiple other officers on top of him) .
Similarly, Officer LaDuca testified that Mr. Chambers was
face down on his stomach with Officer Shipman-Meyer on top of
Mr. Chambers' back, and that Mr. Chambers was completely
surrounded by the other officers. Deposition of Officer
LaDuca Dep. ("LaDuca Dep") at 41:22 - 45:22, 51:3-7
[Dkt. No. 61-9]. Indeed, she describes an extended sequence
in which she attempted to strike Mr. Chambers with her ASP
baton while he was on the ground and then repeatedly tried to
pry his arms out from under him, using the baton as a lever.
LaDucca Dep. at 41:8-43:2.
Karabelas, in addition to Officer LaDuca, also saw Officer
Shipman-Meyer on top of Mr. Chambers and testified that he
had hold of one of Mr. Chambers arms. Karabelas Dep. at
57:3-8, 58:4-5. Similarly, Mr. Yingling testified that as
soon as Mr. Chambers was taken to the ground he saw multiple
officers restraining both of his arms. Yingling Dep. at
the other officers - nor Mr. Yingling - saw Officer
Shipman-Meyer place and maintain a chokehold on Mr. Chambers.
This despite the fact that they were mere feet from Officer
Shipman-Meyer when he was using the chokehold and that the
use of the chokehold may well have lasted at least 3 0
seconds - which is at least as long as all the prior events
in the encounter - if not several minutes longer.
example, despite being directly above the two and with a
clear vantage point, Officer LaDuca claims to have never seen
Officer Shipman-Meyer place his arms around Mr. Chambers'
neck. LaDuca Dep. at 50:21-51:1-2. Similarly, Officer Rose
claims not to have seen Officer Shipman-Meyer with an arm
around Mr. Chamber's neck, despite being mere inches or
feet away from him. Rose Dep. at 29:19-21. Officer Karabelas
did see Officer Shipman-Meyer with his arms around Mr.
Chambers' neck or shoulder area, but was unable to see
whether or not Officer Shipman-Meyer had placed him in a
chokehold. Id. at 56:21-59:2. Similarly, Mr.
Yingling, who claims to have a "clear, unimpeded
view" throughout the encounter, Yingling Dep. at
32:13-17, nonetheless states that he never saw Officer
Shipman-Meyer use a chokehold. Id. at 31:9-12. All
of this testimony is implicitly contradicted by that of Ms.
Chambers, who was present for the same events, but had no
trouble seeing her brother being choked. Chambers Dep. at
Shipman-Meyer maintained the hold for some indeterminate
amount of time, eventually releasing Mr. Chambers when he
determined that Mr. Chambers had stopped moving. At this time
the other officers who had been attempting to handcuff Mr.
Chambers were finally able to do so. Very shortly after
placing him in handcuffs, the officers noticed Mr. Chambers
was non-responsive and in apparent medical distress. The
officers agree that they rolled him into an upright position
on the floor and checked his pulse and breathing, but none
provided emergency first-aid assistance. One of the officers,
possibly Officer LaDuca, called for an ambulance. Other
officers arrived on the scene, and the four officers who were
involved in the melee left the apartment. Some amount of time
passed before an ambulance arrived and took Mr. Chambers for
treatment, but he died en route to the hospital.
the following material questions are conclusively resolved by
the record. Did Mr. Chambers possess such
"superhuman" strength, that it was impossible to
control him, or did the officers immediately gain an
advantage in their battle with him after the surprise of his
attack had faded? Did Officer Shipman-Meyer use the chokehold
as a last-ditch effort to gain control of Mr. Chambers or had
he already been subdued at that point? Did Officer
Shipman-Meyer maintain the chokehold for only the bare
minimum of time necessary to handcuff Mr. Chambers, or did he
maintain it for a significant period of time after Mr.
Chambers had been subdued?
reviewed in great detail the testimony presented, by the
various witnesses, the Court has no trouble concluding that
there are material facts in dispute.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
judgment may be granted only if the pleadings, the discovery
materials, and affidavits on file show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 333
(D.C. Cir. 2006); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A dispute over a
material fact is 'genuine' if 'the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.'" Arrington, 473 F.3d at
333 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is "material" if it
might affect the outcome of the case under the substantive
governing law. Id.
burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of
any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When a moving party
successfully does so, the nonmoving party must show the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact by providing
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial, " and "may not rest on mere allegations
or denials" to prevail. Burke v. Gould, 286
F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the
nonmoving party fails to offer evidence sufficient to
establish an essential element of a claim on which it will
bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S.
reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draws all inferences in her favor.
Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir.
2016). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge at summary
judgment." Barnett v. PA Consulting Grp. Inc.,
715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court's role is
"not [to] determine the truth of the matter, but instead
[to] decide only whether there is a genuine issue for
brings two distinct sets of claims in this action. First, he
brings claims based on a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. §
1983, against all four officers alleging that they violated
his father's constitutional rights. Second, he brings a
number of claims based on the laws of the District of
Columbia against the officers and the District itself. The
Court begins with Plaintiff's federal claims before
turning to his claims based on the laws of the District.
Federal Section 1983 Claims against the Four
Three of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the four
officers violated his father's rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution to be free from
excessive force. First, Plaintiff argues that Officer
Shipman-Meyer violated his father's rights by using a
chokehold on him. Second, Plaintiff argues that the other
three officers violated his father's rights by failing to
stop Officer Shipman-Meyer. The Court will deal with each
claim in turn.
Neither Party Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Claims
against Officer Shipman-Meyer
claims that Officer Shipman-Meyer used excessive force
against Mr. Chambers and thereby violated 42 U.S.C. §
1983, and has moved for summary judgment. Defendants have
also moved for summary judgment arguing that the claim is
barred under the doctrine of qualified immunity. The Court
begins with the issue of qualified immunity.
Officer Shipman-Meyer Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity
for his Use of a Chokehold
i. Qualified Immunity Standard
order to protect officers from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability,
qualified immunity shields federal officials from damages
suits for actions taken while carrying out their official
duties." Fenwick v. Pudimott, 778 F.3d 133,
136-37 (D.C. Cir. 2015). "To defeat a defense of
qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show not only that an
official 'violated a constitutional right' but also
that 'the right was clearly established' at the time
of the violation. Id. at 137 (quoting Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001)); see also
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014). Both
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis present pure
questions of law. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
381 n. 8 (2007).
deciding a motion for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity, the plaintiff is the non-moving party,
and the Court resolves all issues of material fact in her
favor. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-79. In cases involving
deadly force, the Court does not simply accept the account of
the officers, but instead, carefully examines all the
evidence to determine whether a rational jury could conclude
that the officer acted unreasonably. Flythe, 791
F.3d at 19.
Prong 1: Officer Shipman-Meyer Violated ...