United States District Court, District of Columbia
JAMES H. TYLER, Plaintiff,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant.
D. BATES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the District of Columbia
Housing Authority's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No.
37. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be
sought employment with the District of Columbia Housing
Authority (“DCHA”). Compl. at 1; Mem. of P. &
A. in Support of District of Columbia Housing Auth.'s
Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 37 (“Def.'s
Mem.”), Ex. E at 1 (page number designated by ECF); Pl.
Oppose [sic] Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 40
(“Pl.'s Opp'n”) at 1. On September 19,
2007, he applied for a Security Officer position. Compl. at
1; see generally Def.'s Mem., Ex. A at 1. At
that time, plaintiff was 67 years of age. Def.'s Mem.,
Ex. C at 1.
to DCHA, “[a] high school diploma or equivalent degree
was required in order for an applicant to meet the minimum
qualifications for the Security Officer position.”
Def.'s Mem., Ex. H ¶ 4. Tyler alleges that he
“has a G.E.D. and over 100 college credit hours.”
Compl. at 2. On his application, plaintiff indicated that he
attended high school and had taken some college courses.
Def.'s Mem., Ex. A at 1. He did not indicate the dates he
attended high school; he did not check a box to indicate
whether he had graduated high school; he did not indicate the
year he received his diploma or GED. See id., Ex. A
at 1. In short, the “application did not indicate he
had a high school diploma or equivalent degree, ”
id., Ex. H ¶ 5, without which Tyler
“would not have been eligible for the position of
Security Officer, ” id., Ex. H ¶
did not select Tyler. See Compl. at 1. Tyler
believed that DCHA refused to hire him because of his age,
and on May 14, 2008, he filed a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). Id.; see Def.'s
Mem., Ex. B. The EEOC summarized the findings of its
investigation as follows:
You alleged that the [DCHA] discriminated against you on the
basis of your age (67) in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act when it failed to hire you for the position
of Police Officer on or around September 2007. The [DCHA] was
unable to locate any records evidencing your application for
Police Officer. However, it did produce an application for
[a] Security Officer Position you submitted on September 19,
2007. You were not selected for that position. The
evidence indicates that you were not selected because you
failed to indicate that you had earned a high school diploma
or equivalent degree.
You did not produce any additional evidence that would
support a finding of age discrimination. Based on this
evidence, it is unlikely that [DCHA] subjected you to
discrimination on the basis of age in violation of EEOC's
laws. Therefore, we decline to pursue the matter further.
Def.'s Mem., Ex. C (emphasis added). Undaunted by the
EEOC's determination, Tyler has brought this action
against DCHA under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), see 29 U.S.C. § 621
et seq. Compl. at 2.
parties conducted some discovery, namely written discovery
DCHA sent plaintiff on November 14, 2016. Def.'s Mem. at
5. Tyler responded to DCHA's interrogatories. See
id., Ex. E. But he neither appeared for his deposition
on January 11, 2017, see id., Exs. G-H
(respectively, Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum and
Transcript), nor responded to DCHA's requests for
admission, id., Ex. F at 3.
Summary Judgment Standard
Court may grant summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “The party seeking summary judgment
bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Bowe-Connor
v. Shinseki, 845 F.Supp.2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
A fact is material if it “affect[s] the outcome of the
suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A dispute
is ‘genuine' if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Mokhtar v. Kerry, 83 F.Supp.3d 49, 60
(D.D.C. 2015) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007)) (additional citations omitted),
aff'd, No. 15-5137, 2015 WL 9309960 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 4, 2015). “[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
moving party may discharge its burden “by
‘showing' - that is, pointing out to the district
court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 325. The non-moving party must “go beyond the
pleadings” to defeat summary judgment. Id. at
324. He is required to “designate ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, '”
id., by “citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes
of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see
Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir.