United States District Court, District of Columbia
ANDREW P. MOORE, Plaintiff,
BENJAMIN S. CARSON,  Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al. Defendants.
D. BATES, United States District Judge
Moore is a former employee of the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). He is an African-American man
over 62 years old, and he alleges that HUD, and several
individually named HUD employees, took dozens of adverse
actions against him because of his race, sex, and age, and in
retaliation for filing a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In a June 17, 2016, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, this Court granted a motion to dismiss all
claims against the individual defendants, granted in part the
motion to dismiss the claims against HUD itself (via the HUD
Secretary), and granted in part HUD's motion for summary
judgment on Moore's remaining claims. Ultimately, the
only one of Moore's claims to survive is his claim of a
hostile work environment under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621
et seq. Unhappy with this result, Moore filed a
motion to vacate the June 17 decision. After a detour to the
D.C. Circuit, that motion is now before this Court. For the
reasons explained below, the Court will deny Moore's
facts are explained more fully in the Court's June 17
Memorandum Opinion. See 192 F.Supp.3d 18, 31-33
(D.D.C. 2016). A brief summary here will
2014, Moore was selected as a finalist for the Presidential
Management Fellowship (PMF) by the Office of Personnel
Management. Am. Compl. [ECF No. 12] ¶ 27. The PMF
program is a two-year fellowship that serves as an entrance
to federal employment for certain individuals with advanced
degrees. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 362.403(b), (f),
362.404(a). In March 2014, Moore interviewed with HUD at a
job fair where agencies could recruit and hire PMF finalists.
That interview led to a job offer for a role that Moore
believed was a “management position” overseeing
housing grants and vouchers in the Fort Worth, Texas,
regional office. See Am. Compl. ¶ 28.
Moore started the job in April 2014, he was dismayed to learn
that his role was that of a building inspector, rather than a
manager. Id. ¶¶ 36, 46-47. Much to his
frustration, he saw other PMF employees with less education
and management experience assigned to higher paying
positions. Id. ¶ 43. Moore believes that HUD
intentionally discriminated against him by fraudulently
“deceiv[ing] him into believing that he would be
offered a legitimate Presidential Management Fellow position,
” id. ¶ 126(a), and then pushing him into
a worse role once he arrived, id. ¶ 34. And he
believes this discrimination campaign continued once he was
on the job. He argues that other PMF employees at HUD-in
particular, employees who were female, not African American,
or were younger-were treated better than he was. Id.
¶¶ 61, 66.
Moore was fired on September 24, 2014. Id. ¶
107. He alleges that his Notice of Termination contains
“false trumped-up charges, ” and that other PMF
employees (who were younger, female, or not African American)
were not fired. Id. ¶¶ 108, 113.
fall of 2014, Moore filed two formal Equal Employment
Opportunity (EEO) complaints charging HUD with race and sex
discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and
discriminatory and retaliatory discharge. Id. ¶
19. He also separately raised his age discrimination claim
with the EEOC around the same time, when he filed a notice of
intent to sue. Id. ¶ 17. He ultimately brought
suit in this Court on December 11, 2014. He raised nine
causes of action. The first five alleged that then-HUD
Secretary Julian Castro (hereinafter, HUD) discriminated
against Moore based on his age, gender, and race, and
retaliated against him in violation of the ADEA and Title
VII. Specifically, Counts I and II allege a list of
twenty-four discriminatory actions taken against Moore. Count
III asserts retaliation based on many of the same discrete
incidents. Count IV asserts a discriminatory and retaliatory
hostile work environment. And Count V claims that Moore's
termination was also discriminatory and retaliatory.
last four causes of action alleged that nine individual
employees of HUD conspired to obstruct justice in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (Count VI); conspired to deprive
Moore of his rights and privileges in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (Count VI); and engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c) (Count VIII); and that four individuals engaged in
“negligence to prevent conspiracy” in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count VII).
August 11, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or,
in the alternative, for summary judgment. See
Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss & Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No.
20]. They sought to defeat all nine counts of the complaint
either by dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim or under Rule 56 on summary judgment. Plaintiff
opposed the motion, arguing that he had not yet had the
opportunity to engage in discovery. See Pl.'s
Opp'n [ECF No. 30]. He also filed a motion to disqualify
the presiding judge. See Pl.'s Mot. to
Disqualify [ECF No. 53].
Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants'
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment. Ultimately, Moore's allegation of a hostile
work environment based on age discrimination (Count IV) was
the only claim that survived. All other claims were either
dismissed or summary judgment was granted to the defendant.
The Court also denied Moore's motion to disqualify the
then filed the motion at hand to vacate that judgment.
See Pl.'s Mot. to Vacate [ECF No. 63]. Further
proceedings on Moore's remaining claim were stayed while
the motion to vacate proceeded. See July 15, 2016,
Minute Order. Moore also filed an appeal of the Court's
June 17, 2016 Order. Notice of Appeal [ECF No. 76]. The D.C.
Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because
this Court's June 17 Order was neither a final order nor
subject to interlocutory appeal. See Moore v.
Castro, No. 16-5361, Order (D.C. Cir. Feb. 6, 2017) (per
curiam) (nonprecedential) [ECF No. 82-1]. For the reasons
explained below, Moore's motion to vacate will be denied.
has styled his request as a motion for relief under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(4). The former
permits relief from “a final judgment, order, or
proceeding” for “fraud[, ] . . .
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3). The latter permits relief when
“the judgment is void, ” id. at
60(b)(4), that is, when “the rendering court was
powerless to enter it, ” Karsner v. Lothian,
532 F.3d 876, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Combs v. Nick
Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
as the text plainly states, relief under Rule 60(b) is only
available “from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (emphasis added);
see also Isse v. Am. Univ., 544 F.Supp.2d 25, 29
(D.D.C. 2008). The Court's June 17 Order was not final
because it did not resolve all of Moore's claims. See
Moore, No. 16-5361, Order (D.C. Cir. Feb. 6, ...