United States District Court, District of Columbia
TESSA E. BERGMAN, Plaintiff,
STEVEN MNUCHIN,  Secretary of the Department of Treasury, Defendant MICHAEL L. BUESGENS, Intervenor-Movant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge.
24, 2008, Plaintiff Tessa Bergman and Defendant the Secretary
of the Department of the Treasury settled Bergman's
discrimination claims brought against the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) under the Rehabilitation Act, and
the Court dismissed this action. Dkt. 73. The next month, the
Court denied a motion from Michael Buesgens, a “former
employee of the IRS” who alleged that “he too
ha[d] been the subject of employment discrimination by the
IRS, ” to intervene in the case. Dkt. 74 at 1. First,
the Court noted that Buesgens's claims had “already
been adjudicated” by a court in Texas and were thus
“bar[r]ed by res judicata.” Id.
at 1. Next, the Court determined that, because Buesgens had
“failed to identify any statutory authority allowing
him an unconditional right to intervene” or “any
interest he ha[d] in any property or transaction which [wa]s
the subject of th[e] civil action, ” he could not
“satisfy the requirement of [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] 24(a) for intervention.” Id. at 2.
Finally, the Court concluded that Buesgens had “failed
to satisfy the requirements of [Rule] 24(b) for intervention
because he had not identified “any statutory
requirement giving him a conditional right to intervene in
the ligation” and had not identified any “common
questions of law or fact between [his] claims and
[Plaintiff's] claims.” Id.
nearly a decade after the Court's order denying him leave
to intervene in this case, Buesgens has moved to alter or
amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) and for relief from
judgment under Rule 60(b). Dkt. 75. A Rule 59(e) motion must
be filed within 28 days of entering of the judgment,
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), and must demonstrate that “there
[has been] an intervening change of controlling law, ”
“new evidence” has become available, “or
[there is a] need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice, ” Firestone v. Firestone,
76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Such motions are “generally
disfavored” absent “extraordinary circumstances,
” Dage v. Johnson, 537 F.Supp.2d 43, 48
(D.D.C. 2008), and do not represent an opportunity “to
reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already
ruled, ” New York v. United States, 880
F.Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995).
Rule 60(b) permits the Court to “relieve a party . . .
from a final judgment, ” for, among other reasons,
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;” “newly discovered evidence;”
“fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party;” or “any other reason that
justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Absent a showing
that the judgment is void, has been satisfied, or a showing
of “extraordinary circumstances, ” see
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 863 n.11 (1988), a Rule 60(b) motion must be brought
within one year of entry of the judgment. “The party
seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of showing
that he or she is entitled to the relief, ” United
States v. Dynamic Visions, Inc., No. 11-cv-695, 2017 WL
1476102, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2017), and “the
decision to grant or deny a [R]ule 60(b) motion is committed
to the discretion of the [d]istrict [c]ourt, ”
United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston
Co., 984 F.2d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
has not cleared the high bar necessary to obtain relief under
either Rule 59(e) or 60(b). As an initial matter, his motion
under Rule 59(e) is untimely, and this motion under Rule
60(b) is also untimely unless he can show
“extraordinary circumstances.” In addition, it is
unclear what judgment Buesgens seeks to have the Court set
aside. If his challenge is to the settlement agreement
approved by the Court between Plaintiff and Defendant, he has
no standing to attack that agreement because he is not a
party to this case. And if his challenge is to the
Court's order denying his request to intervene, his
motion for reconsideration offers no plausible reason-much
less an extraordinary circumstance-that would justify
revisiting the Court's 2008 decision. His motion does not
address any of the three grounds on which the Court relied,
and, instead, largely contains attacks against the Assistant
U.S. Attorney who handled this case a decade ago, see,
e.g., Dkt. 75 at 2, 3, 6, 8, unexplained citations to
the Code of Federal Regulations, see, e.g. Id. at 1,
8, and a discussion about “completely unrelated . . .
litigation” he brought in “Minnesota State
Courts, ” id. at 9-10. None of these arguments
identify any extraordinary circumstances, changes in
controlling law, or errors made by the Court that would
warrant relief under Rule 59(e) or 60(b).
Buesgens's motion for reconsideration, Dkt. 75, is hereby
 The current officeholder is
automatically substituted as the defendant. See Fed.