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Owens v. Republic of Sudan

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit

July 28, 2017

James Owens, et al., Appellees
Republic of Sudan, Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of the Sudan, Appellants

          Argued October 11, 2016

         Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:01-cv-02244) (1:08-cv-01377) (1:10-cv-00356) (1:12-cv-01224) (1:08-cv-01349) (1:08-cv-01361) (1:08-cv-01380)

          Christopher M. Curran argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Nicole Erb, Claire A. DeLelle, and Celia A. McLaughlin. Bruce E. Fein entered an appearance.

          Stuart H. Newberger and Matthew D. McGill argued the causes for appellees James Owens, et al. With them on the brief were Clifton S. Elgarten, Aryeh S. Portnoy, Emily Alban, John L. Murino, Jonathan C. Bond, Michael R. Huston, Steven R. Perles, Edward B. MacAllister, John Vail, Thomas Fortune Fay, Jane Carol Norman, Michael J. Miller, and David J. Dickens. Annie P. Kaplan, John D. Aldock, and Stephen A. Saltzburg, entered appearances.

          Before: Henderson and Rogers, Circuit Judges, and Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge.


          Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge.

         Table of Contents

         I. Background 5

         A. The FSIA Terrorism Exception 6

         B. History of this Litigation 11

         II. Extrajudicial Killings 19

         A. Textual Arguments 21

         1. State action requirements under international law 21

         2. International law and the TVPA 24

         3. State action requirements in the TVPA and the FSIA terrorism exception 27

         B. Statutory Purpose 31 C. Statutory History 33

         III. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Jurisdiction 36

         A. The Evidentiary Hearing 39

         1. The sources of evidence presented 39

         2. The district court's findings of fact 42

         B. Standard of Review 48

         C. Admissibility of the Evidence 52

         1. The expert testimony 53

         2. The State Department reports 63

         D. Sufficiency of the Evidence 66

         1. Proximate causation 67

         2. Sudan's specific intent 76

         IV. Timeliness of Certain Claims 78

         V. Jurisdiction and Causes of Action for Claims of Third Parties 88

         A. Jurisdiction 89

         B. Causes of Action 94

         C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 98 VI. Punitive Damages 103

         A. Whether to Review the Awards of Punitive Damages 104

         B. Retroactivity of Punitive Damages Under § 1605A(c) 107

         1. Section 1605A operates retroactively 108

         2. Clear statement of retroactive effect 111

         C. Retroactivity of Punitive Damages Under State Law 114

         VII. Vacatur Under Rule 60(b) 115

         A. Excusable Neglect Under Rule 60(b)(1) 116

         B. Extraordinary Circumstances Under Rule 60(b)(6) 127

         On August 7, 1998 truck bombs exploded outside the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The explosions killed more than 200 people and injured more than a thousand. Many of the victims of the attacks were U.S. citizens, government employees, or contractors.

         As would later be discovered, the bombings were the work of al Qaeda, and only the first of several successful attacks against U.S. interests culminating in the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States itself. From 1991 to 1996, al Qaeda and its leader, Usama bin Laden, maintained a base of operations in Sudan. During this time, al Qaeda developed the terrorist cells in Kenya and Tanzania that would later launch the embassy attacks. This appeal considers several default judgments holding Sudan liable for the personal injuries suffered by victims of the al Qaeda embassy bombings and their family members.

         I. Background

         Starting in 2001 victims of the bombings began to bring suits against the Republic of Sudan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, alleging that Sudan, its Ministry of the Interior, Iran, and its Ministry of Information and Security materially supported al Qaeda during the 1990s. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended Sudan provided a safe harbor to al Qaeda and that Iran, through its proxy Hezbollah, trained al Qaeda militants. In bringing these cases, the plaintiffs relied upon a provision in the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) that withdraws sovereign immunity and grants courts jurisdiction to hear suits against foreign states designated as sponsors of terrorism. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). This provision and its successor are known as the "terrorism exception" to foreign sovereign immunity.

         Initially, neither Sudan nor Iran appeared in court to defend against the suits. In 2004 Sudan secured counsel and participated in the litigation. Within a year, its communication with and payment of its attorneys ceased but counsel continued to litigate until allowed to withdraw in 2009. In the years that followed, several new groups of plaintiffs filed suits against Sudan and Iran. The sovereign defendants did not appear in any of these cases, and in 2010 the district court entered defaults in several of the cases now before us. After an evidentiary hearing in 2010 and the filing of still more cases, the court in 2014 entered final judgments in all pending cases. Sudan then reappeared, filing appeals and motions to vacate the judgments. The district court denied Sudan's motions to vacate, and Sudan again appealed.

         Today we address several challenges brought by Sudan on direct appeal of the default judgments and collateral appeal from its motions to vacate. Most of Sudan's contentions require interpretation of the FSIA terrorism exception, to which we now turn.

         A. The FSIA Terrorism Exception

         Enacted in 1976, the FSIA provides the sole means for suing a foreign sovereign in the courts of the United States. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989). A foreign state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, subject to several exceptions codified in §§ 1605, 1605A, 1605B, and 1607.

         When first enacted, the FSIA generally codified the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity, which had governed sovereign immunity determinations since 1952. Under the restrictive theory, states are immune from actions arising from their public acts but lack immunity for their strictly commercial acts. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1983). Thus, the original exceptions in the FSIA withdrew immunity for a sovereign's commercial activities conducted in or causing a direct effect in the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), and for a few other activities not relevant here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(6).

         None of the original exceptions in the FSIA created a substantive cause of action against a foreign state. Rather, the FSIA provided "the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances" except that it prohibited the award of punitive damages against a sovereign. 28 U.S.C. § 1606. As a result, a plaintiff suing a foreign sovereign typically relied upon state substantive law to redress his grievances. In this way, the FSIA "operate[d] as a 'pass-through' to state law principles, " Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 12 (2d Cir. 1996), granting jurisdiction yet leaving the underlying substantive law unchanged, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620 (1983).

         Until 1996 the FSIA provided no relief for victims of a terrorist attack. Courts consistently rebuffed plaintiffs' efforts to fit terrorism-related suits into an existing exception to sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F.Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). This changed with the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which added a new exception to the FSIA withdrawing immunity and granting jurisdiction over cases in which

money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources . . . for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.

Id. at § 221, 110 Stat. at 1241-43 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006) (repealed)).

         This new "terrorism exception" applied only to (1) a suit in which the claimant or the victim was a U.S. national, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii), and (2) the defendant state was designated a sponsor of terrorism under State Department regulations at or around the time of the act giving rise to the suit, § 1605(a)(7)(A) (referencing 50 U.S.C. App. § 2405(j) and 22 U.S.C. § 2371). The AEDPA also set a filing deadline for suits brought under the new exception at ten years from the date upon which a plaintiff's claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(f).

         Initially, there was some confusion about whether the new exception created a cause of action against foreign sovereigns. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F.Supp.2d 31, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2009). Within five months of enacting the AEDPA, the Congress clarified the situation with an amendment, codified as a note to the FSIA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-172 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note), which provides:

[A]n official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism . . . while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a United States national or the national's legal representative for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, for money damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, and punitive damages if the acts were among those described in section 1605(a)(7).

         This amendment was known as the Flatow Amendment after Alisa Flatow, a Brandeis University student mortally wounded in a suicide bombing in the Gaza Strip. The Flatow Amendment, which the Congress intended to deter state support for terrorism, (1) provided a cause of action against officials, employees, or agents of a designated state sponsor of terrorism and (2) authorized the award of punitive damages against such a defendant. These two changes marked a departure from the other FSIA exceptions, none of which provided a cause of action or allowed for punitive damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 1606.

         Although it referred in terms only to state officials, for a time some district courts read the Flatow Amendment and § 1605(a)(7) to create a federal cause of action against foreign states themselves. See, e.g., Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F.Supp.2d 24, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2003). But see Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F.Supp.2d 140, 171 (D.D.C. 2002). In Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, we rejected this approach, holding that "neither 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right of action against a foreign government." 353 F.3d 1024, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2004). We based this conclusion upon the plain text of the Flatow Amendment - which applied only to state officials - and upon the function of all the other exceptions to the FSIA, which withdraw immunity but leave the substantive law of liability unchanged. Id. at 1033-34 (noting the "settled distinction in federal law between statutory provisions that waive sovereign immunity and those that create a cause of action"). Because there was no federal cause of action, we remanded the case "to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint to state a cause of action under some other source of law, including state law." Id. at 1036. Hence, a plaintiff proceeding under the terrorism exception would follow the same pass-through process that governed an action under the original FSIA exceptions.

         The pass-through approach, however, produced considerable difficulties. In cases with hundreds or even thousands of claimants, courts faced a "cumbersome and tedious" process of applying choice of law rules and interpreting state law for each claim. See Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F.Supp.2d at 48. Differences in substantive law among the states caused recoveries to vary among otherwise similarly situated claimants, denying some any recovery whatsoever. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F.Supp.2d 25, 44-45 (D.D.C. 2007) (denying recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress to plaintiffs domiciled in Pennsylvania and Louisiana while permitting recovery for plaintiffs from other states).

         The Congress addressed these problems in 2008. Section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA) repealed § 1605(a)(7) and replaced it with a new "Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state." Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338-44 (2008) (hereinafter NDAA) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A). The new exception withdrew immunity, granted jurisdiction, and authorized suits against state sponsors of terrorism for "personal injury or death" arising from the same predicate acts - torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, and the provision of material support - as had the old exception. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). Jurisdiction for suits under the new exception extended to "claimants or victims" who were U.S. nationals, and for the first time, to members of the armed forces and to government employees or contractors acting within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii). Most important, the new exception authorized a "[p]rivate right of action" against a state over which a court could maintain jurisdiction under § 1605A(a). 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). By doing so, the Congress effectively abrogated Cicippio-Puleo and provided a uniform source of federal law through which plaintiffs could seek recovery against a foreign sovereign. Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F.Supp.2d at 59. A claimant who was a U.S. national, military service member, government employee or contractor acting within the scope of his employment, and the claimant's legal representative could make use of this cause of action. As with the Flatow Amendment but unlike § 1605(a)(7), the NDAA authorized awards of punitive damages under the new federal cause of action. The exception also provided claimants a host of other new benefits not relevant here.

         Like its predecessor, the new exception contained a ten-year limitation period on claims brought under § 1605A. Notwithstanding the limitation period, the NDAA provided two means of bridging the gap between the now-repealed § 1605(a)(7) and the new § 1605A. Claimants with claims "before the courts in any form" who had been adversely affected by the lack of a federal cause of action in § 1605(a)(7) could move to convert or refile their cases under § 1605A(c). NDAA § 1083(c)(2). Furthermore, "[i]f an action arising out of an act or incident has been timely commenced under section 1605(a)(7) or [the Flatow Amendment], " then a claimant could bring a "related action" "arising out of the same act or incident" within 60 days of the entry of judgment in the original action or of the enactment of the NDAA, whichever was later. NDAA § 1083(c)(3). Each of these provisions is examined below in greater detail as they relate to Sudan's arguments.

         B. History of this Litigation

         This appeal follows 15 years of litigation against Sudan arising from the 1998 embassy bombings. In October 2001 plaintiff James Owens filed the first lawsuit against Sudan and Iran for his personal injuries. Other plaintiffs joined the Owens action in the following year. These included individuals (or the legal representatives of individuals) killed or injured in the bombings, who sought recovery for their physical injuries (or deaths), and the family members of those killed or injured, who sued for their emotional distress. The Owens complaint alleged that the embassy bombings were "extrajudicial killings" under the FSIA and that Sudan provided material support for the bombings by sheltering and protecting al Qaeda during the 1990s.

         When Sudan failed to appear, the district court entered an order of default in May 2003. The default was translated into Arabic and sent to Sudan in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). In February 2004 Sudan secured counsel and in March 2004 moved to vacate the default and to dismiss the Owens action. Sudan argued, among other things, it remained immune under the FSIA because the plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded facts showing it had materially supported al Qaeda or that its support had caused the bombings. Sudan attached to its motion declarations from a former U.S. Ambassador to Sudan and a former FBI agent stating that it neither assisted al Qaeda nor knew of the group's terrorist aims during the relevant period.

         In March 2005 the district court granted, in part, Sudan's motion to dismiss and vacated the order of default. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F.Supp.2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2005) (Owens I). The court, however, allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint in order to develop more fully their allegations of material support. Id. at 15. The court further noted that although "the Sudan defendants severed ties to al Qaeda two years before the relevant attacks, " this timing did not necessarily foreclose the conclusion that Sudan had "provided material support within the meaning of the statute and that this support was a proximate cause of the embassy bombings." Id. at 17.

         The plaintiffs then amended their complaint, and Sudan again moved to dismiss. Sudan once again argued the complaint had not sufficiently alleged material support and that any support it provided was not a legally sufficient cause of the embassy bombings. Assuming the truth of the plaintiffs' allegations, the district court denied Sudan's motion in its entirety. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 412 F.Supp.2d 99, 108, 115 (D.D.C. 2006) (Owens II).

         While the motions to dismiss were pending, difficulties arose between Sudan and its counsel. After filing the first motion to dismiss, Sudan's initial counsel withdrew due to a conflict of interest with the Iranian codefendants. Sudan retained new counsel, but their relationship soon deteriorated. Starting in January 2005 new counsel filed several motions to withdraw, citing Sudan's unresponsiveness and failure to pay for legal services. Sudan's last communication with counsel was in September 2008. The district court eventually granted a final motion to withdraw in January 2009, leaving Sudan without representation.

         Despite these difficulties, counsel for Sudan continued to defend their client until the court granted the motion to withdraw in January 2009. Following the denial of its second motion to dismiss, Sudan pursued an interlocutory appeal to this court. Its appeal, in part, challenged the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' allegations that Sudan's material support had caused the embassy bombings. In July 2008 we affirmed the district court's decision, holding that "[a]ppellees' factual allegations and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom show a reasonable enough connection between Sudan's interactions with al Qaeda in the early and mid-1990s and the group's attack on the embassies in 1998" to maintain jurisdiction under the FSIA. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 531 F.3d 884, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Owens III). We then remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to pursue the merits of their claims.

         Shortly after our decision, several new groups of plaintiffs filed actions against Sudan and Iran arising from the embassy bombings. These actions - brought by the Wamai, Amduso, Mwila, and Osongo plaintiffs - were filed after the enactment of the new terrorism exception and before the expiration of its limitation period. This brought the total number of suits against Sudan to six, including the original Owens action and a suit filed by the Khaliq plaintiffs under § 1605(a)(7).

         From that point on, neither Sudan nor its counsel participated in the litigation again until after the 2014 entry of final judgment in Owens. After entering new orders of defaults against Sudan in several of the pending actions, the court held a consolidated evidentiary hearing in order to satisfy a requirement in the FSIA that "the claimant establish[] his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court." 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). Without considering this evidence, the court could not transform the orders of default into enforceable default judgments establishing liability and damages against Sudan.

         For three days, the district court heard expert testimony and reviewed exhibits detailing the relationship between both Iran and Sudan and al Qaeda during the 1990s. Shortly after this hearing the district court held both defendants liable for materially supporting the embassy bombings. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F.Supp.2d 128, 157 (D.D.C. 2011) (Owens IV). More specifically, the district court found Sudan had provided al Qaeda a safe harbor from which it could establish and direct its terrorist cells in Kenya and Tanzania. Id. at 139-43, 146. The court further found Sudan provided financial, military, and intelligence assistance to the terrorist group, which allowed al Qaeda to avoid disruption by hostile governments while it developed its capabilities in the 1990s. Id. at 143-46. These findings established both jurisdiction over and substantive liability for claims against Sudan and Iran.

         The court also addressed the claims of non-American family members of those killed or injured in the bombings. Although those plaintiffs could not make use of the federal cause of action in § 1605A(c), the court concluded they could pursue claims under state law, as was the practice under the previous terrorism exception. Id. at 153. The court's opinion was translated into Arabic and served upon Sudan in September 2012.

         The district court then referred the cases to special masters to hear evidence and recommend the amounts of damages to be awarded. While this process was ongoing, two new sets of plaintiffs entered the litigation. In July 2012 the Opati plaintiffs filed suit against Sudan, claiming their suits were timely as a "related action" with respect to the original Owens litigation. In May 2012 the Aliganga plaintiffs sought to intervene in the Owens suit. Notwithstanding the expiration of the ten-year limitation period starting from the date of the bombings, the district court allowed both groups of plaintiffs to proceed against Sudan and to rely upon the court's factual findings of jurisdiction and liability. The court then referred the Aliganga and Opati claims to the special masters.

         In 2014 the district court entered final judgments in favor of the various plaintiffs. All told, the damages awarded against Sudan came to more than $10.2 billion. Family members, who outnumbered those physically injured by the bombing, received the bulk of the award - over $7.3 billion. Of the total $10.2 billion, approximately $4.3 billion was punitive damages. See, e.g., Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 60 F.Supp.3d 68, 82 (D.D.C. 2014).

         Within a month of the first judgments, Sudan retained counsel and reappeared in the district court. Sudan appealed each case and in April 2015 filed motions in the district court to vacate the default judgments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We stayed the appeals pending the district court's ruling on the motions.

         In those motions, Sudan raised a number of arguments for vacatur, most of them challenging the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. As before, Sudan also attacked the plaintiffs' evidence. It argued the judgments were void because they rested solely upon inadmissible evidence to prove jurisdictional facts, which Sudan argued was impermissible under § 1608(e). It also argued the evidence did not show it proximately caused the bombings because al Qaeda did not become a serious terrorist threat until after Sudan had expelled bin Laden in 1996.

         Sudan raised a host of new arguments as well. In its most sweeping challenge, Sudan argued it did not provide material support for any predicate act that would deprive it of immunity under the FSIA. In making this argument, Sudan contended the embassy bombings, carried out by al Qaeda, were not "extrajudicial killings" because that term requires the involvement of a state actor in the act of killing. Sudan also contended the claims brought by the Opati, Aliganga, and Khaliq plaintiffs were barred by the statute of limitation in § 1605A(b) which, it argued, deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear their suits.[1]

         Sudan's last jurisdictional challenge took aim at the family members of those physically injured or killed by the bombings. Sudan argued that the court could hear claims only from a person who was physically harmed or killed by the bombings or the legal representative of that person. And even if jurisdiction was proper, Sudan contended, foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) family members could not state a claim under either the federal cause of action or state law.

         Finally, Sudan raised two nonjurisdictional arguments: First, it urged the district court to vacate its awards of punitive damages to the plaintiffs proceeding under state law, contending § 1605A(c) is the sole means for obtaining punitive damages against a foreign state. Second, Sudan argued the court should vacate the default judgments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for "extraordinary circumstances" or "excusable neglect" on Sudan's part. In support of the latter argument, Sudan submitted a declaration from the Sudanese Ambassador to the United States detailing the country's troubled history of civil unrest, natural disaster, and disease, which allegedly impeded Sudan's participation in the litigation.

         After a consolidated hearing, the district court denied the motions to vacate in all respects. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 174 F.Supp.3d 242 (D.D.C. 2016) (Owens V). Sudan appealed and its appeal was consolidated with its earlier appeals from the final judgments. Sudan's briefs before this court are directed primarily to the district court's jurisdiction, and present novel questions of law, which we review de novo. See Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Ordinarily, all of Sudan's nonjurisdictional arguments would be forfeited by reason of its having defaulted in the district court. See Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543, 1547 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In this case, however, due to the size of the judgments against Sudan, their possible effects upon international relations, and the likelihood that the same arguments will arise in future litigation, we exercise our discretion to consider some, but not all, of Sudan's nonjurisdictional objections. See Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("while we will ordinarily refrain from reaching non-jurisdictional questions that have not been raised by the parties . . . we may do so on our own motion in 'exceptional circumstances'").

         At the end of the day, we affirm the judgments in most respects, holding the FSIA grants jurisdiction over all the claims and claimants present here. We hold also that those plaintiffs ineligible to proceed under the federal cause of action may continue to press their claims under state law. We also vacate all the awards of punitive damages and certify a question of local tort law to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

         We turn first to Sudan's challenges to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, starting with those that would dispose of the entire case. In Part II we address Sudan's challenge to the meaning of "extrajudicial killings" under the FSIA. In Part III we review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conclusions that Sudan provided material support to al Qaeda and that this support was a jurisdictionally sufficient cause of the embassy bombings.

         We then proceed to Sudan's jurisdictional challenges that would eliminate the claims of particular plaintiffs. In Part IV we consider whether some of the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitation in the FSIA terrorism exception, which Sudan contends is jurisdictional. In Part V we address both jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional arguments opposing the claims of the family members of victims physically injured or killed by the embassy bombings. Finally, we address Sudan's purely nonjurisdictional arguments in Part VI - whether the new terrorism exception authorizes punitive damages for a sovereign's pre-enactment conduct - and Part VII - addressing Sudan's arguments for vacatur under Rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6).

         II. Extrajudicial Killings

         Sudan first argues the 1998 embassy bombings were not "extrajudicial killings" within the meaning of the FSIA terrorism exception. As noted above, § 1605A divests a foreign state of immunity and grants courts jurisdiction over cases

in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by . . . extrajudicial killing . . . or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.

         Because this argument poses a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction, it was not forfeited by Sudan's failure to appear in the district court. See Practical Concepts, 811 F.2d at 1547. This is Sudan's most sweeping challenge, and, if correct, then the claims of all the plaintiffs must fail. The district court rejected Sudan's jurisdictional argument based upon the plain meaning of "extrajudicial killing." Owens V, 174 F.Supp.3d at 259-66. Reviewing de novo this question of law relating to our jurisdiction, we agree that "extrajudicial killings" include the terrorist bombings that gave rise to these cases.

         Section 1605A(h)(7) of the FSIA provides that the term "extrajudicial killing" has the meaning given to it in § 3(a) of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which defines an extrajudicial killing as:

a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.

Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1991) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note) (hereinafter TVPA).

         On its face, this definition contains three elements: (1) a killing; (2) that is deliberated; and (3) is not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court. The 1998 embassy bombings meet all three requirements and do not fall within the exception for killings carried out under the authority of a foreign nation acting in accord with international law. First, the bombings caused the death of more than 200 people in Kenya and Tanzania. The bombings were "deliberated" in that they involved substantial preparation, meticulous timing, and coordination across multiple countries in the region. See Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1155 (11th Cir. 2011) (defining "deliberated" under the TVPA as "being undertaken with studied consideration and purpose"). Finally, the bombings themselves were neither authorized by any court nor by the law of nations. Therefore, on its face, the FSIA would appear to cover the bombings as extrajudicial killings.

         Sudan offers a host of reasons we should ignore the plain meaning of "extrajudicial killing" in the TVPA and exclude terrorist bombings like the 1998 embassy attacks from jurisdiction under the FSIA terrorism exception. Sudan's arguments draw upon the text and structure, the purpose, and the legislative history of the TVPA and of the FSIA terrorism exception. Each of Sudan's arguments shares the same basic premise: Only a state actor, not a nonstate terrorist, may commit an "extrajudicial killing."

         A. Textual Arguments

         We begin, as we must, with the text of the statute. First, Sudan contends the text of the TVPA, and, by extension of the FSIA, defines an "extrajudicial killing" in terms of international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions. According to Sudan, international law generally and the Geneva Conventions specifically prohibit only killings carried out by a state actor. The plaintiffs vigorously contest both propositions.

         1. State action requirements under international law

         Sudan bases its argument that principles of international law supply the meaning of "extrajudicial killing" in the FSIA upon similarities between the TVPA and the prohibition on "summary executions" in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which condemns "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 3(1)(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.S.T.S. 85. The similarities between the two definitions, Sudan contends, shows the Congress intended to define an "extrajudicial killing" in the TVPA with reference to principles of international law adopted in the Geneva Conventions.

         To Sudan, this is of critical importance because the Geneva Conventions and international law, it argues, proscribe killings only when committed by a state agent, not when perpetrated by a nonstate actor. Three pieces of evidence are said to demonstrate this limitation. First, Sudan notes, the United Nations adopted a resolution in 1980 condemning as inconsistent with international law "[e]xtra-legal executions" carried out by "armed forces, law enforcement or other governmental agencies." Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders Res., A/Conf.87/L.11 (Sep. 5, 1980). Second, Sudan cites a United Nations annual report, S. Amos Wako (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶¶ 74-85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/16 (Jan. 31, 1983), which describes "extralegal executions" and "summary executions" in terms suggesting state involvement. And third, Sudan references an online database of the United Nations, which links the term "extrajudicial killing" to the definition of "extra-legal execution." U.N. Terminology Database, extra-legal_execution/c253667 (last visited July 19, 2017).

         Each of these references to international law is both inapposite and rebutted by the plaintiffs. If Sudan means to say the TVPA incorporates the prohibition against a "summary execution" in the Geneva Conventions, then it must show what was meant by that term in the Geneva Conventions themselves. In doing so, however, Sudan principally relies upon U.N. documents published more than a quarter century after the ratification of the Geneva Conventions in 1949, rather than the deliberations over the proposed Conventions, which Sudan does not cite at all. Odder still, none of these documents (or the terminology database) actually says the Geneva Conventions proscribe only "summary executions" committed by a state actor. See Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra p. 22, ¶¶ 35-36 (noting Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits "murder" in general and "also specifically prohibits the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court"). Indeed, the plaintiffs present reasons to doubt whether the Geneva Conventions in specific, or international law in general, prohibit only killings by a state actor. As the plaintiffs note, Article 3 of the First Convention prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds." Geneva Convention, art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.S.T.S. 85. Likewise, the U.N. Terminology Database lists "[k]illings committed by vigilante groups" as an example of an "extrajudicial killing." And finally, a "Handbook" published by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions contains a full chapter on "killings by non-state actors and affirmative state obligations, " which states that "Human rights and humanitarian law clearly apply to killings by non-State actors in certain circumstances." Project on Extrajudicial Executions, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions Handbook, ¶ 45, ndbook%20Chapter%203-Responsibility%20of%20states%20 for%20non-state%20killings.pdf (last visited July 19, 2017).

         This does not mean Sudan's interpretation of international law as it pertains to summary executions (as opposed to extrajudicial killings) is wrong or that direct state involvement is not needed for certain violations of international law. Rather, the point is that the role of the state in an extrajudicial killing appears less clear under international law than Sudan would have us believe; indeed it appears less clear than the definition of an "extrajudicial killing" in the TVPA itself. Accordingly, we doubt the Congress intended categorically to preclude state liability for killings by nonstate actors by adopting a definition of "extrajudicial killing" similar to that of a "summary execution" in the Geneva Conventions.

         2. International law and the TVPA

         More important, even if Sudan's interpretation of the Geneva Conventions and international law is correct, its argument would fail because the TVPA does not appear to define an "extrajudicial killing" coextensive with the meaning of a "summary execution" (or any similar prohibition) under international law. For example, the TVPA does not adopt the phrasing of the Geneva Conventions wholesale. Rather, as the plaintiffs point out, the TVPA substitutes the term "deliberated killing" for "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions" in the Geneva Conventions. While "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions" strongly suggests at least some level of state involvement, a nonstate party may commit a "deliberated killing" as readily as a state actor. Indeed, several other statutes contemplate "deliberate" attacks by nonstate entities, including terrorist groups. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 1169(a) (requiring the Secretary of Transportation to assess vulnerability of hazardous materials in transit to a "deliberate terrorist attack"); 42 U.S.C. § 16276 (mandating research on technologies for increasing "the security of nuclear facilities from deliberate attacks"). Due to the substitution of "deliberated" killings for "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions, " the inference of direct state involvement is much less strong in the TVPA than in the Geneva Conventions. The difference between the definition in the TVPA and the prohibition in the Geneva Conventions also signals the Congress intended the TVPA to reach a broader range of conduct than just "summary executions." For the court to rely upon the narrower prohibition in the Geneva Conventions would contravene the plain text of the TVPA, which is, after all, the sole "authoritative statement" of the law. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).

         Resisting this conclusion, Sudan points to two phrases that, it contends, impose a state actor requirement upon the definition of an extrajudicial killing in the TVPA. First, Sudan notes that an extrajudicial killing must not be one "authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court." As Sudan would have it, the "only killings that can be reasonably be imagined to be authorized by a 'previous judgment' are those by state actors." Regardless whether Sudan is right on this point, the argument does not imply what Sudan intends. If only a state actor may lawfully kill based upon a "previous judgment, " then all killings committed by a nonstate actor are, by definition, not "authorized by a previous judgment." Therefore, only a killing committed by a state actor might not be an "extrajudicial killing, " that is, if it was "authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court." Accepting Sudan's premise, no other outcome can "reasonably be imagined."

         Similarly, Sudan argues the second sentence in the definition of an "extrajudicial killing" in the TVPA anchors the meaning of the first sentence in international law which, in Sudan's view, prohibits only summary executions by state actors. Even accepting Sudan's view of international law, we are not persuaded. In the first sentence of § 3(a), the Congress defined the proscribed conduct (i.e., a "deliberated killing") in terms that extended beyond the prohibition on a "summary execution" under international law. The second sentence excludes from the definition of "extrajudicial killing" "any . . . killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation." This ensured that the more expansive prohibition of the first sentence would not reach the traditional prerogatives of a sovereign nation. Were "extrajudicial killings" no broader than "summary executions, " the limitation in international law of what constitutes an "extrajudicial killing" would be unnecessary because, by Sudan's own argument, a "summary execution" always violates international law. Therefore, Sudan's interpretation would make superfluous the reference to killings "lawfully carried out" "under international law, " contrary to the "cardinal principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

         Moreover, the reference to international law in the second sentence of § 3(a) of the TVPA highlights its omission in the first sentence. Had the Congress intended the definition of an "extrajudicial killing" to track precisely with that of a "summary execution" under international law, § 3(a) could have expressly referenced international law in both the prohibition and its limitation. That approach is found elsewhere in the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (authorizing jurisdiction where "rights in property [are] taken in violation of international law"), as well as in other statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (proscribing "the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations"). Indeed, the Congress specifically defined other predicate acts in § 1605A by reference to international treaties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(1), (2) (defining "aircraft sabotage" and "hostage taking" with reference to international treaties), but referenced only a U.S. statute, the TVPA, in its definition of "extrajudicial killing." That the Congress incorporated international law expressly into other jurisdictional provisions undermines the inference that it intended implicitly to do so here. See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S.Ct. 913, 919 (2015) ("Congress generally acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another").

         3. State action requirements in the TVPA and the FSIA terrorism exception

         The plaintiffs provide another persuasive reason Sudan's textual arguments are flawed. The TVPA authorizes an action only for harms arising from the conduct of a state actor. See TVPA § 2(a) (providing a cause of action against an "individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation" engages in torture or extrajudicial killing). Sudan argues the state actor requirement for a suit under the TVPA is "necessarily incorporated" in § 3(a) and therefore applies to those actions arising from "extrajudicial killings" under the FSIA. The limitation of actions to state actors, however, is found not in § 3(a) but in § 2(a) of the TVPA. As the plaintiffs note, when passing the current and prior FSIA terrorism exceptions, the Congress each time incorporated the section of the TVPA that defined an "extrajudicial killing" but not the section that limited the cause of action under the TVPA to state actors. If the Congress had wanted to limit extrajudicial killings to state actors, then it could have incorporated both sections of the TVPA into the FSIA terrorism exception. That it did not compels us to conclude the state actor limitation in the TVPA does not transfer to the definition of an "extrajudicial killing" in the FSIA. Cf. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S.Ct. 1886, 1894 (2013) (declining to apply limitations from one section of a statue when the text of another section does not cross-reference the first section).

         Indeed, the reason the Congress declined to incorporate the state-actor limitation in the TVPA is plain on the face of the FSIA terrorism exception. As the plaintiffs observe, the TVPA and the FSIA share a similar structure. Each statute defines the predicate acts that give rise to liability in one section - TVPA § 3 and FSIA § 1605A(h) - and then limits who may be subjected to liability in another - TVPA § 2 and FSIA §§ 1605A(a)(1) and (c). Both statutes also require a plaintiff to show a certain type of nexus to a foreign sovereign. In the TVPA, a state official must act "under actual or apparent authority, or color of law" of a foreign sovereign. In the FSIA, liability arises when the state official, employee, or agent acting within the scope of his authority either directly commits a predicate act or provides "material support or resources" for another to commit that act. If the more stringent state-actor limitation in the TVPA traveled with the definition of an "extrajudicial killing" in that statute, then it would all but eliminate the "material support" provision of § 1605A(a), at least with respect to extrajudicial killings. For example, § 1605A(a) would extend jurisdiction over a sovereign that did not directly commit an extrajudicial killing only if an official of the defendant state materially supported a killing committed by a state actor from a different state. We seriously doubt the Congress intended the exception to immunity for materially supporting an extrajudicial killing to be so narrow.

         Sudan attempts to avoid the conclusion that the FSIA does not adopt the state-actor limitation in the TVPA in two ways. First, Sudan contends the introductory clause of § 3(a) implicitly incorporates the state actor limitation of § 2(a). This clause states that an "extrajudicial killing" is defined "[f]or the purposes of this Act." That supposedly indicates the Congress intended to import the state actor limitation of § 2(a) into the definition of an extrajudicial killing in § 3(a). But Sudan's reading of this phrase leads to an illogical conclusion. A statutory definition made expressly "[f]or the purposes of this Act" informs our understanding of the entire statute. In other words, the definitions in TVPA § 3 govern the use of those defined terms elsewhere in the Act. Under Sudan's interpretation, however, the reverse would occur: in order to understand the meaning of a defined term, we would have to look to the remainder of the statute, and not to the definition itself. What then, we wonder, would the definition contribute to the statute? Would it be wholly redundant, a conclusion that conflicts with our usual interpretive presumptions? See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 669 (2007). Or, if not redundant, how would a court then apply the definition to terms used in the remainder of the statute if the remainder of the statute, in turn, gave meaning to the definition? Given these paradoxes, the phrase "[f]or the purposes of this Act" cannot mean what Sudan contends. Instead, that phrase simply means that the definition of an "extrajudicial killing" in TVPA § 3(a) informs the remainder of the TVPA (and, by extension, the FSIA), and not the reverse.

         Second, Sudan contends the definition of an "extrajudicial killing" in the TVPA implicitly incorporates international law (and the supposed state-actor limitation therein) even without reference to the state-actor limitation in § 2(a). Here Sudan relies principally upon a dictum in a Second Circuit opinion discussing the TVPA in a case arising under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which expressly incorporates international law: "torture and summary execution - when not perpetrated in the course of genocide or war crimes - are proscribed by international law only when committed by state officials or under color of law." Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (1995). The court further noted that "official torture is prohibited by universally accepted norms of international law, and the Torture Victim Act confirms this holding and extends it to cover summary execution." Id. at 244 (citation omitted). This, Sudan contends, shows the TVPA definition of an "extrajudicial killing" (and not just the TVPA in general) draws upon international law. The court's discussion in that case, however, relied not only upon the definition of an "extrajudicial killing" in TVPA § 3(a) but also upon the limitation of the cause of action to state actors in TVPA § 2(a). Id. at 243. Indeed, the court later separately summarized the two provisions of the TVPA, distinguishing § 2(a), which "provides a cause of action" against an individual acting under state authority, from § 3, which "defines the terms 'extrajudicial killing' and 'torture.'" Id. at 245.

         Sudan's argument that the definitions in the TVPA incorporate international law is flawed as a matter of statutory interpretation. If the definition of an "extrajudicial killing" (and "torture") in TVPA § 3(a) already had a state actor limitation from international law, then the additional state actor limitation in § 2(a) would be surplusage. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. , 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (instructing courts in interpreting a statute to "avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant"). That the Congress included § 2(a) in the TVPA therefore implies either that the definition of extrajudicial killing in § 3(a) of the FSIA does not incorporate international law or that international law contains no state actor limitation. Either way, Sudan is out of luck.

         In sum, Sudan's textual arguments that an extrajudicial killing requires a state actor all fail. Even if international law contained such a limitation - a proposition we doubt but do not decide - the TVPA does not incorporate international law (or any limitations therein) into its definition of an "extrajudicial killing." Because the FSIA terrorism exception references only the definitions in TVPA § 3, and not the limitation to state actors ...

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