United States District Court, District of Columbia
C. LAMBERTH United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss [ECF No. 4]. For the reasons discussed below, the
Court will grant the motion and dismiss this civil action.
to plaintiff, at an unspecified time and place and while
driving "a rental vehicle[, he] was stopped unlawfully
at a red light, " presumably by a United States Park
Police officer. Compl. [ECF No. 1-2]. His vehicle was
impounded. Id. As a result, plaintiff alleged, he
"never was able to retest for CDL nor update information
for medical assistance from Social Security
Administration." Id. Plaintiff filed his
complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
on August 8, 2016, where he demanded a judgment in the sum of
$45, 620. Id. He subsequently increased his demand
to $127, 000 to compensate him for medical expenses, costs
for CDL training, and other expenses. See Motion -
(Pro Se), Edwards v. U.S. Park Police, No.
2016-CA-005846 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed August 16,
2016)). Defendant removed this action on November
18, 2016, and filed its motion to dismiss on December 8,
January 9, 2017, the Court issued an Order advising plaintiff
of his obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the local civil rules of this Court. See Neal v.
Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Fox v.
Strickland, 837 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Specifically, the Court notified plaintiff that, if he failed
to file an opposition or other response to defendant's
motion within 14 days, or by January 20, 2017, the Court
would treat the pending dispositive motion as conceded.
See Local Civil Rule 7(b) (permitting court to
"treat... as conceded" a motion not met with a
timely opposing memorandum of points and authorities). The
Clerk of Court mailed a copy of the January 9, 2017 Order to
plaintiff at his address of record, and plaintiff filed his
opposition on February 16, 2017.
moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim.
See generally Mem. of P. & A. in Support of
Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mem.") at
Because plaintiff demands money damages from a federal
government agency, he must proceed under the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA"), which operates as a waiver of
the government's sovereign immunity for certain tort
claims. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369
U.S. 1, 6 (1962). For example, a person may bring a claim in
federal district court "for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury .. . caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission" of a federal government employee
"acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). There are
limitations under and exceptions to the FTCA, however, one of
which dooms plaintiffs claim:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the
United States for money damages for injury or loss of
property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim
to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have
been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by
certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to
make final disposition of a claim within six months after it
is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time
thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for
purposes of this section.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added). In other words,
"[t]he FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal
court until they have exhausted their administrative
remedies, " and the plaintiffs "fail[ure] to heed
that clear statutory command" warrants dismissal.
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113(1993).
support of its motion, defendant submits the declaration of
Charles B. Wallace, an Attorney-Advisor with the United
States Department of the Interior's Office of the
Solicitor assigned to its Division of General Law - Branch of
Acquisitions and Intellectual Property. Def.'s Mem., Ex.
1 ("Wallace Decl.") ¶ 1. He is responsible for
the "receipt and handling of administrative tort claims
against the Department of the Interior . . . and its bureaus,
" Wallace Decl. ¶ 3, "including the National
Park Service and United States Park Police, "
id. ¶ 4. The declarant has "reviewed . . .
FTCA intake records and claim logs, and [finds] no record of
any FTCA administrative claim submitted by or on behalf of
Allen Edwards, nor any FTCA claim that relates to the
allegations made in the captioned litigation."
Court carefully has reviewed plaintiffs opposition, and fails
to identify a substantive response to the legal arguments set
forth in defendant's motion to dismiss. Rather, it
appears that plaintiff merely submits exhibits to support his
claim for damages, such as costs arising from the impoundment
of the vehicle. Defendant thus demonstrates that plaintiff
did not exhaust his administrative remedies under the FTCA
because he did not file an administrative tort claim with the
appropriate federal agency prior to filing this lawsuit.
Accordingly, the Court grants defendant's motion and
dismisses this action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. An Order is issued separately.
 ECF No. 3 at 27.
 The Clerk of Court received plaintiffs
opposition on January 11, 2017, and the Court granted leave
to file the opposition on February 16, 2017. The Court deems
plaintiffs opposition timely filed.
 For purposes of this Memorandum, the
Court presumes without deciding that service of process on
defendant is sufficient. Defendant's motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) for failure to
effectuate proper ...