United States District Court, District of Columbia
 DEFENDANT MANAGEMENT & TRAINING CORPORATION'S
MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING  DEFENDANT CHUGACH GOVERNMENT
SOLUTIONS LLC'S MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING AS MOOT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT; DENYING AS MOOT  DEFENDANT CHUGACH GOVERNMENT
SOLUTIONS LLC'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge.
David Golden brings this civil action against Management
& Training Corporation and Chugach Government Solutions
LLC, alleging that they retaliated against him in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. Specifically,
Plaintiff claims that Defendants placed him on a performance
improvement plan and ultimately fired him in 2015 for an
internal grievance that he submitted in 2013, alleging
“age discrimination” and a “hostile work
environment.” See First Am. Compl.
¶¶ 1, 7-18, ECF No. 20. This matter now comes
before the Court on Defendants' motions to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see generally MTC's Mot. Dismiss
(“MTC's Mot.”), ECF No. 22; CGS's Mot.
Dismiss Am. Compl. (“CGS's Mot.”), ECF No.
23, as well as Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a
Second Amended Complaint (“Plaintiff's Mot. for
Leave”), ECF No. 26, and Chugach Government Solutions
LLC's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply, ECF No. 34.
For the following reasons, the Court concludes that it must
grant Defendants' motions to dismiss and will deny as
moot Plaintiff's motion to amend and Chugach Government
Solutions LLC's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply.
2009, David Golden was hired as a career and technical
training manager at the Potomac Job Corps facility, located
in the District of Columbia. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5,
7, ECF No. 20. The Potomac Job Corps facility is one of
several locations around the country at which the U.S.
Department of Labor administers a program called Job Corps.
See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. Job Corps is
a free academic and career technical training program for
young, former offenders designed to provide those individuals
with skills and education that will allow them to obtain
meaningful employment and become productive members of their
communities. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 8. Chugach
Government Services, Inc. (“CGSI”) is an Alaska
corporation that allegedly contracted with the Department of
Labor to operate this program on its behalf throughout the
United States. Proposed Second. Am. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF
No. 26-2. Management & Training Corporation
(“MTC”) is a subcontractor under CGSI, that
“assists in the management of the Potomac Job Corps
facility.” Proposed Second Am. Compl. ¶ 5. Golden
alleges that he was hired by MTC when he was 57 years old and
that his responsibilities at the facility included teaching
former criminal offenders about educational training,
plumbing, and culinary arts. See First Am. Compl.
October 16, 2013, Golden filed a grievance with MTC's
Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Coordinator
in which he alleged “age discrimination” and a
“hostile working environment.” First. Am. Compl.
¶ 12. Golden's grievance allegedly encompassed two
perceived harms. See First. Am. Compl. ¶ 12.
First, Golden claimed that, beginning in 2011, he had
informed his supervisors of concerns he had relating to
Defendants' allegedly poor administration of the Job
Corps program and the lack of certain resources and
administrative support that they provided to him and his
staff. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10, 12.
According to Golden, however, these concerns went
unaddressed. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Second,
he claimed that his MTC supervisor erroneously placed him on
a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) in 2012
for allegedly failing to obtain certifications for students,
even though Golden had maintained a satisfactory rating on
his performance evaluation for that year. First. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 11-12. According to Golden, his administrative
concerns went unaddressed and he was erroneously placed on
the PIP because of “age discrimination, ” though
his complaint provides no details explaining how he arrived
at that conclusion. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 12.
He further alleged that these harms were representative of a
“hostile work environment, ” but again, he
provides no other details supporting that belief.
See First Am. Compl. ¶ 12.
point in 2015, more than a year after Golden's internal
complaint, a different MTC supervisor placed Golden on yet
another PIP. First Am. Compl. ¶ 13. Again, this was done
despite Plaintiff maintaining a satisfactory performance
rating for that year. First Am. Compl. ¶ 13. Then, in
July 2015, MTC terminated Golden from his employment because
he allegedly failed to complete the second PIP's
requirements. First Am. Compl. ¶ 14.
February 18, 2016, Golden filed a Charge of Discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), alleging that he had been
“discriminated against and been the victim of
retaliation for engaging in protected activity” in
violation of the ADEA. See EEOC Charge of
Discrimination, ECF No. 25-3. Three months later, on May 18,
2016, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter. EEOC Dismissal
and Notice of Rights, ECF No. 1-2.
August 16, 2016, Golden brought suit against MTC and Chugach
Government Solutions (“CGS”)-not CGSI-alleging
that Defendants retaliated against him by “erroneously
placing Plaintiff on a PIP and terminating him despite his
satisfactory ratings on his yearly performance
appraisals” as a result of Golden's “internal
complaint for age discrimination and hostile work
environment.” Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 1. Golden's
Complaint, however, sought relief under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, not the ADEA. Compl. ¶ 1.
After Defendants filed motions to dismiss highlighting this
fact, Golden amended his Complaint to replace the Title VII
claim with a retaliation claim under the ADEA on November 3,
2016. See generally First Am. Compl. Golden did not
alter any of the underlying allegations. Compare
Compl., with First. Am. Compl.
November 21, 2016, MTC and CGS each filed new motions to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See generally MTC's Mot.;
CGS's Mot. One of the arguments advanced by CGS in its
motion was that it could not be liable to Golden because it,
in fact, did not operate the Potomac Job Corps facility and
thus could not have been his employer. See CGS's
Mot. at 3-4. CGS pointed out, as it had in its prior motion,
that the facility was, in reality, operated by CGSI.
See CGS's Mot. at 3-4. In response, Golden filed
a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, which
sought to replace CGS with CGSI without altering any of the
underlying factual allegations, see generally
Pl.'s Mot. for Leave, and Defendants opposed the motion,
see generally CGS's Opp'n to Pl.'s
Second Mot. Leave Am. Compl., ECF No. 30; MTC's Opp'n
Pl.'s Mot Leave File Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32. The
Court now addresses each of the pending
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint
contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim” in order to give the defendant fair notice of
the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
does not test a plaintiff's ultimate likelihood of
success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff
has properly stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). A court
considering such a motion presumes that the complaint's
factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in
the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United
States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135
(D.D.C. 2000). Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This means
that a plaintiff's factual allegations “must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (citations omitted).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” are
therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court need not accept a
plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, see id.,
nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal
conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. At 555.