United States District Court, District of Columbia
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge
case returns to the Court on remand from the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
(“D.C. Circuit”), with instructions to consider
whether Plaintiff's lawsuit can go forward under Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”). The gravamen of Plaintiff's
Complaint in this case is that he was treated unfairly when
his employment as a security guard with the Defendant,
AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC
(“AlliedBarton”), was terminated. He also
complains about various other issues both pre- and
post-dating his termination. Plaintiff initially brought his
case as one for breach of contract under District of Columbia
law, which the Court dismissed because it was preempted by
the Section 301 of the LMRA. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the
Court's decision in-part, in that it agreed that
Plaintiff's state law claims were preempted. However, the
D.C. Circuit remanded the case for this Court to decide
whether Plaintiff's pleadings could be viewed as stating
a claim under Section 301.
before the Court is Defendant's  Second Motion to
Dismiss. Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a
claim under Section 301 because any such claim would be
untimely. The Court agrees. Plaintiff's allegations,
although somewhat difficult to understand, are best
characterized as asserting what is known as a “hybrid
§ 301/fair representation claim.” A six month
statute of limitations applies to such a claim, and
Plaintiff's Complaint was filed far outside of this
statutory period. Accordingly, upon consideration of the
pleadings, the relevant legal authorities, and the
record for purposes of this motion, the Court GRANTS
Defendant's Motion and once again DISMISSES this case.
Factual Allegations in Plaintiff's Pre-Remand
Court begins by recounting the allegations in Plaintiff's
pleadings as they existed before the remand in this case. For
the purposes of the currently-pending motion, the Court
accepts as true the well-pleaded allegations in
Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court does “not accept
as true, however, the plaintiff's legal conclusions or
inferences that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”
Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758
F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Further, because Plaintiff
proceeds in this matter pro se, the Court must
consider not only the facts alleged in Plaintiff's
Complaint, but also the facts alleged in the various other
documents Plaintiff has filed thus far in this case. See
Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“a district court errs in failing to
consider a pro se litigant's complaint ‘in
light of' all filings, including filings responsive to a
motion to dismiss”) (quoting Richardson v. United
States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999));
Fillmore v. AT & T Mobility Servs. LLC, 140
F.Supp.3d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2015) (“the Court, as it must in
a case brought by a pro se plaintiff, considers the
facts as alleged in both the Complaint and Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.”).
Court noted in its November 15, 2016 Memorandum Opinion,
Plaintiff's allegations are not a model of clarity.
Nonetheless, the Court can discern the following: Plaintiff
was hired by Defendant as a security officer in 2012.
See Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.
15, at 4. Before being employed by Defendant, Plaintiff
worked for a company called U.S. Security Associates Inc.
Id. While working for U.S. Security, Plaintiff
complained to his superiors, including a Major Jenkins, that
assignments were not being made on the basis of
employees' seniority. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also
complained about his superiors' refusal to allow
Plaintiff to see the company's “seniority list,
” which Plaintiff alleges must be given to a new
contractor within ten days when a contract changes hands.
Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges that his superiors
retaliated against him for making these complaints.
being hired by Defendant in 2012, Plaintiff was stationed at
Johnson Middle School in Washington D.C. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff alleges that Major Jenkins was responsible for this
placement, and that she placed Plaintiff there in retaliation
for Plaintiff's previous complaints while at U.S.
Security. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that this
placement was wrongful because his seniority demanded that he
be given a better assignment. Id.
2013, Plaintiff was fired for allowing an unauthorized
individual to enter the school. Id. at 4. Plaintiff
alleges that his termination was wrongful because the
individual was a parent of one of the students at the school
and therefore authorized to enter. Id. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant lied on a disciplinary form that
states that Plaintiff allowed an unauthorized person on to
school premises. Id. at 4, 6. Plaintiff also takes
issue with the fact that the disciplinary form was unsigned.
Id. at 6.
suggests that these actions violated a number of policies or
documents. Primarily, Plaintiff refers to a
“disciplinary policy” or “progressive
disciplinary policy” and a “Dos and
Don'ts” list prepared by a company hired by
Defendant to handle employment issues. Id. at 3, 6.
has indicated that he filed a grievance against AlliedBarton
with his union, the Service Employees International Union
(“SEIU”), based on the above allegations, but
that the SEIU refused to arbitrate his claims because it
determined that they lacked merit. See Pl.'s
Suppl. Brief, ECF No. 22, at 1. Plaintiff appealed this
decision, but his appeal was denied. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff apparently then filed a charge with the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), challenging the
SEIU's refusal to arbitrate against AlliedBarton.
Plaintiff has attached to one of his pleadings a letter from
the NLRB denying Plaintiff's appeal from a Regional
Director's refusal to issue a complaint asserting that
the SEIU failed to fairly represent him in the processing of
his grievance. Id. at 8.
Dismissal, Remand and Subsequent Pleadings
30, 2016, Defendant moved to dismiss this case on the grounds
that Plaintiff's claim, which was styled as one for
breach of contract under District of Columbia law, was
completely preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. See
Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 6. On November 15, 2016,
the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting
Defendant's motion and dismissing this case. See
Nov. 15, 2016 Mem. Op. and Order, ECF Nos. 23, 24. The Court
found that Plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by
Section 301 because they were not meaningfully independent of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that
was in place between the SEIU and AlliedBarton during
Plaintiff's employment. See Berry v. Coastal
Int'l Sec., Inc., 968 F.Supp.2d 104, 110 (D.D.C.
2013) (“section 301 completely preempts any action
predicated on state law if that action is either: (1) founded
upon rights created by a collective bargaining agreement; or
(2) substantially dependent upon analysis of that
August 2, 2017, the D.C. Circuit affirmed-in-part this
Court's Order dismissing this case, in that it held that
the Court correctly concluded that Plaintiff's state law
claims were preempted by the LMRA because they depended on
the meaning of the CBA. See Washington v. AlliedBarton
Sec. Servs., LLC, No. 16-7147, 2017 WL 4180147 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 2, 2017). Accordingly, the court held that
“appellant's claims must be brought, if at all,
under Section 301.” Id. The D.C. Circuit
ordered that this case be remanded to determine whether
Plaintiff's pleadings could be viewed as stating a claim
under that statute. Id. Because Plaintiff's
Complaint asserted a state law cause of action for breach of
contract, and Plaintiff had not previously asserted a claim