United States District Court, District of Columbia
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
appearing pro se, filed a complaint in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia solely against the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), which removed the
complaint to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1442(a) and 1446. Not. of Removal [Dkt. # 1]. In the tersely
worded complaint, plaintiff alleges that in November 2015,
staff at St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C., hit him
in his right eye, which was “injure[d]
already.” As a result, plaintiff seeks $25 million
in monetary damages. Compl. [Dkt. # 1-1 at 2].
is BOP's Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Dkt. # 6].
On September 27, 2017, plaintiff was ordered to respond to
defendant's motion by November 6, 2017, or face possible
dismissal of the case. See Order [Dkt. # 7].
Plaintiff has neither complied with the order nor requested
additional time to comply. Consistent with the advisements in
the order, the Court finds that plaintiff has conceded
defendant's arguments for dismissal and, for the reasons
explained below, agrees that dismissal is warranted under
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
and foremost, defendant argues correctly that dismissal is
necessitated by the derivative jurisdiction doctrine.
See Def.'s Mem. at 6-8 [Dkt. # 6-1]. Under that
doctrine, which “still applies to claims removed under
[§] 1442, . . . a federal court's jurisdiction must
‘mirror the jurisdiction that the state court had over
the action prior to removal.'” Johnson v. D.C.
Metro Transit Auth., 239 F.Supp.3d 293, 295 (D.D.C.
2017) (quoting Merkulov v. United States Park
Police, 75 F.Supp.3d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2014) (other
citation omitted)). If the state court never had jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the parties, the federal court
cannot “acquire jurisdiction, ” even if it could
have “in a like suit originally brought” in
federal court. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore &
O.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). Notwithstanding that
plaintiff has yet to allege facts implicating a federal
employee in the alleged misconduct, any personal injury claim
plaintiff may have against BOP for monetary damages must be
pursued under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”), which grants “exclusive
jurisdiction” of such claims in the federal district
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); see id. §
2679(a) (“the remedies provided [under the FTCA] shall
be exclusive”). As a result, this Court lacks
jurisdiction over the removed case because D.C. Superior
Court “never acquired jurisdiction over either the
subject matter or the [BOP] as a United States agency.”
Johnson, 239 F.Supp.3d at 296.
this action had originated in this Court, BOP argues
correctly that subject matter jurisdiction still is lacking
because plaintiff has not pursued, let alone exhausted, his
administrative remedies under the FTCA. See
Def.'s Mem. at 8-9 (citing Decl. of Richard J. Hansford
¶¶ 5-6 [Dkt. 6-2]). Under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, “the United States may not be sued without
its consent and . . . the existence of consent is a
prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). Such consent may not
be implied, but must be “unequivocally
expressed.” United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The FTCA waives the United
States' immunity under limited circumstances. It states:
“[a]n action shall not be instituted [under the FTCA]
unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to
the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been
finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified
or registered mail, ” or unless the agency has failed
to render a “final disposition of a claim within six
months after it is filed, ” which then is “deemed
a final denial of the claim[.]” 28 U.S.C. §
2675(a). It is established in this circuit that an FTCA claim
not previously presented to the appropriate agency is barred
on “jurisdictional” grounds. Ali v.
Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); see Simpkins v.
District of Columbia Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (“This court and the other courts of appeals
have treated the FTCA's requirement of filing an
administrative complaint with the appropriate agency prior to
instituting an action as jurisdictional.”) (citation
omitted)). And “[w]ith the case in this posture, the
court could no more rule in favor of the government than
against it.” Simpkins, 108 F.3d at 371.
Accordingly, the Court will grant defendant's motion to
dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction and will
dismiss the case without prejudice. A separate order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
 In contrast to the federal entity sued
in this case, St. Elizabeths Hospital is an entity of the
District of Columbia Department of Behavioral Health, see
cannot be sued in its own name. See Univ. Legal Servs.,
Inc. v. St. Elizabeths Hosp., 2005 WL 3275915, at *6
(D.D.C. July 22, 2005) (dismissing action against ...