Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Grant v. Entertainment Cruises, Inc.

United States District Court, District of Columbia

October 16, 2017

TAMEA GRANT, Plaintiff,
v.
ENTERTAINMENT CRUISES, INC.; SPIRIT CRUISES, LLC, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          JAMES E. BOASBERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Tamea Grant, a deckhand on a local cruise ship who suffered injuries during a docking incident, now brings these consolidated pro se actions against the cruise line and its parent. While difficult to decipher, the Amended Complaints appear to invoke the District of Columbia's Occupational Safety and Health Act, the District's Industrial Safety Act, and the federal Jones Act. Defendants now move to dismiss, contending that the first statute provides no private right of action and that claims asserted under the latter two are insufficiently pled. Agreeing with the first argument but only some of the second, the Court will grant the Motion in part and deny it in part.

         I. Background

         As the two Amended Complaints (one in No. 17-1159 and one in No. 17-1410) are virtually identical - save for a few exceptions addressed shortly - the Court will principally cite the more recent one, which was filed in No. 17-1159 on August 29, 2017. See ECF No. 23. The Court presumes the allegations therein true at this stage and sets forth the following facts accordingly. This is no easy task as much of the factual recitation is jumbled, and what actually happened on board the ship is not easily discerned.

         Plaintiff, who served in the U.S. Navy for 20 years, was employed as a deckhand on vessels operated by Entertainment Cruises in the District of Columbia's harbor. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 13, 16. On April 25, 2015, an injury to a member of the dining staff left the boat's captain “in a bad mood.” Id., ¶¶ 17-18. In the casting-off process shortly thereafter, Grant assisted the Captain, who “yanked the gangway . . . [and] began slamming it back and forth in the walkway.” Id., ¶ 19. Another officer was concerned that she had been injured, but Plaintiff informed him that she had “moved [her] hand.” Id. There was then a second incident when the boat was preparing to dock after the outing, in which the Captain, “upset with the many negative events that day, ” attempted to dislodge a stuck rope or line, but ended up “whipp[ing] the line over Ms. Grant['s] head” and “smack[ing] [her] on the fore head.” Id., ¶ 22. She “became dazed and began to faint, ” but he only smiled. Id., ¶ 23. These incidents caused “severe headaches, ringing in her ears, memory loss, visual disturbances, searing pain in elbow joint, and inability to straighten arm diagnosed as golfer's elbow.” Id., ¶ 30.

         The Amended Complaint, which invokes this Court's diversity jurisdiction, lists four causes of action, one each under D.C. Code § 32-1117(e), § 32-808(a), § 32-1103(a), and § 12-301(8). Id. at ECF pp. 9-13. The Amended Complaint in No. 17-1410, conversely, adds to the fourth count a reference to 46 U.S.C. § 30104 and “federal maritime law.” See ECF No. 16 at 13. Defendants have successfully moved to consolidate the two cases, given their identical nature, see Minute Order of Aug. 29, 2017, in No. 17-1410, and now seek dismissal of all claims.

         II. Legal Standard

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a Court to dismiss any count of a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court “must treat the complaint's factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (citation omitted). The Court need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” or an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The Court will also consider the facts set forth in Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. See Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

         Rule 12(b)(6)'s pleading standard is “not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff, ” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005), as a count will survive so long as there is a “‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to support the claim.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 347). While “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a dismissal motion, id. at 555, a complaint still “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In other words, a plaintiff must put forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint may survive even if “‘recovery is very remote and unlikely'” or the veracity of the claims are “doubtful in fact” if the factual matter alleged in the complaint is “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

         III. Analysis

         In seeking dismissal here, Defendants argue that each of Plaintiff's causes of action is facially defective. The Court largely treats them in turn.

         A. D.C. Code §§ 32-1117(e), -1103(a)(1) (Counts I & III)

         In her first and third causes of action, Grant asserts that Defendants violated provisions of the D.C. Occupational Safety and Health Act, found at D.C. Code § 32-1101 et seq. More specifically, by denying Grant medical assistance, she alleges in the former count that the vessel's captain somehowviolated D.C. Code § 32-1117(e), which “makes it an unlawful practice to ‘discipline an employee for refusal to perform work that the employee believes creates a dangerous situation that could cause harm to the physical health or threatens the safety of the employee.'” Am. Compl. at ECF p. 9 & ¶ 28 (quoting § 32-1117(e)). Count III posits a violation of § 32-1103(a)(1), apparently on the ground that the ship's employees were not “properly trained in basic medical first aid, trauma, and life saving techniques.” Id. at ECF p. 12 & ¶ 40.

         Although it is not clear from the Amended Complaint how Defendants purportedly violated these provisions, a more fundamental obstacle blocks Grant's path forward - viz., the statute does not provide a private right of action. As to the former count, only the D.C. Occupational Safety and Health Commission may determine whether a violation has occurred and order appropriate relief. See § 32-1117 (detailing procedure for filing complaint with Commission, after which can appeal to D.C. Court of Appeals); cf. also Johnson v. Interstate Mgmt. Co., 849 F.3d 1093, 1096-97 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding no private cause of action in 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2), federal analog to D.C. Code § 32-1117(b)). Similarly, the latter count is also only ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.