United States District Court, District of Columbia
S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court on Jimmie McNair's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.For the reasons discussed below,
the petition is denied.
found Petitioner guilty of distribution of a controlled
substance (cocaine), and on December 6, 2011, the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia imposed a 48-month term of
imprisonment followed by five-year term of supervised
release. U.S. Parole Comm'n's Opp'n to the
Pet'r's Pet. for a Writ of Mandamus and Habeas Corpus
(“USPC Opp'n”), Ex. 1. The supervised release
term began on May 19, 2014, see id., Ex. 3 at 1, and
Petitioner soon amassed dozens of violations of the
conditions of his release, see id., Ex. 3 at 2-4. On
the recommendation of Petitioner's Community Supervision
Officer, see id., Ex. 3 at 4, the United States
Parole Commission (“USPC”) issued a warrant for
Petitioner's arrest on August 5, 2015, see id.,
Ex. 4 at 3.
October 4, 2016, a Metropolitan Police Department officer
arrested Petitioner and charged him with distribution of a
controlled substance (crack cocaine) and possession of a
controlled substance (crack cocaine). See id., Ex.
7. The USPC's warrant was executed on October 7, 2016.
Id., Ex. 6 at 1. A hearing examiner conducted
Petitioner's probable cause hearing on October 14, 2016,
id., Ex. 6 at 1, and found probable cause to hold
Petitioner pending a revocation hearing, id., Ex. 6
at 2-6. The revocation hearing took place on November 30,
2016. Id., Ex. 9 at 1. The hearing examiner
recommended revocation of supervised release and
Petitioner's return to custody for a 22-month term.
Id., Ex. 9 at 5. The USPC concurred with the
recommendation to revoke supervised release, and determined
that Petitioner instead serve a 26-month term of imprisonment
from October 7, 2016, the date its warrant was executed.
Id., Ex. 10 at 1. Petitioner's appeal, see
generally id., Exs. 11-14, was unsuccessful,
id., Ex. 15 at 1.
claims that his due process rights were violated when the
USPC failed to conduct a probable cause hearing within five
days, see Pet. at 1, as is required by regulation:
A supervised releasee who is retaken and held in custody in
the District of Columbia on a warrant issued by the
Commission, and who has not been convicted of a new crime,
shall be given a probable cause hearing by an examiner of the
Commission no later than five days from the date of such
28 C.F.R. § 2.214(a). For this reason alone, Petitioner
claims “that he is entitle[d] to be release[d], ”
Pet. at 1, even if he were to be transferred from the D.C.
Jail to another facility, see id. at 2.
Further, Petitioner appears to allege that the delay in
conducting the revocation hearing prejudiced him because he
“had call[ed] people to appear a[t] that hearing date
with [his] medical records to exonerate [him] of the
allege[d] violation[s].” Id.
Petitioner's circumstances, relief on a claim arising
from the delay of a hearing ordinarily would be available
through “a writ of mandamus to compel the [USPC's]
compliance with the statute[.]” Sutherland v.
McCall, 709 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis
removed). The USPC's delay in conducting Petitioner's
probable cause hearing is a mere three days - his hearing
should have occurred on or about October 11, 2016, and the
USPC conducted the hearing on October 14, 2016. A hearing
examiner found probable cause to believe that Petitioner
committed the alleged violations of the conditions of
supervised release, and this determination justifies
Petitioner's detention pending his revocation hearing.
Petitioner's subsequent custody comes about as a result
of the USPC's decision to revoke supervised release and
to incarcerate him for an additional 26 months. Now that
Petitioner has had both a probable cause hearing and a
revocation hearing, he is not entitled to mandamus relief.
See, e.g., Colts v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 531
F.Supp.2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2008).
does not show that there was a delay in conducting
Petitioner's supervision revocation hearing. Where, as
here, probable cause is found, “the examiner shall
schedule a final revocation hearing to be held within 65 days
of the releasee's arrest.” 28 C.F.R. §
2.214(a). Petitioner's revocation hearing took place well
within the 65-day period, and even if there had been a delay,
Petitioner makes no showing that the delay both was
unreasonable and actually prejudiced him. See
Sutherland, 709 F.2d at 732. Petitioner mentions that he
“had call[ed] people to appear” at the hearing
with “medical records” that purportedly would
have “exonerate[ed him] of the allege[d]
violation[s].” Pet. at 1. He does not identify any
witness he may have called or explain the relevance of his
medical records, however. The Court finds that
Petitioner's claim of prejudice is meritless. See
Hill v. Johnston, 750 F.Supp.2d 103, 106 (D.D.C. 2010);
Vactor v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 815 F.Supp.2d 81,
84 (D.D.C. 2011).
Court concludes that Petitioner's claims are moot insofar
as he already has had a probable cause hearing and a
supervision revocation hearing. Further, the Court finds that
the USPC timely conducted the revocation hearing and that
there was no prejudice to Petitioner in conducting the
hearing on November 30, 2017. The ...