United States District Court, District of Columbia
appearing pro se, has submitted a Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and
Permanent Injunction ("TRO/PI Motion"), accompanied
by his complaint and application for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. The Court will grant the in forma
pauperis application, deny the TRO/PI Motion, and
dismiss the case because the complaint fails to meet the
minimal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.Supp. 237, 239
(D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires complaints to contain "(1) a short
and plain statement of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661,
668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that
defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so
that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate
defense and determine whether the doctrine of res
judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D.
497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).
addition, "[t]he standard for issuance of the
extraordinary and drastic remedy of a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction is very high .. . and by
now very well established." RCM Techs., Inc. v.
Beacon Hill Staffing Grp., LLC, 502 F.Supp.2d 70, 72-73
(D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A court considering a plaintiffs request for a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction must
examine whether: (1) there is a substantial likelihood
plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) plaintiff will be
irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; (3) an
injunction will substantially injure the other party; and (4)
the public interest will be furthered by an injunction.
Davenport v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO,
166 F.3d 356, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
instant TRO/PI motion, plaintiff seeks an order to stop
defendants United States of America, United States Postal
Service ("USPC"), and Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") "from hacking into all
of [his] electronic devices including the router." Mot.
at 3 [Dkt. # 3]. He fails sorely to demonstrate his
entitlement to any relief, let alone such extraordinary
injunctive relief. In the accompanying complaint, plaintiff
purports to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-80. He claims that this venue is
because the conspiracy was developed in this jurisdiction,
where the USPS with the cooperation of DEA architects
created, conspired, recruited participants, designed and
executed in the Defendants province of Washington, D.C. Plus
many of the violations such as stalking, harassment, fraud,
breach of contract, Constitutional, Color of law and Civil
Rights infractions occurred in this judicial district.
¶ 5. Plaintiff introduces his purported claims as
follows: "This civil complaint is a continuation of the
John Edmond Vs United States Postal Service case in which the
Washington D.C. Court of Appeals consisting of now United
States Supreme Court Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Jurists
Edwards and Silberstein ruled that Plaintiffs Edmond and
Lyles were kidnapped by USPS." Compl. ¶ 6. In more
than 50 paragraphs spanning 13 pages, plaintiff alleges a
myriad of wrongdoing by assorted entities that allegedly
conspired against him. Plaintiff alleges, among other things,
that "the coconspirators recruited Chase Bank employees
to violate Plaintiff Edmond by suspending his bank card
during June 2017 even though Edmond was and is current with
all payments[, ]" id. ¶ 7, that "the
federal agents have infiltrated all aspects of [his] privacy
[by] hacking into electronic devices which give them access
to all private conversations that they are not entitled to[,
]" and "[f]hen there's electronic harassment
consisting of but not limited to the federal agency opening
new accounts without authority, changing Google's
passwords, accessing PNC's Bank account to decline
overdraft protection [and] coconspirator the United States
Postal Service still intercepting mail[.]" Id.
premised on fantastic or delusional scenarios or supported
wholly by allegations lacking ''an arguable basis
either in law or in fact" are subject to dismissal as
frivolous. Neilzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989); see Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992) ("[A] finding of factual frivolousness is
appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible[.]"); Crisafi v.
Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("A court may dismiss as frivolous complaints . . .
postulating events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful
kind."). A significant portion of the instant complaint
satisfies the foregoing standard. Otherwise, the complaint is
"rambling, disjointed, incoherent, [and] full of. . .
confusing material" and thus "does not meet [Rule
8's] liberal pleading requirement." T.M. v.
D.C., 961 F.Supp.2d 169, 174 (D.D.C. 2013).
Consequently, this action will be dismissed. A separate order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
 In Edmond v. United States Postal
Service General Counsel,949 F.2d 415, 422 (D.C. Cir.
1991), the circuit court did not "rule" as
plaintiff suggests. Rather, in remanding plaintiffs case in
part to the district court, the court observed: "Even
the most passive listener could hardly have failed to hear
appellants' plea: in their own words, that they
were 'effectually kidnapped.' In short, they did
enough to state and preserve for ...